The Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates has required UAE lenders with exposure to feuding Al Saad Group and Ahmad Hamad al Gosaibi & Brothers to increase their loan loss provisions from 50 to 80 percent. The requirement issued in a circular to all UAE lenders is designed to protect UAE financial institutions from a worst case fallout of the dispute between the two groups.
"All these provisions must be by the end of 2010 and the Central Bank's approval of the banks' annual audited results are conditional on the allocation of those provisions," UAE Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser al-Suweidi said in the circular.
The circular comes a year after the Central Bank ordered lenders to raise provisions related to Al Saad and Al Ghosaibi to 50 percent. It follows press reports that Saad had offered Kuwaiti lenders a settlement based on payment of $0.20 for each dollar the group owes. The press reports said lenders were negotiating for up to $0.40 on the dollar.
The Central Bank circular asked banks to maintain their 100 percent provisions Saad Group’s Bahrain-based Awal Bank and Al Gosaibi’s The International Banking Corp (TIBC) that were taken over by the Bahraini central bank last year. The difference is provisioning ratios reflects the Central Bank’s assessment of exposure by UAE lenders to those entities and the likelihood that lenders will be able to recover their outstanding loans.
Defaults on loans by Awal Bank TIBC set off a bitter legal battle on three continents between the two groups that are related by Saad Group’s Maan al Sanea’s marriage to a daughter of the Al-Ghosaibi family. Al-Gosaibi has accused Al-Sanea in court filings on three continents of siphoning off $10 billion from his in-laws.
Al Gosaibi is seeking to recover $9.2 billion in lawsuits in the Cayman Islands against al-Sanea and Awal subsidiaries. Court proceedings involving Awal are also ongoing in the United States, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Britain.
A Chapter 11 filing by Awal in New York has suggested that the bank may file for liquidation in Bahrain. According to its court filing, Awal has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Under Bahrain law, the administrator has until the summer of 2011 to decide whether to liquidate Awal or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
Monday, December 27, 2010
Friday, December 10, 2010
Judicial Reform in Saudi Arabia: A Battle of the Fatwas
Qantara
A spate of recent religious opinions and court rulings ranging from the bizarre to endorsement of mutilation issued by prominent Saudi sheikhs and judges highlight the difficulty King Abdullah faces in clamping down on fatwas and codifying the kingdom's largely unwritten Islamic legal regulations. James M. Dorsey reports
In response to disputed religious opinions and court rulings in Saudi Arabia, king Abdullah has intervened repeatedly in recent months to ensure that none of the more outrageous legal opinions and rulings were implemented and has curtailed media access of their authors.
In doing so, Abdullah appears to be gaining the upper hand in his battle to push through sweeping legal reform and codification of Saudi law needed to meet World Trade Organization and human rights standards, encourage foreign investment, standardize legal practice and grant courts enforcement powers.
Restructuring of the court system
Abdullah recently won a major victory when the kingdom's top religious body endorsed his reform and codification proposals. Abdullah also decreed that only members of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars were authorized to issue fatwas in a bid to halt religious rulings that embarrass the kingdom. Abdullah last year removed Sheikh Saleh al Luheidan from his post as head of the Supreme Judicial Council because the ultraconservative cleric was obstructing implementation of the king's proposed restructuring of the court system.
Lawyers and analysts say the recent spate of controversial fatwas constitute an attempt to thwart Abdullah's efforts by his opponents within the royal family and conservative clerics who fear that they could undermine Saudi Arabia's puritan interpretation of Islamic law as well as the independence of judges by making them adhere to written rules and regulations. "The traditional establishment is by nature against these reforms. So it's going to take time to implement them," said Riyadh-based lawyer Ibrahim al-Modaimeegh.
Opposition to the principle of retribution
In the latest ruling sparking international concern, Saudi judge Sheikh Saud Al-Yousef ordered a man to be paralyzed in retribution for injuries he allegedly caused with a meat cleaver during a fight two years before the verdict. Applying the principle of 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth', the judge ruled that the man should be injured at the same place on his spinal cord to cause identical crippling damage to what he inflicted on his victim, 22-year-old Abdul-Aziz al-Mitairy.
Al-Mitairy had petitioned the court in the town of Tabuk to replace its sentencing of his attacker to seven months in prison with an equivalent punishment in accordance with the Islamic principle of qisas, or retribution. Past Saudi applications of qisas have involved eye-gouging, tooth extraction, and death in cases involving murder. Two Saudi hospitals, including Riyadh's prestigious King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center, rejected the judge's request that they implement his ruling.
In a statement condemning the ruling, Amnesty International said another hospital had advised the judge that it was medically possible to administer to the perpetrator an injury identical to the one that he caused. "Under international human rights law, the use of this sentence would constitute a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," the statement said, suggesting that the court instead imprison, fine or flog the condemned man.
In response, officials say Abdullah persuaded Al-Yousef to deny that he had seriously considered ordering the mutilation. Al Riyadh newspaper quoted the judge as saying that "the proceedings in this case are still pending and no verdict had been issued in that regard." Al-Yousef said the court had queried hospitals and other authorities about surgical paralysis in order to convince the plaintiff that it would be impossible to carry out such a medical procedure. "The plaintiff was demanding punishment of the attacker, and the judicial ruling in this case only includes the plaintiff's eligibility for blood money," Al-Yousef said.
The hot and curious issue of gender mixing
At about the same time, Saudi authorities pulled on Abdullah's instructions the plug on the daily radio program of Sheikh Abdel Mohsen Obeikan, a cleric and royal court adviser who earlier this year earned notoriety by decreeing that women could give men breast milk to avoid illicit gender mixing. "The man should take the milk, but not directly from the breast of the woman," Obeikan was quoted. "He should drink it and then becomes a relative of the family, a fact that allows him to come in contact with the women without breaking Islam's rules about mixing." Islamic tradition stipulates that breastfeeding establishes a degree of maternal bond, even if a woman breast feeds a child who is not her own.
In a separate incident, the kingdom's most senior religious scholar, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheik, ordered a preacher to shut up after he issued a fatwa calling for a boycott of the Panda supermarket chain because it employs women as cashiers. The fatwa forced the chain to reassign 11 of its 16 female cashiers who were part of a pilot project to employ females in a country where women are prevented from working in gender mixed environments, according to Panda spokesman Tarik Ismail.
The preacher, Sheikh Yousuf Ahmad, known for his strident opposition to gender mixing, had earlier suggested that only Muslim maids could work in Saudi homes. He also called for the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam's holiest site and the world's largest mosque, to be demolished and rebuilt to ensure segregation between the sexes in the shrine.
The Islamic Affairs Ministry, in a further curtailing of clerical power, ordered clerics to keep their Friday sermons short and smart. Azam Shewair, a ministry official, warned clerics they would face punishment if they didn't trim their speeches, including forced training or having their paychecks docked. Shewair said clergymen needed to keep in mind that elderly or sick worshipers may not be able to sit and listen to hour-long speeches filled with their words of wisdom.
New sources of legitimacy
A debate on the ministerial edict in the Saudi Gazette suggests a generational divide among Saudi religious scholars with older clerics displaying contempt for their younger colleagues whom they dismiss as a bunch of uneducated rabble who need to be cut down to size. "The impact of the sermon is not measured by its length but by the eloquent, concise and precise wording," said Saleh Humaid, a ranking cleric. "Imams should refrain from flowery and bombastic language and delve directly into the core of their sermon."
Another scholar accused some clergy of copying and pasting Friday sermons from books or the Internet and reading them out loud without even understanding what they're saying. Yet others suggested that clerics needed to improve their writing skills. "Some of them elaborate on the topic by repeating themselves and going around in circles," Ahmad Mawrai, a Saudi professor, told the Gazette. "In many cases they jump from one topic to another. This is why their sermons are tedious and boring."
The debate over the rules that govern the issuing of fatwas reflects King Abdullah's recognition and a growing body of public opinion that Wahhabisim, the kingdom's puritan version of Islam, hinders the development of a modern state capable of competing in the 21st century and catering to people's needs. Five years ago, bizarre and obscure fatwas would have been seriously debated rather than ridiculed and condemned.
Many Saudi clergymen have yet to recognize that Abdullah's legal reform offers them an opportunity to consolidate their influence. Yet, they seem more intent on scoring own goals that undermine their public credibility and ultimately could signal the decline of clerical power in Saudi Arabia. In doing so, the clergy could be opening the door for the House of Saud to identify new sources of legitimacy that go beyond their historical reliance on Wahhabism.
A spate of recent religious opinions and court rulings ranging from the bizarre to endorsement of mutilation issued by prominent Saudi sheikhs and judges highlight the difficulty King Abdullah faces in clamping down on fatwas and codifying the kingdom's largely unwritten Islamic legal regulations. James M. Dorsey reports
In response to disputed religious opinions and court rulings in Saudi Arabia, king Abdullah has intervened repeatedly in recent months to ensure that none of the more outrageous legal opinions and rulings were implemented and has curtailed media access of their authors.
In doing so, Abdullah appears to be gaining the upper hand in his battle to push through sweeping legal reform and codification of Saudi law needed to meet World Trade Organization and human rights standards, encourage foreign investment, standardize legal practice and grant courts enforcement powers.
Restructuring of the court system
Abdullah recently won a major victory when the kingdom's top religious body endorsed his reform and codification proposals. Abdullah also decreed that only members of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars were authorized to issue fatwas in a bid to halt religious rulings that embarrass the kingdom. Abdullah last year removed Sheikh Saleh al Luheidan from his post as head of the Supreme Judicial Council because the ultraconservative cleric was obstructing implementation of the king's proposed restructuring of the court system.
Lawyers and analysts say the recent spate of controversial fatwas constitute an attempt to thwart Abdullah's efforts by his opponents within the royal family and conservative clerics who fear that they could undermine Saudi Arabia's puritan interpretation of Islamic law as well as the independence of judges by making them adhere to written rules and regulations. "The traditional establishment is by nature against these reforms. So it's going to take time to implement them," said Riyadh-based lawyer Ibrahim al-Modaimeegh.
Opposition to the principle of retribution
In the latest ruling sparking international concern, Saudi judge Sheikh Saud Al-Yousef ordered a man to be paralyzed in retribution for injuries he allegedly caused with a meat cleaver during a fight two years before the verdict. Applying the principle of 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth', the judge ruled that the man should be injured at the same place on his spinal cord to cause identical crippling damage to what he inflicted on his victim, 22-year-old Abdul-Aziz al-Mitairy.
Al-Mitairy had petitioned the court in the town of Tabuk to replace its sentencing of his attacker to seven months in prison with an equivalent punishment in accordance with the Islamic principle of qisas, or retribution. Past Saudi applications of qisas have involved eye-gouging, tooth extraction, and death in cases involving murder. Two Saudi hospitals, including Riyadh's prestigious King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center, rejected the judge's request that they implement his ruling.
In a statement condemning the ruling, Amnesty International said another hospital had advised the judge that it was medically possible to administer to the perpetrator an injury identical to the one that he caused. "Under international human rights law, the use of this sentence would constitute a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," the statement said, suggesting that the court instead imprison, fine or flog the condemned man.
In response, officials say Abdullah persuaded Al-Yousef to deny that he had seriously considered ordering the mutilation. Al Riyadh newspaper quoted the judge as saying that "the proceedings in this case are still pending and no verdict had been issued in that regard." Al-Yousef said the court had queried hospitals and other authorities about surgical paralysis in order to convince the plaintiff that it would be impossible to carry out such a medical procedure. "The plaintiff was demanding punishment of the attacker, and the judicial ruling in this case only includes the plaintiff's eligibility for blood money," Al-Yousef said.
The hot and curious issue of gender mixing
At about the same time, Saudi authorities pulled on Abdullah's instructions the plug on the daily radio program of Sheikh Abdel Mohsen Obeikan, a cleric and royal court adviser who earlier this year earned notoriety by decreeing that women could give men breast milk to avoid illicit gender mixing. "The man should take the milk, but not directly from the breast of the woman," Obeikan was quoted. "He should drink it and then becomes a relative of the family, a fact that allows him to come in contact with the women without breaking Islam's rules about mixing." Islamic tradition stipulates that breastfeeding establishes a degree of maternal bond, even if a woman breast feeds a child who is not her own.
In a separate incident, the kingdom's most senior religious scholar, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheik, ordered a preacher to shut up after he issued a fatwa calling for a boycott of the Panda supermarket chain because it employs women as cashiers. The fatwa forced the chain to reassign 11 of its 16 female cashiers who were part of a pilot project to employ females in a country where women are prevented from working in gender mixed environments, according to Panda spokesman Tarik Ismail.
The preacher, Sheikh Yousuf Ahmad, known for his strident opposition to gender mixing, had earlier suggested that only Muslim maids could work in Saudi homes. He also called for the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam's holiest site and the world's largest mosque, to be demolished and rebuilt to ensure segregation between the sexes in the shrine.
The Islamic Affairs Ministry, in a further curtailing of clerical power, ordered clerics to keep their Friday sermons short and smart. Azam Shewair, a ministry official, warned clerics they would face punishment if they didn't trim their speeches, including forced training or having their paychecks docked. Shewair said clergymen needed to keep in mind that elderly or sick worshipers may not be able to sit and listen to hour-long speeches filled with their words of wisdom.
New sources of legitimacy
A debate on the ministerial edict in the Saudi Gazette suggests a generational divide among Saudi religious scholars with older clerics displaying contempt for their younger colleagues whom they dismiss as a bunch of uneducated rabble who need to be cut down to size. "The impact of the sermon is not measured by its length but by the eloquent, concise and precise wording," said Saleh Humaid, a ranking cleric. "Imams should refrain from flowery and bombastic language and delve directly into the core of their sermon."
Another scholar accused some clergy of copying and pasting Friday sermons from books or the Internet and reading them out loud without even understanding what they're saying. Yet others suggested that clerics needed to improve their writing skills. "Some of them elaborate on the topic by repeating themselves and going around in circles," Ahmad Mawrai, a Saudi professor, told the Gazette. "In many cases they jump from one topic to another. This is why their sermons are tedious and boring."
The debate over the rules that govern the issuing of fatwas reflects King Abdullah's recognition and a growing body of public opinion that Wahhabisim, the kingdom's puritan version of Islam, hinders the development of a modern state capable of competing in the 21st century and catering to people's needs. Five years ago, bizarre and obscure fatwas would have been seriously debated rather than ridiculed and condemned.
Many Saudi clergymen have yet to recognize that Abdullah's legal reform offers them an opportunity to consolidate their influence. Yet, they seem more intent on scoring own goals that undermine their public credibility and ultimately could signal the decline of clerical power in Saudi Arabia. In doing so, the clergy could be opening the door for the House of Saud to identify new sources of legitimacy that go beyond their historical reliance on Wahhabism.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
World Cup 2022: A Middle East Game Changer?
By James M. Dorsey
With its winning of the bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar may face both its greatest challenge and biggest opportunity in positioning itself as a maverick regional peacemaker and agent of change.
Soccer constitutes for Middle Eastern regimes a double-edged sword. Only soccer commands the kind of deep-seated emotion evoked by Islam. And in a world of predominantly repressive regimes, soccer together with Islam provides the only public space for pent-up anger and frustration. Managing the national, ethnic, religious and social fault lines that soccer in the Middle East highlights could make cooling down football stadia in temperatures of 50 degrees Celsius the least of Qatar’s worries.
A look at the Gulf Cup that ended in Aden on Sunday as well as Middle Eastern soccer’s walk up to this year’s World Cup in South Africa tells all. To many residents of southern Yemen, which united with the north in 1990, the Gulf Cup highlighted the very reasons why southerners support cessation. It also highlighted the effect of political control of the game by regimes bent on retaining power. To southerners, Yemen’s national team represented the country’s most powerful government-aligned tribes rather than the nation. That sense was reinforced by the fact that southerners were virtually excluded from participation in the organization of the cup.
The picture is no better elsewhere in the Middle East where spectators in Lebanon have been barred from soccer games since the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; Palestinians can’t compete because of Israeli travel restrictions; Iran and Iraq’s performance has been hampered by political interference; players on Egypt’s national team have to prove not only their soccer skills but also their religious devotion; and Saudi players struggle to maintain international standards because the government discourages players from joining foreign clubs. The world’s most violent derby between Cairo archrivals Al Ahly and Zamalek constitutes an epic struggle over nationalism, class and escapism. Women’s soccer is a continuous fight for its existence in a chauvinist, male dominated world in which women playing the game is at best controversial and at worst blasphemous.
If anyone can rise to the challenge a World Cup in the Middle East poses, it is Qatar, a maverick oil-rich Gulf state that maintains close ties to Islamic radicals while hosting a US military base and has rewritten the Middle East’s heavily controlled media landscape with Al Jazeera’s often no-holds barred reporting. Qatar’s successful bid could prove to be with FIFA President Sepp Blatter’s help the monkey wrench that forces Middle Eastern rulers to recognize opportunities offered by sports to manage the region's many fault lines.
The Middle East is riper than ever for a contribution by Blatter, who has successfully imposed his will on notoriously intransigent Middle Eastern leaders seeking to control the game. Take Middle East peace for example. Blatter could engineer Israel’s return to playing World Cup qualifying games in the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) against Middle Eastern teams rather than as it does against European squads in UEFA since the Arabs four decades ago forced its ouster from the AFC.
International tennis has paved the way for Blatter to force the issue. Three Israeli tennis players appeared this year at the ATP World Tour and World Tennis Association tournaments in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates despite the two countries’ formal ban on sports encounters with Israel and Israeli passport holders crossing their borders.
If Israel drew for example Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen or Iraq, governments would be hard pressed to prevent their teams from playing. Stopping their teams would cost their squads valuable points and reduce, if not eliminate, their chances of reaching the Asian and World Cup finals.
The teams would face censure from FIFA, which in turn could spark riots as soccer did in Tehran in 1998 and 2001. So deep-seated is soccer passion that governments would be acting at their own peril and would likely conclude that they have no alternative but to allow their teams to play Israel. By doing so, they would effectively recognize the Jewish state and offer Middle Eastern soccer fans a picture of Israelis that differs substantially from widespread preconceptions.
With its winning of the bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar may face both its greatest challenge and biggest opportunity in positioning itself as a maverick regional peacemaker and agent of change.
Soccer constitutes for Middle Eastern regimes a double-edged sword. Only soccer commands the kind of deep-seated emotion evoked by Islam. And in a world of predominantly repressive regimes, soccer together with Islam provides the only public space for pent-up anger and frustration. Managing the national, ethnic, religious and social fault lines that soccer in the Middle East highlights could make cooling down football stadia in temperatures of 50 degrees Celsius the least of Qatar’s worries.
A look at the Gulf Cup that ended in Aden on Sunday as well as Middle Eastern soccer’s walk up to this year’s World Cup in South Africa tells all. To many residents of southern Yemen, which united with the north in 1990, the Gulf Cup highlighted the very reasons why southerners support cessation. It also highlighted the effect of political control of the game by regimes bent on retaining power. To southerners, Yemen’s national team represented the country’s most powerful government-aligned tribes rather than the nation. That sense was reinforced by the fact that southerners were virtually excluded from participation in the organization of the cup.
The picture is no better elsewhere in the Middle East where spectators in Lebanon have been barred from soccer games since the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; Palestinians can’t compete because of Israeli travel restrictions; Iran and Iraq’s performance has been hampered by political interference; players on Egypt’s national team have to prove not only their soccer skills but also their religious devotion; and Saudi players struggle to maintain international standards because the government discourages players from joining foreign clubs. The world’s most violent derby between Cairo archrivals Al Ahly and Zamalek constitutes an epic struggle over nationalism, class and escapism. Women’s soccer is a continuous fight for its existence in a chauvinist, male dominated world in which women playing the game is at best controversial and at worst blasphemous.
If anyone can rise to the challenge a World Cup in the Middle East poses, it is Qatar, a maverick oil-rich Gulf state that maintains close ties to Islamic radicals while hosting a US military base and has rewritten the Middle East’s heavily controlled media landscape with Al Jazeera’s often no-holds barred reporting. Qatar’s successful bid could prove to be with FIFA President Sepp Blatter’s help the monkey wrench that forces Middle Eastern rulers to recognize opportunities offered by sports to manage the region's many fault lines.
The Middle East is riper than ever for a contribution by Blatter, who has successfully imposed his will on notoriously intransigent Middle Eastern leaders seeking to control the game. Take Middle East peace for example. Blatter could engineer Israel’s return to playing World Cup qualifying games in the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) against Middle Eastern teams rather than as it does against European squads in UEFA since the Arabs four decades ago forced its ouster from the AFC.
International tennis has paved the way for Blatter to force the issue. Three Israeli tennis players appeared this year at the ATP World Tour and World Tennis Association tournaments in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates despite the two countries’ formal ban on sports encounters with Israel and Israeli passport holders crossing their borders.
If Israel drew for example Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen or Iraq, governments would be hard pressed to prevent their teams from playing. Stopping their teams would cost their squads valuable points and reduce, if not eliminate, their chances of reaching the Asian and World Cup finals.
The teams would face censure from FIFA, which in turn could spark riots as soccer did in Tehran in 1998 and 2001. So deep-seated is soccer passion that governments would be acting at their own peril and would likely conclude that they have no alternative but to allow their teams to play Israel. By doing so, they would effectively recognize the Jewish state and offer Middle Eastern soccer fans a picture of Israelis that differs substantially from widespread preconceptions.
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Saudi Arabia Prepares to Hand Power to a Younger Generation
These are uncertain times for Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer and a key ally in the struggle against militant Islam. The conservative kingdom is balancing on the cuff of a change in leadership that threatens to introduce a period of volatility as the health of its most senior, octogenarian royals falters. At risk, is continued reform designed to curb the sharp ends of the kingdom’s puritan interpretation of Islam and create greater economic and social prospects and opportunity.
Fuelling the uncertainty is the fact that understanding the inner workings of the ruling royal family is akin to the art of reading tea leaves. That art is in high demand with 86-year old reformist King Abdullah recuperating in New York from an operation to relieve haematoma resulting from a prolapsed disc. Abdullah’s illness is not life-threatening, but has raised the spectre of a Saudi Arabia ruled by a succession of short-lived monarchs. The king’s medical treatment comes weeks after he appointed his son as commander of the National Guard, the Bedouin force responsible for the royal family’s security, and the return to the kingdom of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the United States who is a consummate dealmaker. Taken together, these developments suggest that Saudi Arabia’s ruling family may be preparing for a gradual transfer of power to its next generation.
The stakes for Saudi Arabia as well as its western allies are high. Concern focuses on whether Abdullah’s reforms intended to defeat militant Islam, liberalize the economy, reduce unemployment, fight corruption, limit the power of the conservative, religious establishment and reform the judiciary have taken sufficient root to survive his rule. The reforms challenge basic tenants of the powerful clergy’s puritan interpretation of Islam that coupled with the lack of economic opportunity creates a breeding ground for religious militants. Saud Arabia’s recent announcement of the arrest of 149 primarily Saudi members of Al Qaeda and revelations that the curriculum of some 40 Saudi schools in Britain and Ireland preach hatred, racism and incitement to violence underlines the urgency of continued reform in the kingdom.
In an absolute monarchy in which passes down the line of aging sons of King Abdulaziz, the kingdom’s founder, Abdullah’s most probable immediate successors are grappling with health issues of their own. 84-year old Crown Prince and Defence Minister Prince Sultan, returned to Saudi Arabia on the eve of Abdullah’s departure from a two-year absence due to illness. Their younger brother, Prince Nayef, the 76 year-old interior minister who is third in line, may not be healthy enough to fully take over the reins of power when his time comes. Nayef, moreover, is widely viewed as a hard line and conservative, raising questions about whether he would pursue reform with the same zeal as Abdullah.
Tension between Sultan and Nayef could well erupt in a post-Abdullah Saudi Arabia as the kingdom prepares to hand the reins to the next generation, Abdulaziz’s grandsons who may not be as amenable as their elders to compromise in the competition for power. Abdullah’s creation in 2006 of an Allegiance Council made up of Abdulaziz’s surviving sons and grandsons to confirm the nomination of crown princes was intended to formally involve the next generation in the succession process. It could well serve as a platform to fuel their ambitions.
The creation of the council signalled that Saudi leaders were envisioning the day on which power would pass to their sons. Abdullah reinforced this view by in November appointing Prince Mutaib, his 57-year old son to replace him as commander of the National Guard. In a country in which senior prince’s run their ministries as family fiefdoms, the appointment was widely seen as Abdullah emphasizing that it was time to start turning over power to the next generation and possibly kick starting changes in anticipation of a changing of the guard while at the same time reducing the risk of a power struggle within the family.
In this scenario, Prince Sultan would step down as defence minister in favour of Khalid bin Sultan, his deputy and son who gained prominence as commander of Arab forces during the 1991 expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. Critics hold Khalid responsible for tactical mistakes that caused higher than necessary Saudi casualties in fighting last year against rebels in Yemeni tribal areas bordering on the kingdom. Further change would involve the succession of ailing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal by his brother, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence who served as ambassador to Britain and then the United States. Similarly, Prince Nayef would is likely succeeded as interior minister by Prince Mohammed, his son and deputy minister who has earned praise for his leadership in battling the Islamists.
The envisioned changes leave open the question of who will ultimately emerge as the monarch to steer Saudi Arabia through continued reform designed to eradicate the grounds on which the militants feed and ensure that the economy can compete in the 21st century. For much of the past decade, reformers and Western officials saw the 74-year old long-standing governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, a full brother of Prince Nayef, as their preferred candidate. Recently, however, Prince Khalid al-Faisal, the 69-year old governor of Mecca, an accomplished poet and painter known for his friendship with Britain’s Prince Charles and his successful administration of the province of Asir, home to several of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, appears to be emerging as a compromise candidate.
All of this amounts to little more than reading tea leaves. The good news, however, is that Saudi Arabia’s most powerful princes appear determined to reduce the risk of volatility by seeking to ensure a smooth generational transition that would allow the kingdom to push ahead with the reforms needed to create a more open, competitive economy capable of offering Saudis prospects that compete with the dire alternative put forward by Islamist militants.
Fuelling the uncertainty is the fact that understanding the inner workings of the ruling royal family is akin to the art of reading tea leaves. That art is in high demand with 86-year old reformist King Abdullah recuperating in New York from an operation to relieve haematoma resulting from a prolapsed disc. Abdullah’s illness is not life-threatening, but has raised the spectre of a Saudi Arabia ruled by a succession of short-lived monarchs. The king’s medical treatment comes weeks after he appointed his son as commander of the National Guard, the Bedouin force responsible for the royal family’s security, and the return to the kingdom of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the United States who is a consummate dealmaker. Taken together, these developments suggest that Saudi Arabia’s ruling family may be preparing for a gradual transfer of power to its next generation.
The stakes for Saudi Arabia as well as its western allies are high. Concern focuses on whether Abdullah’s reforms intended to defeat militant Islam, liberalize the economy, reduce unemployment, fight corruption, limit the power of the conservative, religious establishment and reform the judiciary have taken sufficient root to survive his rule. The reforms challenge basic tenants of the powerful clergy’s puritan interpretation of Islam that coupled with the lack of economic opportunity creates a breeding ground for religious militants. Saud Arabia’s recent announcement of the arrest of 149 primarily Saudi members of Al Qaeda and revelations that the curriculum of some 40 Saudi schools in Britain and Ireland preach hatred, racism and incitement to violence underlines the urgency of continued reform in the kingdom.
In an absolute monarchy in which passes down the line of aging sons of King Abdulaziz, the kingdom’s founder, Abdullah’s most probable immediate successors are grappling with health issues of their own. 84-year old Crown Prince and Defence Minister Prince Sultan, returned to Saudi Arabia on the eve of Abdullah’s departure from a two-year absence due to illness. Their younger brother, Prince Nayef, the 76 year-old interior minister who is third in line, may not be healthy enough to fully take over the reins of power when his time comes. Nayef, moreover, is widely viewed as a hard line and conservative, raising questions about whether he would pursue reform with the same zeal as Abdullah.
Tension between Sultan and Nayef could well erupt in a post-Abdullah Saudi Arabia as the kingdom prepares to hand the reins to the next generation, Abdulaziz’s grandsons who may not be as amenable as their elders to compromise in the competition for power. Abdullah’s creation in 2006 of an Allegiance Council made up of Abdulaziz’s surviving sons and grandsons to confirm the nomination of crown princes was intended to formally involve the next generation in the succession process. It could well serve as a platform to fuel their ambitions.
The creation of the council signalled that Saudi leaders were envisioning the day on which power would pass to their sons. Abdullah reinforced this view by in November appointing Prince Mutaib, his 57-year old son to replace him as commander of the National Guard. In a country in which senior prince’s run their ministries as family fiefdoms, the appointment was widely seen as Abdullah emphasizing that it was time to start turning over power to the next generation and possibly kick starting changes in anticipation of a changing of the guard while at the same time reducing the risk of a power struggle within the family.
In this scenario, Prince Sultan would step down as defence minister in favour of Khalid bin Sultan, his deputy and son who gained prominence as commander of Arab forces during the 1991 expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. Critics hold Khalid responsible for tactical mistakes that caused higher than necessary Saudi casualties in fighting last year against rebels in Yemeni tribal areas bordering on the kingdom. Further change would involve the succession of ailing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal by his brother, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence who served as ambassador to Britain and then the United States. Similarly, Prince Nayef would is likely succeeded as interior minister by Prince Mohammed, his son and deputy minister who has earned praise for his leadership in battling the Islamists.
The envisioned changes leave open the question of who will ultimately emerge as the monarch to steer Saudi Arabia through continued reform designed to eradicate the grounds on which the militants feed and ensure that the economy can compete in the 21st century. For much of the past decade, reformers and Western officials saw the 74-year old long-standing governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, a full brother of Prince Nayef, as their preferred candidate. Recently, however, Prince Khalid al-Faisal, the 69-year old governor of Mecca, an accomplished poet and painter known for his friendship with Britain’s Prince Charles and his successful administration of the province of Asir, home to several of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, appears to be emerging as a compromise candidate.
All of this amounts to little more than reading tea leaves. The good news, however, is that Saudi Arabia’s most powerful princes appear determined to reduce the risk of volatility by seeking to ensure a smooth generational transition that would allow the kingdom to push ahead with the reforms needed to create a more open, competitive economy capable of offering Saudis prospects that compete with the dire alternative put forward by Islamist militants.
Friday, November 26, 2010
Elections in Egypt to test Western commitment to democracy
By James M. Dorsey
Deutsche Welle
Egyptians head to the polls on November 28 to vote for their next parliament amid criticism of systematic repression. Will Western nations step up their support for political reform or simply stand on the sidelines?
The parliamentary elections in Egypt are shaping up to be as much an indication of US and European commitment to human rights and democracy as they are a dress rehearsal for next year's Egyptian presidential election.
Michele Dunne, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said people in Egypt and other Arab countries were watching the West closely to see to what extent they press for free and fair elections in the Arab world's most populous country.
"They will take that as a sign of whether the US and Europe are serious about these issues or whether they have relegated them to the sidelines," Dunne said.
For much of the past year, the US and the European Union have largely been quiet about the deterioration of human rights and prospects for real democracy in Egypt. These issues were glaringly absent from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's agenda when she met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit earlier this month in Washington. Similarly, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's poor human rights and democracy record has not figured prominently in recent high-level contacts between the EU and Egypt.
Crackdown on opposition
The western stance appears to have led Mubarak, in power since 1981, to conclude that he has a free hand in shaping the electoral process. For weeks, police and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition movement, have been clashing. The banned group controls a fifth of the seats in the present parliament by running candidates as independents.
According to Human Rights Watch, security forces have so far arrested over 1,300 Muslim Brotherhood members, including five candidates. The government has also shut down several independent media organizations.
"The regime is sending a message that there will be no election," said Mohamed Saad el-Katatni, the head of the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc.
Monitors? No, thank you
The US has, however, called for free and fair elections. Earlier this week, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley appealed to Egypt to allow peaceful political gatherings, open media coverage and admit international observers to the polls. The foreign ministry in Cairo countered in a statement that this constituted meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.
"The latest positions taken by the administration toward internal Egyptian affairs is something that is absolutely unacceptable," the foreign ministry said in the statement, quoting an unnamed official. "It is as if the United States has turned into a caretaker of how Egyptian society should conduct its own politics. Whoever thinks that this is possible is deluded."
The statement said Egypt would honor the tradition of mutual respect as long as the United States did the same.
The heated discussion over the Egyptian political scene is nothing new and has been going on for some 20 years, said Adel Iskandar, a professor at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. But it was crucial for the US and Europe to foster debate about democracy and human rights.
"The regime has taken two steps forward and five steps back," Iskandar said. "Instead of focusing on how much progress has been made, the debate should revolve around how little progress has been achieved."
Weighing the pros and cons
It is a fine line, though, considering the volatile, geo-strategic part of the world. Western governments fear that taking Egypt to task for its dismal democracy and human rights record could prompt Mubarak to withdraw support for the stumbling Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Egypt also supplies valuable logistics for allied military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Some analysts argue, however, that the long-term risks of the US and Europe being perceived as perpetuating authoritarian rule in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world could prove costlier than the short-term benefits of turning a blind eye to flagrant violations of human rights and democratic deficiencies.
But Edward Walker, a former US ambassador to Egypt, said changes were up to the Egyptian people.
"It is not something that the US can or should dictate, but neither should we be quiet about what we believe in," Walker said. "So I think it is appropriate for the administration to review what is going on."
In addition, western powers may just have more leverage than they assume. Analysts said Egypt had a vested interest in continued support of US policy in the greater Middle East.
The Arab nation would not backtrack on support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and risk US congressional favor for its substantial annual aid package. The government in Cairo uses much of the aid to strengthen its domestic security and ability to confront opposition groups. Putting that in jeopardy could spark unrest in the military concerned that it could lose its prerogatives at a time that Egypt is gearing up for a battle over who will succeed the country's octogenarian leader.
The government is also unlikely to risk its control of all US and European democracy and human rights assistance to Egyptian non-governmental organizations. It exercises that control through an agreement with donors that they will only fund NGOs, which are officially recognized and authorized by the government.
Pivotal presidential elections next year
This month's parliamentary polls are of only moderate importance compared to the presidential elections scheduled for next year that could change Egypt's political landscape, many US and European officials believe.
Speculation is rife about whether 82-year-old Mubarak, who is in poor health, will run for a sixth six-year term or whether he will push his banker son Gamal or his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as his successor. Even if Mubarak does opt for reelection, it is unlikely that he would be able to serve another full term.
Proponents of a more assertive American and European stance said the time will then be ripe to address Egypt's human rights record and stifling of democratic development.
By publicly focusing on the issue, the US and the EU would shape debate in Egypt prior to a changing of the guard along the Nile, encourage democracy and human rights activists and alter widespread perception in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world that the United States favors authoritarian rule.
Deutsche Welle
Egyptians head to the polls on November 28 to vote for their next parliament amid criticism of systematic repression. Will Western nations step up their support for political reform or simply stand on the sidelines?
The parliamentary elections in Egypt are shaping up to be as much an indication of US and European commitment to human rights and democracy as they are a dress rehearsal for next year's Egyptian presidential election.
Michele Dunne, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said people in Egypt and other Arab countries were watching the West closely to see to what extent they press for free and fair elections in the Arab world's most populous country.
"They will take that as a sign of whether the US and Europe are serious about these issues or whether they have relegated them to the sidelines," Dunne said.
For much of the past year, the US and the European Union have largely been quiet about the deterioration of human rights and prospects for real democracy in Egypt. These issues were glaringly absent from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's agenda when she met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit earlier this month in Washington. Similarly, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's poor human rights and democracy record has not figured prominently in recent high-level contacts between the EU and Egypt.
Crackdown on opposition
The western stance appears to have led Mubarak, in power since 1981, to conclude that he has a free hand in shaping the electoral process. For weeks, police and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition movement, have been clashing. The banned group controls a fifth of the seats in the present parliament by running candidates as independents.
According to Human Rights Watch, security forces have so far arrested over 1,300 Muslim Brotherhood members, including five candidates. The government has also shut down several independent media organizations.
"The regime is sending a message that there will be no election," said Mohamed Saad el-Katatni, the head of the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc.
Monitors? No, thank you
The US has, however, called for free and fair elections. Earlier this week, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley appealed to Egypt to allow peaceful political gatherings, open media coverage and admit international observers to the polls. The foreign ministry in Cairo countered in a statement that this constituted meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.
"The latest positions taken by the administration toward internal Egyptian affairs is something that is absolutely unacceptable," the foreign ministry said in the statement, quoting an unnamed official. "It is as if the United States has turned into a caretaker of how Egyptian society should conduct its own politics. Whoever thinks that this is possible is deluded."
The statement said Egypt would honor the tradition of mutual respect as long as the United States did the same.
The heated discussion over the Egyptian political scene is nothing new and has been going on for some 20 years, said Adel Iskandar, a professor at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. But it was crucial for the US and Europe to foster debate about democracy and human rights.
"The regime has taken two steps forward and five steps back," Iskandar said. "Instead of focusing on how much progress has been made, the debate should revolve around how little progress has been achieved."
Weighing the pros and cons
It is a fine line, though, considering the volatile, geo-strategic part of the world. Western governments fear that taking Egypt to task for its dismal democracy and human rights record could prompt Mubarak to withdraw support for the stumbling Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Egypt also supplies valuable logistics for allied military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Some analysts argue, however, that the long-term risks of the US and Europe being perceived as perpetuating authoritarian rule in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world could prove costlier than the short-term benefits of turning a blind eye to flagrant violations of human rights and democratic deficiencies.
But Edward Walker, a former US ambassador to Egypt, said changes were up to the Egyptian people.
"It is not something that the US can or should dictate, but neither should we be quiet about what we believe in," Walker said. "So I think it is appropriate for the administration to review what is going on."
In addition, western powers may just have more leverage than they assume. Analysts said Egypt had a vested interest in continued support of US policy in the greater Middle East.
The Arab nation would not backtrack on support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and risk US congressional favor for its substantial annual aid package. The government in Cairo uses much of the aid to strengthen its domestic security and ability to confront opposition groups. Putting that in jeopardy could spark unrest in the military concerned that it could lose its prerogatives at a time that Egypt is gearing up for a battle over who will succeed the country's octogenarian leader.
The government is also unlikely to risk its control of all US and European democracy and human rights assistance to Egyptian non-governmental organizations. It exercises that control through an agreement with donors that they will only fund NGOs, which are officially recognized and authorized by the government.
Pivotal presidential elections next year
This month's parliamentary polls are of only moderate importance compared to the presidential elections scheduled for next year that could change Egypt's political landscape, many US and European officials believe.
Speculation is rife about whether 82-year-old Mubarak, who is in poor health, will run for a sixth six-year term or whether he will push his banker son Gamal or his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as his successor. Even if Mubarak does opt for reelection, it is unlikely that he would be able to serve another full term.
Proponents of a more assertive American and European stance said the time will then be ripe to address Egypt's human rights record and stifling of democratic development.
By publicly focusing on the issue, the US and the EU would shape debate in Egypt prior to a changing of the guard along the Nile, encourage democracy and human rights activists and alter widespread perception in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world that the United States favors authoritarian rule.
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
Rap and Metal on Planet Islam
The booming voice of pent-up Middle Eastern anger
James M. Dorsey from the December 2010 issue of Reason Magazine
Nabyl Guennouni, 30, is a heavy metal singer and band manager in Morocco. He also sits on a jury that selects rising talents to perform at Casablanca’s annual L’Boulevard des Jeunes Musiciens, a six-day extravaganza in two soccer stadiums that has become North Africa’s largest underground music festival, with some 160,000 visitors each year. This marks a dramatic change for Guennouni. When he and 13 other black-shirted, baseball-capped, middle-class headbangers tried to organize a music festival seven years ago, the police dragged them from their homes and charged them with wooing young Moroccans into Satanism, with a bonus count of promoting prostitution. Morocco’s legal system allows a maximum sentence of three years for such attempts to convert Muslims to another faith.
Egged on by conservative Islamist politicians, who six months earlier had doubled their number of seats in parliament, prosecutors produced as evidence against Guennouni fake skeletons and skulls, plaster cobras, a latex brain, T-shirts depicting the devil, and “a collection of diabolical CDs,” which they described as “un-Islamic” and “objects that breach morality.” In cross-examination, the government attorneys asked the defendants such questions as, “Why do you cut the throats of cats and drink their blood?” Al Attajdid, a conservative daily, depicted the musicians as part of a movement that “encourages all forms of delinquency, alcohol and licentiousness which are ignored by the authorities.” One of the trial judges maintained that “normal people go to concerts wearing suits and ties” and that it was “suspicious” that some of the musicians’ lyrics had been penned in English.
During the trial, some of the defendants recited sections of the Koran to prove they were good Muslims. It didn’t work. In a verdict that divided the nation, Guennouni was sentenced to one month in jail; the others received sentences ranging from six months to a year. Outside the courthouse, protesters organized concerts, waged an Internet campaign, and criticized King Muhammad VI for presiding over a travesty of justice.
Yet as dark as that moment was for Casablancan rockers, the trial was a turning point that set Morocco on a path to becoming one of the Arab world’s more liberal societies when it comes to accepting alternative lifestyles. A month after the sentencing, prosecutors, unnerved by the degree of popular support the musicians had attracted, urged an appeals court to overturn the verdicts. The appeals court acquitted 11 of the defendants and reduced the sentences of three others. The decision constituted a rare example of successful civic protest in the Arab world.
Weeks after the appeals court decision, Casablanca was rocked by a series of Islamist suicide bombings that killed 45 people. Musicians responded with a Metal Against Terrorism concert that boosted what Moroccans call Al Nayda, the Awakening, a movement for greater cultural freedom that is topped every year by the L’Boulevard festival. “We needed to channel the aspirations and frustrations of young people in Morocco,’ ” Guennouni tells me. “Al Nayda is a community of spirit,” adds Mohammed “Momo” Merhar, co-founder of the festival. “Moroccan youth was holding its breath for 40 years. A wind of freedom is blowing now, and creativity is exploding.”
Today L’Boulevard attracts metal, rap, and jazz performers from around the globe. King Muhammad donated $250,000 to the event last year. Marie Korpe, executive director of Freemuse, a Copenhagen-based organization funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that advocates freedom of expression for musicians and composers worldwide, notes that “as musicians push the boundaries of acceptable musical performance in their countries, it is clear that, wittingly or not, they are helping to open their cultures and potentially their political systems.”
With L’Boulevard, Morocco is doing something new in a part of the world where repression and censorship are the norm. The cultural awakening nonetheless operates within a narrow band in a country where human rights groups, independent media outlets, and critical artists continue to live a precarious existence. Moroccan radio stations, acting on government instructions, recently boycotted a collection of rap songs that was appropriately titled Forbidden on the Radio. Invincible Voice (I-Voice), a Beirut-based Palestinian duo that fuses hip-hop with classical Arab music, was forced to cancel an Arab world tour when Morocco and other Arab countries denied them visas. Yasin Qasem, a 21-year-old freelance sound engineer and half of I-Voice, was subsequently denied entry to lead a sound engineering workshop in Casablanca. Qasem and his partner, TNT, a.k.a. Mohammed Turk, a 20-year-old construction foreman whose songs lament the sorry state of political, cultural, and economic affairs in the Arab world, finally obtained visas for the United Arab Emirates to finish production of their upcoming album, only to be declined entry when they landed at the Dubai airport.
Across a swath of land stretching from Morocco’s Atlantic coast to the Persian Gulf, underground musicians are playing a continuous game of cat and mouse with authorities to evade harassment and arrest. Musicians in Iran endure forced haircuts, beatings in jail, and threats to their families. Egypt bans heavy metal from radio and television. Earlier this year, Islamist police stormed a crowded auditorium in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, where the hip-hop musicians B Boy Gaza had just started performing. “The show is over,” the officers announced before confiscating equipment and arresting six musicians, who were eventually released after signing a pledge not to hold further performances without police permission. The rapping Emirati brothers Salem and Abdullah Dahman have had their music banned in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia because their lyrics contrast the Arab world’s multiple problems with the glorious Muslim past. Last summer, police in the Saudi capital Riyadh broke up a metal concert in a residential compound attended by 500 mostly Saudi fans.
Civilian and religious authorities across the Middle East and North Africa have accused heavy metal musicians of threatening public order, undermining Islam, and performing the devil’s music. Metalheads are also singled out because of their music’s highly charged and often politically, socially, and sexually suggestive lyrics. As a result, their music flourishes mostly in underground clubs, basements, and private homes, and only occasionally on stage when a regime decides that banning a public performance is not worth the political risk.
Underground musicians pose a challenge to Middle Eastern and North African regimes because they often reflect in their lyrics pent-up anger and frustration about unemployment, corruption, and police tyranny. “We play heavy metal ’cause our lives are heavy metal,” says Reda Zine, one of the founders of the Moroccan headbanger scene.
With the growing realization that the region’s authoritarian regimes and controlled economies are unable to offer opportunity to their predominantly young populations, metal and rap have been elevated as channels to express discontent. Their role is enhanced by the Internet and other technologies for mass distribution that make government control difficult and allow musicians and their fans to carve out autonomous spaces that shield them from intrusion by censors and other cultural scolds.
In a recent report for Freemuse, Mark LeVine argues that music plays a role in the Middle East and North Africa similar to the role rock played in the velvet revolutions that toppled regimes in Eastern Europe. LeVine has a good vantage point for studying the subject: He is both a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of California at Irvine and a musician who has performed with the likes of Mick Jagger and Albert Collins. The struggle and success of underground music, he says, “reminds us of a past, and offers a model for the future, in which artists—if inadvertently at first—helped topple a seemingly impregnable system of rule.” LeVine describes underground musical communities as “avatars of change or struggles for greater social and political openness,” saying “they point out cracks in the facade of conformity that is crucial to keeping authoritarian or hierarchical and inegalitarian political systems in power.”
Nowhere is that more evident than in Iran, where all rock music is forced underground. Musicians risk harassment and imprisonment by a regime that frowns on all music and routinely tortures dissidents. In May 2009, a heavy metal concert in Shiraz was raided by an Islamist militia that arrested some 100 people on charges of consuming alcohol and worshiping the devil. Musicians are forced into exile or onto the Internet to carve out creative spaces of their own.
Coming under particular scrutiny are Iranian underground musicians who replicate American accents, indulge in obscene lyrics, and use female singers—all viewed as symbols of Western decadence by the authorities. Most CD shop owners refuse to sell underground music, fearing raids, imprisonment, and hefty fines. Concerts in private gatherings are often canceled because of threats from neighborhood vigilantes. Kalameh, an Iranian rapper, recently uploaded one of his latest songs to YouTube in response to the regime’s crackdown on the country’s reform movement: “This nation says No / Says NO to autocracy / Says NO to censorship / Says NO to sedition / Says NO to beating and killing / Says NO to injustice / Says NO to democracy / This constant pain of mine, emanates from being a human / Because one night, they stole my light of hope / If I stay silent, if I stay still / Who is gonna right? Who is gonna say? / If I leave it that way?”
Yet hip-hop’s lyrical style and heavy metal’s pounding beat may be natural fits in a world where poetry is a popular art form and praying often involves rhythm and bobbing. Some Muslim religious figures, particularly practitioners of more mystical forms of Islam, recognize an affinity with metal, even though some of the genre’s most popular forms in the region are its most extreme. “I don’t like heavy metal,” a Shiite cleric in Baghdad told LeVine. “Not because it’s irreligious or against Islam; but because I prefer other styles of music. But you know what? When we get together and pray loudly, with the drums beating fiercely, chanting and pumping our arms in the air, we’re doing heavy metal too.” Cyril Yarboudi of Lebanon’s Oath to Vanquish agrees. “You can practice your religion; you can go pray in a mosque and listen to metal,” he says. “What’s the problem?”
In a 1997 crackdown that put its stamp on much of the heavy metal scene in the Middle East and North Africa, police in Cairo arrested 100 heavy metal fans. The arrests followed publication of a photo from a metal concert allegedly showing someone carrying an upside-down cross. One newspaper reported that the house raided by the police was “filled with tattooed, devil-worshiping youths holding orgies, skinning cats, and writing their names in rats’ blood on the palace’s walls.”
Muslim and Christian clerics were up in arms. Cartoons in newspapers depicted scruffy, marijuana-smoking musicians with T-shirts emblazed with the Star of David who play guitar while being seduced by scantily dressed blond women. The musicians’ critics portrayed them as Zionist agents subverting Muslim society and blamed their emergence on a government that, in their view, was in cahoots with the Zionists in allowing Western culture to undermine Egypt’s social and religious values. Interestingly, this criticism was expressed by many in the underground music community as well. A broad segment of Egyptians, cutting across political, ideological, religious, and social fault lines, accuses the government of failing to effectively support the Palestinians, acquiescing in the Israeli control of Palestinian territories, and supporting unpopular U.S. policies in the region.
Emotions peaked when Sheikh Nasr Farid, Egypt’s mufti at the time, demanded that those arrested repent or face the death penalty for apostasy. In response, intimidated musicians and fans destroyed their guitars and shaved off their beards to avoid the worst. A decade later, many Egyptian musicians remain reluctant to publicly discuss their music or lyrics, even though government policy has become somewhat more relaxed. (The regime of President Hosni Mubarak is currently more concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood and dissident bloggers than it is about underground music.)
“You can’t get arrested for being a metalhead so easily now,” an Egyptian heavy metal fan tells me. “They can still stop you in the streets, or stop your car if you listen to very loud heavy music. But when it comes to arresting they can’t now unless you have some sort of drugs on you. It’s not that the law is more liberal now. Rather, it’s because the whole media is not so interested to know about us anymore.”
Morocco’s bow to popular pressure and Egypt’s recent shift of focus highlight a lesson most Arab regimes have yet to learn: The velvet glove is often more effective than the baton. The more mainstream underground music becomes and the less censorship it endures, the less socially and politically potent it may become.
But as long as there is discontent to be expressed, there will be musicians eager to channel it. Even if metal and hip-hop lose their bite, LeVine predicts, the “cultural avant-garde of youth culture will naturally search for other genres of music to express the anger, anxieties, and despair that originally made the music so powerful.”
James M. Dorsey from the December 2010 issue of Reason Magazine
Nabyl Guennouni, 30, is a heavy metal singer and band manager in Morocco. He also sits on a jury that selects rising talents to perform at Casablanca’s annual L’Boulevard des Jeunes Musiciens, a six-day extravaganza in two soccer stadiums that has become North Africa’s largest underground music festival, with some 160,000 visitors each year. This marks a dramatic change for Guennouni. When he and 13 other black-shirted, baseball-capped, middle-class headbangers tried to organize a music festival seven years ago, the police dragged them from their homes and charged them with wooing young Moroccans into Satanism, with a bonus count of promoting prostitution. Morocco’s legal system allows a maximum sentence of three years for such attempts to convert Muslims to another faith.
Egged on by conservative Islamist politicians, who six months earlier had doubled their number of seats in parliament, prosecutors produced as evidence against Guennouni fake skeletons and skulls, plaster cobras, a latex brain, T-shirts depicting the devil, and “a collection of diabolical CDs,” which they described as “un-Islamic” and “objects that breach morality.” In cross-examination, the government attorneys asked the defendants such questions as, “Why do you cut the throats of cats and drink their blood?” Al Attajdid, a conservative daily, depicted the musicians as part of a movement that “encourages all forms of delinquency, alcohol and licentiousness which are ignored by the authorities.” One of the trial judges maintained that “normal people go to concerts wearing suits and ties” and that it was “suspicious” that some of the musicians’ lyrics had been penned in English.
During the trial, some of the defendants recited sections of the Koran to prove they were good Muslims. It didn’t work. In a verdict that divided the nation, Guennouni was sentenced to one month in jail; the others received sentences ranging from six months to a year. Outside the courthouse, protesters organized concerts, waged an Internet campaign, and criticized King Muhammad VI for presiding over a travesty of justice.
Yet as dark as that moment was for Casablancan rockers, the trial was a turning point that set Morocco on a path to becoming one of the Arab world’s more liberal societies when it comes to accepting alternative lifestyles. A month after the sentencing, prosecutors, unnerved by the degree of popular support the musicians had attracted, urged an appeals court to overturn the verdicts. The appeals court acquitted 11 of the defendants and reduced the sentences of three others. The decision constituted a rare example of successful civic protest in the Arab world.
Weeks after the appeals court decision, Casablanca was rocked by a series of Islamist suicide bombings that killed 45 people. Musicians responded with a Metal Against Terrorism concert that boosted what Moroccans call Al Nayda, the Awakening, a movement for greater cultural freedom that is topped every year by the L’Boulevard festival. “We needed to channel the aspirations and frustrations of young people in Morocco,’ ” Guennouni tells me. “Al Nayda is a community of spirit,” adds Mohammed “Momo” Merhar, co-founder of the festival. “Moroccan youth was holding its breath for 40 years. A wind of freedom is blowing now, and creativity is exploding.”
Today L’Boulevard attracts metal, rap, and jazz performers from around the globe. King Muhammad donated $250,000 to the event last year. Marie Korpe, executive director of Freemuse, a Copenhagen-based organization funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that advocates freedom of expression for musicians and composers worldwide, notes that “as musicians push the boundaries of acceptable musical performance in their countries, it is clear that, wittingly or not, they are helping to open their cultures and potentially their political systems.”
With L’Boulevard, Morocco is doing something new in a part of the world where repression and censorship are the norm. The cultural awakening nonetheless operates within a narrow band in a country where human rights groups, independent media outlets, and critical artists continue to live a precarious existence. Moroccan radio stations, acting on government instructions, recently boycotted a collection of rap songs that was appropriately titled Forbidden on the Radio. Invincible Voice (I-Voice), a Beirut-based Palestinian duo that fuses hip-hop with classical Arab music, was forced to cancel an Arab world tour when Morocco and other Arab countries denied them visas. Yasin Qasem, a 21-year-old freelance sound engineer and half of I-Voice, was subsequently denied entry to lead a sound engineering workshop in Casablanca. Qasem and his partner, TNT, a.k.a. Mohammed Turk, a 20-year-old construction foreman whose songs lament the sorry state of political, cultural, and economic affairs in the Arab world, finally obtained visas for the United Arab Emirates to finish production of their upcoming album, only to be declined entry when they landed at the Dubai airport.
Across a swath of land stretching from Morocco’s Atlantic coast to the Persian Gulf, underground musicians are playing a continuous game of cat and mouse with authorities to evade harassment and arrest. Musicians in Iran endure forced haircuts, beatings in jail, and threats to their families. Egypt bans heavy metal from radio and television. Earlier this year, Islamist police stormed a crowded auditorium in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, where the hip-hop musicians B Boy Gaza had just started performing. “The show is over,” the officers announced before confiscating equipment and arresting six musicians, who were eventually released after signing a pledge not to hold further performances without police permission. The rapping Emirati brothers Salem and Abdullah Dahman have had their music banned in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia because their lyrics contrast the Arab world’s multiple problems with the glorious Muslim past. Last summer, police in the Saudi capital Riyadh broke up a metal concert in a residential compound attended by 500 mostly Saudi fans.
Civilian and religious authorities across the Middle East and North Africa have accused heavy metal musicians of threatening public order, undermining Islam, and performing the devil’s music. Metalheads are also singled out because of their music’s highly charged and often politically, socially, and sexually suggestive lyrics. As a result, their music flourishes mostly in underground clubs, basements, and private homes, and only occasionally on stage when a regime decides that banning a public performance is not worth the political risk.
Underground musicians pose a challenge to Middle Eastern and North African regimes because they often reflect in their lyrics pent-up anger and frustration about unemployment, corruption, and police tyranny. “We play heavy metal ’cause our lives are heavy metal,” says Reda Zine, one of the founders of the Moroccan headbanger scene.
With the growing realization that the region’s authoritarian regimes and controlled economies are unable to offer opportunity to their predominantly young populations, metal and rap have been elevated as channels to express discontent. Their role is enhanced by the Internet and other technologies for mass distribution that make government control difficult and allow musicians and their fans to carve out autonomous spaces that shield them from intrusion by censors and other cultural scolds.
In a recent report for Freemuse, Mark LeVine argues that music plays a role in the Middle East and North Africa similar to the role rock played in the velvet revolutions that toppled regimes in Eastern Europe. LeVine has a good vantage point for studying the subject: He is both a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of California at Irvine and a musician who has performed with the likes of Mick Jagger and Albert Collins. The struggle and success of underground music, he says, “reminds us of a past, and offers a model for the future, in which artists—if inadvertently at first—helped topple a seemingly impregnable system of rule.” LeVine describes underground musical communities as “avatars of change or struggles for greater social and political openness,” saying “they point out cracks in the facade of conformity that is crucial to keeping authoritarian or hierarchical and inegalitarian political systems in power.”
Nowhere is that more evident than in Iran, where all rock music is forced underground. Musicians risk harassment and imprisonment by a regime that frowns on all music and routinely tortures dissidents. In May 2009, a heavy metal concert in Shiraz was raided by an Islamist militia that arrested some 100 people on charges of consuming alcohol and worshiping the devil. Musicians are forced into exile or onto the Internet to carve out creative spaces of their own.
Coming under particular scrutiny are Iranian underground musicians who replicate American accents, indulge in obscene lyrics, and use female singers—all viewed as symbols of Western decadence by the authorities. Most CD shop owners refuse to sell underground music, fearing raids, imprisonment, and hefty fines. Concerts in private gatherings are often canceled because of threats from neighborhood vigilantes. Kalameh, an Iranian rapper, recently uploaded one of his latest songs to YouTube in response to the regime’s crackdown on the country’s reform movement: “This nation says No / Says NO to autocracy / Says NO to censorship / Says NO to sedition / Says NO to beating and killing / Says NO to injustice / Says NO to democracy / This constant pain of mine, emanates from being a human / Because one night, they stole my light of hope / If I stay silent, if I stay still / Who is gonna right? Who is gonna say? / If I leave it that way?”
Yet hip-hop’s lyrical style and heavy metal’s pounding beat may be natural fits in a world where poetry is a popular art form and praying often involves rhythm and bobbing. Some Muslim religious figures, particularly practitioners of more mystical forms of Islam, recognize an affinity with metal, even though some of the genre’s most popular forms in the region are its most extreme. “I don’t like heavy metal,” a Shiite cleric in Baghdad told LeVine. “Not because it’s irreligious or against Islam; but because I prefer other styles of music. But you know what? When we get together and pray loudly, with the drums beating fiercely, chanting and pumping our arms in the air, we’re doing heavy metal too.” Cyril Yarboudi of Lebanon’s Oath to Vanquish agrees. “You can practice your religion; you can go pray in a mosque and listen to metal,” he says. “What’s the problem?”
In a 1997 crackdown that put its stamp on much of the heavy metal scene in the Middle East and North Africa, police in Cairo arrested 100 heavy metal fans. The arrests followed publication of a photo from a metal concert allegedly showing someone carrying an upside-down cross. One newspaper reported that the house raided by the police was “filled with tattooed, devil-worshiping youths holding orgies, skinning cats, and writing their names in rats’ blood on the palace’s walls.”
Muslim and Christian clerics were up in arms. Cartoons in newspapers depicted scruffy, marijuana-smoking musicians with T-shirts emblazed with the Star of David who play guitar while being seduced by scantily dressed blond women. The musicians’ critics portrayed them as Zionist agents subverting Muslim society and blamed their emergence on a government that, in their view, was in cahoots with the Zionists in allowing Western culture to undermine Egypt’s social and religious values. Interestingly, this criticism was expressed by many in the underground music community as well. A broad segment of Egyptians, cutting across political, ideological, religious, and social fault lines, accuses the government of failing to effectively support the Palestinians, acquiescing in the Israeli control of Palestinian territories, and supporting unpopular U.S. policies in the region.
Emotions peaked when Sheikh Nasr Farid, Egypt’s mufti at the time, demanded that those arrested repent or face the death penalty for apostasy. In response, intimidated musicians and fans destroyed their guitars and shaved off their beards to avoid the worst. A decade later, many Egyptian musicians remain reluctant to publicly discuss their music or lyrics, even though government policy has become somewhat more relaxed. (The regime of President Hosni Mubarak is currently more concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood and dissident bloggers than it is about underground music.)
“You can’t get arrested for being a metalhead so easily now,” an Egyptian heavy metal fan tells me. “They can still stop you in the streets, or stop your car if you listen to very loud heavy music. But when it comes to arresting they can’t now unless you have some sort of drugs on you. It’s not that the law is more liberal now. Rather, it’s because the whole media is not so interested to know about us anymore.”
Morocco’s bow to popular pressure and Egypt’s recent shift of focus highlight a lesson most Arab regimes have yet to learn: The velvet glove is often more effective than the baton. The more mainstream underground music becomes and the less censorship it endures, the less socially and politically potent it may become.
But as long as there is discontent to be expressed, there will be musicians eager to channel it. Even if metal and hip-hop lose their bite, LeVine predicts, the “cultural avant-garde of youth culture will naturally search for other genres of music to express the anger, anxieties, and despair that originally made the music so powerful.”
Friday, November 19, 2010
U.S. Should Push for Democracy in Egypt
By James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
Human rights were glaringly absent from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's agenda when she recently met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit ahead of Egypt's Nov. 28 parliamentary elections. The silence is noteworthy, given Cairo's suppression of the political opposition in advance of the elections as well as its overall dismal human rights record.
The Obama administration fears that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak will respond to criticism by withdrawing both political support for the stumbling Israeli-Palestinian peace process and logistical support for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The administration is also concerned that criticism would boost the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's popular Islamist opposition group. Finally, should Egypt simply reject the criticism, it could paint President Barack Obama as too weak to influence one of the United States' closest allies and a major recipient of U.S. aid.
Apparently testing the waters, State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley called on Egypt in a written statement to allow peaceful political gatherings and open media coverage, and to admit international election observers. Egypt immediately rejected the call, saying it has a system of judges and other safeguards in place to monitor the fairness of the elections and that the government has issued guidelines for free and fair media coverage of the campaign.
To be sure, repression of the opposition, intimidation and control of the media, and electoral restrictions virtually guarantee that Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party will win the elections. But for the U.S., the long-term risks of being perceived as perpetuating authoritarian rule in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world may well outweigh the short-term benefits of turning a blind eye to flagrant human-rights violations and measures that stymie democratic development.
Read more at World Politics Review
World Politics Review
Human rights were glaringly absent from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's agenda when she recently met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit ahead of Egypt's Nov. 28 parliamentary elections. The silence is noteworthy, given Cairo's suppression of the political opposition in advance of the elections as well as its overall dismal human rights record.
The Obama administration fears that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak will respond to criticism by withdrawing both political support for the stumbling Israeli-Palestinian peace process and logistical support for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The administration is also concerned that criticism would boost the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's popular Islamist opposition group. Finally, should Egypt simply reject the criticism, it could paint President Barack Obama as too weak to influence one of the United States' closest allies and a major recipient of U.S. aid.
Apparently testing the waters, State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley called on Egypt in a written statement to allow peaceful political gatherings and open media coverage, and to admit international election observers. Egypt immediately rejected the call, saying it has a system of judges and other safeguards in place to monitor the fairness of the elections and that the government has issued guidelines for free and fair media coverage of the campaign.
To be sure, repression of the opposition, intimidation and control of the media, and electoral restrictions virtually guarantee that Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party will win the elections. But for the U.S., the long-term risks of being perceived as perpetuating authoritarian rule in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world may well outweigh the short-term benefits of turning a blind eye to flagrant human-rights violations and measures that stymie democratic development.
Read more at World Politics Review
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Proposed NATO Defense Shield Fuels Discussion of New European Security Architecture
By James M. Dorsey
A proposed $280 million NATO missile defense system upgrade is straining relations between the United States and Turkey in the run-up to this week’s NATO summit in Lisbon. Turkish officials say they will only agree to having radar components of the system on Turkish soil if NATO abstains from identifying any potential target of the system and promises not to share intelligence with non-NATO members.
The Turkish demands reflect a mounting divergence in US and Turkish foreign policy with Turkey no longer signing up to Western policies simply to align itself with the West but instead making cost-benefit analysis a key element of its decision-making. As a result, Turkey is demanding a quid-pro-quid for its accommodation of the proposed missile defense shield upgrade that threatens to put it between a rock and a hard place.
If Turkey rejects the upgrade, it risks angering its US and NATO allies; if it joins the shield, it would upset Iran, a neighbor and major energy supplier, and could complicate its relations with Russia, which opposed the upgrade when it was first proposed by US President George W. Bush. "We do not perceive any threat from any neighbor countries and we do not think our neighbors form a threat to Nato," says Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu.
The Turkish demand that NATO refrain from identifying the system’s target strikes at declared US policy: a White House fact sheet recently described Iran as the threat the proposed shield would be designed to counter. Turkey opposes Iran becoming a nuclear power but advocates continued engagement in the hope to expand its trade with Iran to $30 billion a year over the next five years. The US Treasury’s point man on Iran sanctions, Stuart Levy, last month failed to convince his Turkish counterparts to go further than the largely symbolic United Nations sanctions, which Turkey opposed, and endorse the much stricter US sanctions regime.
Turkey, concerned that any US or Israeli military effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program would further destabilize the Middle East, moreover wants assurances that any intelligence garnered from radars on its territory will not be shared with Israel. Turkish officials refused to confirm or deny reports that the Turkish Security Council last month approved changes in its national security document, called the "Red Book," removing Iran and Syria and adding Israel to the list of countries that pose a "major threat."
Turkey fears that allowing the radar to be based in Turkey will raise Iranian suspicions that it would be associated with a potential US or Israeli strike against the Islamic republic. The United States wants to base the radars in Turkey after US President Barak Obama promised Russia in September of last year that it would seek to accommodate Russian objections against basing them in Poland and the Czech Republic. Turkey’s position on the defense shield is influenced by the fact that its past accommodation of US and European interests has not pushed forward as Turkish leaders had hoped its efforts to join the European Union.
The quid-pro-quid Turkey is seeking for possible accommodation of NATO is US pressure on France and Germany to reverse policies that are preventing progress in negotiations for Turkish European Union membership. The US has signaled its willingness to accommodate the Turks by putting high on the agenda of a US-EU summit scheduled immediately after the NATO gathering Turkish EU membership. In expectation of a NATO compromise, Turkish officials say they have begun technical studies on the radars in preparation for possible deployment. The studies are in part designed to reduce tension between the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the armed forces, which view Iran’s nuclear program as a threat and favor deployment of the NATO missile shield.
While most analysts and officials believe that Turkey is genuinely seeking to balance its long-standing commitment to Western interests with the impact of paradigm change since the end of the Cold War, some analysts caution that a failure to take Turkish interests into account could provoke a rupture with Turkey feeling forced to choose between the West and Iran.
Mitigating against a rupture is the fact that Europe may have a renewed interest in embracing Turkey because of the United States’ perceived preoccupation with security risks posed by the Middle East and China at the expense of its past focus on Europe. Calls in Europe for a new European security architecture that would put a greater emphasis on the role of Turkey as well as Russia are gaining momentum. A recently published European Council on Relations report entitled "The spectre of a multipolar Europe" argues that Obama’s failure to participate in ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall was the latest sign that the US is no longer focused on Europe’s internal security. “Washington has its hands full dealing with Afghanistan, Iran and China and is no longer a European power,” the report concluded.
To fill the void, the report calls for an informal dialogue that would allow the EU, Turkey and Russia to build a new European security architecture from the ground up. This would require blowing new life into Turkey’s EU accession negotiations by expanding them to include common security and defense policies as well as energy. “The post-Cold War order is unraveling. Rather than uniting under a single system, Europe’s big powers are moving apart. Tensions between them have made security systems dysfunctional: they failed to prevent war in Kosovo and Georgia, instability in Kyrgyzstan, disruption to Europe’s gas supplies, and solve frozen conflicts… The EU has spent much of the last decade defending a European order that no longer functions. Russia and Turkey may complain more, but the EU has the most to lose from the current peaceful disorder,” the report says.
A proposed $280 million NATO missile defense system upgrade is straining relations between the United States and Turkey in the run-up to this week’s NATO summit in Lisbon. Turkish officials say they will only agree to having radar components of the system on Turkish soil if NATO abstains from identifying any potential target of the system and promises not to share intelligence with non-NATO members.
The Turkish demands reflect a mounting divergence in US and Turkish foreign policy with Turkey no longer signing up to Western policies simply to align itself with the West but instead making cost-benefit analysis a key element of its decision-making. As a result, Turkey is demanding a quid-pro-quid for its accommodation of the proposed missile defense shield upgrade that threatens to put it between a rock and a hard place.
If Turkey rejects the upgrade, it risks angering its US and NATO allies; if it joins the shield, it would upset Iran, a neighbor and major energy supplier, and could complicate its relations with Russia, which opposed the upgrade when it was first proposed by US President George W. Bush. "We do not perceive any threat from any neighbor countries and we do not think our neighbors form a threat to Nato," says Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu.
The Turkish demand that NATO refrain from identifying the system’s target strikes at declared US policy: a White House fact sheet recently described Iran as the threat the proposed shield would be designed to counter. Turkey opposes Iran becoming a nuclear power but advocates continued engagement in the hope to expand its trade with Iran to $30 billion a year over the next five years. The US Treasury’s point man on Iran sanctions, Stuart Levy, last month failed to convince his Turkish counterparts to go further than the largely symbolic United Nations sanctions, which Turkey opposed, and endorse the much stricter US sanctions regime.
Turkey, concerned that any US or Israeli military effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program would further destabilize the Middle East, moreover wants assurances that any intelligence garnered from radars on its territory will not be shared with Israel. Turkish officials refused to confirm or deny reports that the Turkish Security Council last month approved changes in its national security document, called the "Red Book," removing Iran and Syria and adding Israel to the list of countries that pose a "major threat."
Turkey fears that allowing the radar to be based in Turkey will raise Iranian suspicions that it would be associated with a potential US or Israeli strike against the Islamic republic. The United States wants to base the radars in Turkey after US President Barak Obama promised Russia in September of last year that it would seek to accommodate Russian objections against basing them in Poland and the Czech Republic. Turkey’s position on the defense shield is influenced by the fact that its past accommodation of US and European interests has not pushed forward as Turkish leaders had hoped its efforts to join the European Union.
The quid-pro-quid Turkey is seeking for possible accommodation of NATO is US pressure on France and Germany to reverse policies that are preventing progress in negotiations for Turkish European Union membership. The US has signaled its willingness to accommodate the Turks by putting high on the agenda of a US-EU summit scheduled immediately after the NATO gathering Turkish EU membership. In expectation of a NATO compromise, Turkish officials say they have begun technical studies on the radars in preparation for possible deployment. The studies are in part designed to reduce tension between the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the armed forces, which view Iran’s nuclear program as a threat and favor deployment of the NATO missile shield.
While most analysts and officials believe that Turkey is genuinely seeking to balance its long-standing commitment to Western interests with the impact of paradigm change since the end of the Cold War, some analysts caution that a failure to take Turkish interests into account could provoke a rupture with Turkey feeling forced to choose between the West and Iran.
Mitigating against a rupture is the fact that Europe may have a renewed interest in embracing Turkey because of the United States’ perceived preoccupation with security risks posed by the Middle East and China at the expense of its past focus on Europe. Calls in Europe for a new European security architecture that would put a greater emphasis on the role of Turkey as well as Russia are gaining momentum. A recently published European Council on Relations report entitled "The spectre of a multipolar Europe" argues that Obama’s failure to participate in ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall was the latest sign that the US is no longer focused on Europe’s internal security. “Washington has its hands full dealing with Afghanistan, Iran and China and is no longer a European power,” the report concluded.
To fill the void, the report calls for an informal dialogue that would allow the EU, Turkey and Russia to build a new European security architecture from the ground up. This would require blowing new life into Turkey’s EU accession negotiations by expanding them to include common security and defense policies as well as energy. “The post-Cold War order is unraveling. Rather than uniting under a single system, Europe’s big powers are moving apart. Tensions between them have made security systems dysfunctional: they failed to prevent war in Kosovo and Georgia, instability in Kyrgyzstan, disruption to Europe’s gas supplies, and solve frozen conflicts… The EU has spent much of the last decade defending a European order that no longer functions. Russia and Turkey may complain more, but the EU has the most to lose from the current peaceful disorder,” the report says.
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
US Risks Little With Support for Egyptian Human Rights
Human rights were glaringly absent on the agenda of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit in the run-up to Egypt's parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28.
U.S. officials fear that criticism of Egypt's dismal human rights record could jeopardize Egyptian support for the Middle East peace process and U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan encourage the country's popular Islamist opposition and set President Barak Obama up for a failure if Egypt ignores U.S. pressure.
Repression and electoral restrictions virtually guarantee that the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) will win this month's elections, but the long-term risks of perpetuating authoritarian rule in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world may well prove costlier than the short-term benefits of turning a blind eye to flagrant violations of human rights.
Analysis of the feared risks, moreover, shows that they are grounded more in perception than in reality and that U.S. support for adherence to human rights is a battle that can be won over time rather than a zero-sum game. Divided over whether or not to participate in the elections, Egypt's foremost opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, is going into the elections substantially weakened with many of its leaders in prison and a quarter of its candidates barred from standing as candidates. Egypt would risk U.S. Congressional support for its substantial annual aid package by backtracking on support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or logistics for U.S. military operations in the region or reducing intelligence. Similarly, Obama could avoid perceived failure by raising the human rights issue publicly without invoking threats or sanctions and instead taking a leaf out of former President George W. Bush's playbook.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak would surely reject Obama's criticism. Nonetheless, Obama's public focus on human rights and democracy would shape debate in Egypt, encourage activists and influence perceptions of the United States. All in all, the United States has more to win by nudging Egyptian and Arab debate about democracy and human rights and more to lose by maintaining a policy that so far has exclusively identified it with repressive, corrupt regimes and significantly tarnished its image.
Friday, November 5, 2010
Awal Bank Asks US Court For Deadline Extension
Charles Russell LLP, the Bahrain-appointed administrator of Awal Bank BSC, a subsidiary of Saudi Arabia’s embattled Saad Group owned by Saudi billionaire Maan al-Sanea, has asked a U.S. court for an extension of the deadline to file schedules of assets and liabilities and a statement of financial affairs in the bank’s application for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
The request follows rejection last week by the New York court of Awal Bank’s initial application for limited Chapter 11 because the troubled bank was asking to be allowed to keep information confidential and to be exempted from the need to create a U.S. creditors committee. At the same time, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper kept the door open for Awal to repetition the court provided it the bank agreed to establish such a committee. Gropper said he would allow more time to assess the information provided give creditors the opportunity for creditors to make representations.
In the request for an extension, Charles Russell said it needed additional time to canvass creditors’ views and would only once it had done so decide whether it wished to further pursue Chapter 11 protection. The Office of the United States Trustee indicated that it had no objection to Charles Russell request for an extension of the deadline.
Awal initially applied last month for Chapter 11 protection saying that it would help the bank recover “avoidable” transfers out of its estate prior to the bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 filing came little more than a year after Awal had filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy in the same court. Chapter 15 bankruptcy seeks to protect companies from U.S. litigation while they reorganize in a non-U.S. court.
Defaults on loans last year by Awal Bank as well as Saudi conglomerate, Ahmad Hamad Al-Gosaibi & Brothers Co. set off a bitter legal battle on three continents between the two groups that are related by al Sanea’s marriage to a daughter of the Al-Ghosaibi family. Al-Gosaibi has accused Al-Sanea in court filings on three continents of siphoning off $10 billion from his in-laws.
Al-Gosaibi is seeking to recover $9.2 billion in lawsuits in the Cayman Islands against al-Sanea and Awal subsidiaries. The lawsuits were stayed after al-Sanea challenged the Cayman court’s jurisdiction, and an appeal of that decision is set to be heard in November. In July, New York State Supreme Judge Hon. Richard B. Lowe dismissed a lawsuit Al-Gosaibi had filed against Awal and al- Sanea, on grounds of that court being an improper forum. Court proceedings involving Awal are also ongoing in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Britain.
Awal’s original Chapter 11 court filing suggested that it would it file a reorganization plan or opt for liquidation in Bahrain rather than the United States. Even though the court papers kept reorganization on the table, the Chapter 11 filing suggests that liquidation is the more likely option. According to its court filing, Awal has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Under Bahrain law, the administrator has until the summer of next year to decide whether to liquidate Awal or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
The request follows rejection last week by the New York court of Awal Bank’s initial application for limited Chapter 11 because the troubled bank was asking to be allowed to keep information confidential and to be exempted from the need to create a U.S. creditors committee. At the same time, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper kept the door open for Awal to repetition the court provided it the bank agreed to establish such a committee. Gropper said he would allow more time to assess the information provided give creditors the opportunity for creditors to make representations.
In the request for an extension, Charles Russell said it needed additional time to canvass creditors’ views and would only once it had done so decide whether it wished to further pursue Chapter 11 protection. The Office of the United States Trustee indicated that it had no objection to Charles Russell request for an extension of the deadline.
Awal initially applied last month for Chapter 11 protection saying that it would help the bank recover “avoidable” transfers out of its estate prior to the bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 filing came little more than a year after Awal had filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy in the same court. Chapter 15 bankruptcy seeks to protect companies from U.S. litigation while they reorganize in a non-U.S. court.
Defaults on loans last year by Awal Bank as well as Saudi conglomerate, Ahmad Hamad Al-Gosaibi & Brothers Co. set off a bitter legal battle on three continents between the two groups that are related by al Sanea’s marriage to a daughter of the Al-Ghosaibi family. Al-Gosaibi has accused Al-Sanea in court filings on three continents of siphoning off $10 billion from his in-laws.
Al-Gosaibi is seeking to recover $9.2 billion in lawsuits in the Cayman Islands against al-Sanea and Awal subsidiaries. The lawsuits were stayed after al-Sanea challenged the Cayman court’s jurisdiction, and an appeal of that decision is set to be heard in November. In July, New York State Supreme Judge Hon. Richard B. Lowe dismissed a lawsuit Al-Gosaibi had filed against Awal and al- Sanea, on grounds of that court being an improper forum. Court proceedings involving Awal are also ongoing in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Britain.
Awal’s original Chapter 11 court filing suggested that it would it file a reorganization plan or opt for liquidation in Bahrain rather than the United States. Even though the court papers kept reorganization on the table, the Chapter 11 filing suggests that liquidation is the more likely option. According to its court filing, Awal has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Under Bahrain law, the administrator has until the summer of next year to decide whether to liquidate Awal or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Oil and Gas Finds Fueling Tension in Eastern Mediterranean
By James M. Dorsey
(In)Coherenci / World Politics Review
Oil and gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean are ratcheting up tensions in a region that already has its fair share of pernicious disputes. Rival communities on the divided island of Cyprus, as well as Turkey and arch-enemies Lebanon and Israel are staking claims in one of the world's newest oil frontiers.
The region's deposits are minor compared to the Persian Gulf, but for small nations like Israel and Cyprus they hold substantial promise. But rather than providing an opportunity for stability through economic cooperation, the discoveries raise the specter of renewed conflict as the parties push ahead with deals to start exploration.
Complicating matters is the fact that the deposits are in international waters, historically a reason for nations to call in the gun boats in the absence of a production-sharing agreements. The potential threat is heightened by the state of war between Israel and Lebanon and tension between Turkey and Cyprus over Turkey's backing of Turkish Cypriots in their dispute with the island's Greek Cypriot majority.
While Israel and Lebanon have warned that their economic rights in the eastern Mediterranean may constitute a casus belli, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities have so far steered clear of military threats in their perennial disputes over oil and gas.
Turkey's announcement last month that it will soon begin to explore for oil in a 288,000-square-kilometer area between the southeastern Turkish city of Mersin and the northern coast of Cyprus has nonetheless fueled tension. Turkey maintains an estimated 40,000 troops in northern Cyprus since its invasion of the island in 1974 and is the only country to have recognized the north's self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
The internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government, the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), which represents the island in the European Union, accuses Turkey of acting as a "bully" in disputes over oil-exploration licenses that are a continuous point of friction in two-year-old peace talks aimed at ending one of the world's most enduring conflicts.
Turkey and the TRNC have denounced ROC negotiations of oil-exploration deals with Lebanon that will also include Syria, arguing that it lacks the authority. Lebanon and the ROC signed an exclusive-zone agreement in 2007 to demarcate an undersea border that would determine the areas in which each may grant oil- and gas-exploration licenses. ROC signed a similar agreement with Egypt, and in September it concluded a memorandum of cooperation with Israel for the surveying and mapping of joint-research energy projects.
ROC initially licensed companies in 2007 to explore blocks in a 20,000 square-kilometer area. Texas-based Noble Energy, an independent oil company, together with its Israeli consortium partners, Delek Drilling and Avner Oil and Gas, acquired a license, but Turkey's opposition persuaded majors such as ExxonMobil, BP, China National Petroleum Corporation and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation not to participate. Noble, as well as Libya's National Oil Company, are expected to participate in a second ROC licensing round next year.
Turkey has warned the Lebanese and the ROC governments that it is "determined to protect its rights and interests" and will "not allow attempts to erode them." Turkish officials, however, believe that Lebanon and the ROC will not start exploration any time soon. Amid mounting tension in Lebanon over the proceedings of a United Nations investigation into the 2005 killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Ankara believes that parliament is unlikely to focus on the agreement once it is presented for ratification.
As a result, Turkey and Israel may be laughing all the way to the bank. Israel has completed preliminary exploration and is preparing to begin extracting gas in 2012. Israel hopes the oil and gas finds will make it energy-independent, but its preliminary efforts have Lebanon up in arms. Staking its claim on the potential reserves, Lebanon sees newly found oil and gas wealth as its ticket to paying off its $50 billion national debt.
Lebanon accuses Israel of intending to siphon the gas from reserves off the northern Israeli coast that it says are rightfully Lebanese. Israel denies the claim and says that the three fields it has invested in lie between it and Cyprus.The largest of the fields, Leviathan, is estimated to hold 16 trillion cubic feet of gas worth billions of dollars.
The fields are in international waters between Israel and Cyprus, beyond the maritime borders that extend 12 nautical miles off the coasts of both countries. Under international law, Israel or Cyprus could declare an exclusive economic zone that extends 200 nautical miles beyond their maritime borders, but so far neither has opted to do so. Israeli officials say they see no need to make such a declaration because the reserves lie under Israel's continental shelf.
The conflicting Israeli and Lebanese claims have both countries rattling their sabers. Israeli Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau has warned that Israel "will not hesitate to use force" to protect its investment. In response, Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri called for speedy approval of proposals for oil and gas exploration off the coast of Lebanon as "the best way to respond to Israeli threats."
It will take years for Lebanon to prove its claims that Israeli exploration and production would violate Lebanese territory. Even if it does, Beirut lacks the military muscle to do anything about it. That frustrating realization is likely to complicate efforts to reduce tension in a region that already has enough flash points.
(In)Coherenci / World Politics Review
Oil and gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean are ratcheting up tensions in a region that already has its fair share of pernicious disputes. Rival communities on the divided island of Cyprus, as well as Turkey and arch-enemies Lebanon and Israel are staking claims in one of the world's newest oil frontiers.
The region's deposits are minor compared to the Persian Gulf, but for small nations like Israel and Cyprus they hold substantial promise. But rather than providing an opportunity for stability through economic cooperation, the discoveries raise the specter of renewed conflict as the parties push ahead with deals to start exploration.
Complicating matters is the fact that the deposits are in international waters, historically a reason for nations to call in the gun boats in the absence of a production-sharing agreements. The potential threat is heightened by the state of war between Israel and Lebanon and tension between Turkey and Cyprus over Turkey's backing of Turkish Cypriots in their dispute with the island's Greek Cypriot majority.
While Israel and Lebanon have warned that their economic rights in the eastern Mediterranean may constitute a casus belli, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities have so far steered clear of military threats in their perennial disputes over oil and gas.
Turkey's announcement last month that it will soon begin to explore for oil in a 288,000-square-kilometer area between the southeastern Turkish city of Mersin and the northern coast of Cyprus has nonetheless fueled tension. Turkey maintains an estimated 40,000 troops in northern Cyprus since its invasion of the island in 1974 and is the only country to have recognized the north's self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
The internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government, the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), which represents the island in the European Union, accuses Turkey of acting as a "bully" in disputes over oil-exploration licenses that are a continuous point of friction in two-year-old peace talks aimed at ending one of the world's most enduring conflicts.
Turkey and the TRNC have denounced ROC negotiations of oil-exploration deals with Lebanon that will also include Syria, arguing that it lacks the authority. Lebanon and the ROC signed an exclusive-zone agreement in 2007 to demarcate an undersea border that would determine the areas in which each may grant oil- and gas-exploration licenses. ROC signed a similar agreement with Egypt, and in September it concluded a memorandum of cooperation with Israel for the surveying and mapping of joint-research energy projects.
ROC initially licensed companies in 2007 to explore blocks in a 20,000 square-kilometer area. Texas-based Noble Energy, an independent oil company, together with its Israeli consortium partners, Delek Drilling and Avner Oil and Gas, acquired a license, but Turkey's opposition persuaded majors such as ExxonMobil, BP, China National Petroleum Corporation and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation not to participate. Noble, as well as Libya's National Oil Company, are expected to participate in a second ROC licensing round next year.
Turkey has warned the Lebanese and the ROC governments that it is "determined to protect its rights and interests" and will "not allow attempts to erode them." Turkish officials, however, believe that Lebanon and the ROC will not start exploration any time soon. Amid mounting tension in Lebanon over the proceedings of a United Nations investigation into the 2005 killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Ankara believes that parliament is unlikely to focus on the agreement once it is presented for ratification.
As a result, Turkey and Israel may be laughing all the way to the bank. Israel has completed preliminary exploration and is preparing to begin extracting gas in 2012. Israel hopes the oil and gas finds will make it energy-independent, but its preliminary efforts have Lebanon up in arms. Staking its claim on the potential reserves, Lebanon sees newly found oil and gas wealth as its ticket to paying off its $50 billion national debt.
Lebanon accuses Israel of intending to siphon the gas from reserves off the northern Israeli coast that it says are rightfully Lebanese. Israel denies the claim and says that the three fields it has invested in lie between it and Cyprus.The largest of the fields, Leviathan, is estimated to hold 16 trillion cubic feet of gas worth billions of dollars.
The fields are in international waters between Israel and Cyprus, beyond the maritime borders that extend 12 nautical miles off the coasts of both countries. Under international law, Israel or Cyprus could declare an exclusive economic zone that extends 200 nautical miles beyond their maritime borders, but so far neither has opted to do so. Israeli officials say they see no need to make such a declaration because the reserves lie under Israel's continental shelf.
The conflicting Israeli and Lebanese claims have both countries rattling their sabers. Israeli Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau has warned that Israel "will not hesitate to use force" to protect its investment. In response, Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri called for speedy approval of proposals for oil and gas exploration off the coast of Lebanon as "the best way to respond to Israeli threats."
It will take years for Lebanon to prove its claims that Israeli exploration and production would violate Lebanese territory. Even if it does, Beirut lacks the military muscle to do anything about it. That frustrating realization is likely to complicate efforts to reduce tension in a region that already has enough flash points.
Monday, November 1, 2010
Prominent Dutch jihadist recants and denounces terrorism
By James M. Dorsey
(In)Coherent / Deutsche Welle
A key figure in one militant Islamic European network has joined the ranks of a small but important number of jihadists to have a change of heart, calling on their brethren to abandon violence. The imprisoned Dutch terrorism suspect Jason Walters said in an open letter that he has renounced Islamic radicalism.
"The ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt," Walters said in what he called a "review document" written from the maximum-security prison in Vught. It was published recently in the Dutch daily De Volkskrant.
Walters is a leading member of the jihadist Hofstadgroep, made up of Islamists primarily of Moroccan origin. The group was led by Mohammed Bouyeri, who is serving a life sentence for killing controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.
Observers said Walters' letter offered a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence. It helped to understand why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
Walters' review could also inform the increasingly partisan immigration debate in Germany and other European nations about how to prevent the radicalization of immigrant youth and help them become functioning members of society.
A different denunciation
Walters was accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. He resisted his arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police, injuring four policemen. He has now served four years of his 15-year sentence.
Born in the Netherlands to an African-American soldier and a Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 after the divorce of his parents and his father's subsequent conversion. In 2003, he made his way to Pakistan for training with jihadist groups. He boasted on his return to the Netherlands that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again."
Walters' denunciation is more political and philosophical than that of other jihadist ideologues which employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) or Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, one of the early associates of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command. Walters, on the other hand, takes issue in his letter with the basic tenant of his former worldview.
"The image that the world only exists of believers and infidels, in which the latter are motivated only to destroy the former, is a childish and coarse simplification of reality," Walters said. "It ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich."
Analysts and counter-terrorism authorities say Walters' letter is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe. In a statement, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) described it as "a remarkable document" not seen before in the Netherlands.
Dutch terrorism analyst Edwin Bakker from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael said the letter would serve as "a good tool in the ideological fight against terrorists and Islamists."
A sincere document
Walters' lawyer, Bart Nooitgedagt, rejected allegations that his client had written the letter in an effort to influence his appeal hearing. An Amsterdam court is set to determine whether the throwing of the grenade was a criminal or a terrorist act and whether the Hofstadgroep was a terrorist organization.
The appeals court had ordered new proceedings in response to objections by the public prosecutor to the initial conviction of Walters and his associates on criminal charges only. Of the seven defendants in the original case, Walters is the only one still incarcerated.
Nooitgedagt said Walters had written his letter some time ago, even though he only published it last week.
"Jason anticipated the criticism, but assertions that the letter was inspired by dishonest motives are incorrect," Nooitgedagt said. "The content of the letter is too fundamental for that."
Walters initially signaled his change of heart during the appeals court hearing in July, where he was the only defendant to appear in court in person.
"I was passive and uncooperative in the (lower) court in The Hague," Walters told the court in a reference to his earlier rejection of the Dutch justice system. "But now I will actively defend myself. I have confidence in the competence and the integrity of this court and in the Dutch system."
A warning to youth
Nooitgedagt said Walters' change of heart was sparked by his reading of history books, as well as writings on the theory of evolution and the works of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Popper. In his letter, he explained his recantation with the fact that those nations who were liberated by Islamists ultimately rejected the
Islamist worldview.
"This has forced me to reconsider my views critically, and has led to the realization that they are untenable," Walters said in the letter.
Walters expressed his disappointment with a utopian movement that has fallen short of its ideals.
"I have watched with horror how a once lofty 'struggle for freedom' that should have been the go-ahead signal for a new, just world - especially in Iraq - has turned into a bloody escalation of violence, sectarianism and religious mania," he wrote. "Unheard of cruelty and crimes have been committed in the process."
He said the random killing by Islamists of innocent Muslims had rendered the struggle for Islamic rule "a total failure."
The 25-year-old said he hoped his letter would serve "to warn youth not to be misguided by false promises and ideals." He called on Islamists "to put down their weapons and employ other, productive methods" in order to bring about reforms instead of blaming the United States and the West.
Lessons learned
Dutch commentator and De Volkskrant columnist Pieter Hilhorst noted that Walters, like other recanting Islamists, explained his change of heart in analytical rather than personal terms.
"He doesn't write that he regrets throwing a grenade at the police," Hilhorst said. "He doesn't write that he is ashamed of having glorified the murder of Theo van Gogh. Jason acts as if he was an observer, not a perpetrator."
The lesson from recantations like that of Walters, Hilhorst said, is that appealing to Islamists' compassion in an effort to change their wayward means was meaningless as they "express no empathy with their non-Muslim victims."
"They are only concerned about the nature of the true Muslim and the consequences for Muslims," he said. "This last point is every jihadist's real Achilles Heel. The best way to draw him away from his violent belief is to ask him what he really wants to achieve. That's when facts become more important than divine inclination."
(In)Coherent / Deutsche Welle
A key figure in one militant Islamic European network has joined the ranks of a small but important number of jihadists to have a change of heart, calling on their brethren to abandon violence. The imprisoned Dutch terrorism suspect Jason Walters said in an open letter that he has renounced Islamic radicalism.
"The ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt," Walters said in what he called a "review document" written from the maximum-security prison in Vught. It was published recently in the Dutch daily De Volkskrant.
Walters is a leading member of the jihadist Hofstadgroep, made up of Islamists primarily of Moroccan origin. The group was led by Mohammed Bouyeri, who is serving a life sentence for killing controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.
Observers said Walters' letter offered a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence. It helped to understand why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
Walters' review could also inform the increasingly partisan immigration debate in Germany and other European nations about how to prevent the radicalization of immigrant youth and help them become functioning members of society.
A different denunciation
Walters was accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. He resisted his arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police, injuring four policemen. He has now served four years of his 15-year sentence.
Born in the Netherlands to an African-American soldier and a Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 after the divorce of his parents and his father's subsequent conversion. In 2003, he made his way to Pakistan for training with jihadist groups. He boasted on his return to the Netherlands that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again."
Walters' denunciation is more political and philosophical than that of other jihadist ideologues which employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) or Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, one of the early associates of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command. Walters, on the other hand, takes issue in his letter with the basic tenant of his former worldview.
"The image that the world only exists of believers and infidels, in which the latter are motivated only to destroy the former, is a childish and coarse simplification of reality," Walters said. "It ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich."
Analysts and counter-terrorism authorities say Walters' letter is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe. In a statement, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) described it as "a remarkable document" not seen before in the Netherlands.
Dutch terrorism analyst Edwin Bakker from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael said the letter would serve as "a good tool in the ideological fight against terrorists and Islamists."
A sincere document
Walters' lawyer, Bart Nooitgedagt, rejected allegations that his client had written the letter in an effort to influence his appeal hearing. An Amsterdam court is set to determine whether the throwing of the grenade was a criminal or a terrorist act and whether the Hofstadgroep was a terrorist organization.
The appeals court had ordered new proceedings in response to objections by the public prosecutor to the initial conviction of Walters and his associates on criminal charges only. Of the seven defendants in the original case, Walters is the only one still incarcerated.
Nooitgedagt said Walters had written his letter some time ago, even though he only published it last week.
"Jason anticipated the criticism, but assertions that the letter was inspired by dishonest motives are incorrect," Nooitgedagt said. "The content of the letter is too fundamental for that."
Walters initially signaled his change of heart during the appeals court hearing in July, where he was the only defendant to appear in court in person.
"I was passive and uncooperative in the (lower) court in The Hague," Walters told the court in a reference to his earlier rejection of the Dutch justice system. "But now I will actively defend myself. I have confidence in the competence and the integrity of this court and in the Dutch system."
A warning to youth
Nooitgedagt said Walters' change of heart was sparked by his reading of history books, as well as writings on the theory of evolution and the works of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Popper. In his letter, he explained his recantation with the fact that those nations who were liberated by Islamists ultimately rejected the
Islamist worldview.
"This has forced me to reconsider my views critically, and has led to the realization that they are untenable," Walters said in the letter.
Walters expressed his disappointment with a utopian movement that has fallen short of its ideals.
"I have watched with horror how a once lofty 'struggle for freedom' that should have been the go-ahead signal for a new, just world - especially in Iraq - has turned into a bloody escalation of violence, sectarianism and religious mania," he wrote. "Unheard of cruelty and crimes have been committed in the process."
He said the random killing by Islamists of innocent Muslims had rendered the struggle for Islamic rule "a total failure."
The 25-year-old said he hoped his letter would serve "to warn youth not to be misguided by false promises and ideals." He called on Islamists "to put down their weapons and employ other, productive methods" in order to bring about reforms instead of blaming the United States and the West.
Lessons learned
Dutch commentator and De Volkskrant columnist Pieter Hilhorst noted that Walters, like other recanting Islamists, explained his change of heart in analytical rather than personal terms.
"He doesn't write that he regrets throwing a grenade at the police," Hilhorst said. "He doesn't write that he is ashamed of having glorified the murder of Theo van Gogh. Jason acts as if he was an observer, not a perpetrator."
The lesson from recantations like that of Walters, Hilhorst said, is that appealing to Islamists' compassion in an effort to change their wayward means was meaningless as they "express no empathy with their non-Muslim victims."
"They are only concerned about the nature of the true Muslim and the consequences for Muslims," he said. "This last point is every jihadist's real Achilles Heel. The best way to draw him away from his violent belief is to ask him what he really wants to achieve. That's when facts become more important than divine inclination."
Al Qaeda Threat Heightens Need to Resolve Western Sahara
It’s hard to see the United States’ faltering efforts to resolve the seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a model for conflict resolution. Yet, parallels between the Middle East conflict and the Arab world’s other seemingly intractable dispute in the Western Sahara that has soured relations between Morocco and Algeria, suggest otherwise.
Resolution of the 35-year old conflict, one of Africa’s longest festering disputes, has become more urgent with the realization that lack of cooperation between North African and Sahel nations undermines efforts to stem the rise of Al Qaida’s affiliate in the region, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The need to align North African nations was driven home by AQIM’s brazen kidnapping in Niger in September of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, that threatens France's major source of uranium. Algeria, which backs Polisario, the Sahrawi liberation movement in its dispute with Morocco, last month refused to participate in a meeting in the Malian capital Bamako organized by the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group to discuss AQIM because of the presence of Moroccan representatives.
While there are obvious differences between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the conflict in the Western Sahara, similarities between the two suggest that the most recent Middle East peacemaking experience may be applicable.
At the heart of both conflicts is annexation of territory that has displaced population groups and subjected them to occupation. The parties to both conflicts pay lip service to international peace efforts but in practice act to subvert them. Both conflicts position a Western-backed ally against a liberation movement supported by influential regional powers. The United States and Europe, despite their support for the occupying power in both conflicts, pay lip service to the rights of the dispossessed.
It is these similarities that positions Middle East peacemaking as a model for preventing the festering conflict in the Sahara from playing into AQIM’s hands. The Obama’s administration message to Israel that security can only be achieved by accommodating Palestinian national aspirations is applicable to Morocco too: regional security demands a two-state solution. Morocco and the Sahrawis need to agree on a formula that balances Moroccan claims of sovereignty with Sahrawi demands for independence.
The roadmap adopted by the Middle East Quartet, which groups the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia is equally applicable to the Western Sahara based on UN Security Council resolutions that call for a negotiated solution and recognition of the Sahrawi right to self-determination. A Saharan roadmap would allow the international community to empower former US diplomat and current UN envoy Chris Ross with the same mandate given to US Middle East peace negotiator George Mitchell: impose a one-year deadline within which the parties seriously negotiate a resolution of their seemingly intractable differences.
To provide the roadmap, the international community would have to come together as it did in the case of the Middle East rather than ignoring the dispute in the Sahara or adopting contradictory policies.In the past the United States was the only power seeking to bring the parties to the negotiating table with little support from its fellow council members. That is no longer a tenable situation with AQIM’s increasingly brazen operations and threats by Polisario, the Saharan liberation movement, to revive its armed struggle.
Resolution of the 35-year old conflict, one of Africa’s longest festering disputes, has become more urgent with the realization that lack of cooperation between North African and Sahel nations undermines efforts to stem the rise of Al Qaida’s affiliate in the region, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The need to align North African nations was driven home by AQIM’s brazen kidnapping in Niger in September of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, that threatens France's major source of uranium. Algeria, which backs Polisario, the Sahrawi liberation movement in its dispute with Morocco, last month refused to participate in a meeting in the Malian capital Bamako organized by the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group to discuss AQIM because of the presence of Moroccan representatives.
While there are obvious differences between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the conflict in the Western Sahara, similarities between the two suggest that the most recent Middle East peacemaking experience may be applicable.
At the heart of both conflicts is annexation of territory that has displaced population groups and subjected them to occupation. The parties to both conflicts pay lip service to international peace efforts but in practice act to subvert them. Both conflicts position a Western-backed ally against a liberation movement supported by influential regional powers. The United States and Europe, despite their support for the occupying power in both conflicts, pay lip service to the rights of the dispossessed.
It is these similarities that positions Middle East peacemaking as a model for preventing the festering conflict in the Sahara from playing into AQIM’s hands. The Obama’s administration message to Israel that security can only be achieved by accommodating Palestinian national aspirations is applicable to Morocco too: regional security demands a two-state solution. Morocco and the Sahrawis need to agree on a formula that balances Moroccan claims of sovereignty with Sahrawi demands for independence.
The roadmap adopted by the Middle East Quartet, which groups the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia is equally applicable to the Western Sahara based on UN Security Council resolutions that call for a negotiated solution and recognition of the Sahrawi right to self-determination. A Saharan roadmap would allow the international community to empower former US diplomat and current UN envoy Chris Ross with the same mandate given to US Middle East peace negotiator George Mitchell: impose a one-year deadline within which the parties seriously negotiate a resolution of their seemingly intractable differences.
To provide the roadmap, the international community would have to come together as it did in the case of the Middle East rather than ignoring the dispute in the Sahara or adopting contradictory policies.In the past the United States was the only power seeking to bring the parties to the negotiating table with little support from its fellow council members. That is no longer a tenable situation with AQIM’s increasingly brazen operations and threats by Polisario, the Saharan liberation movement, to revive its armed struggle.
Turkish Opposition To NATO Missile Shield Fuels Tension
A proposed $280 million NATO missile defense system upgrade is straining relations between the United States and Turkey in the run-up to a NATO summit in Lisbon later this month.
Turkish officials say they will only agree to basing radar components of the system on Turkish soil if NATO abstains from identifying any potential target of the system and promises not to share intelligence with non-NATO members.
The Turkish demands reflect a mounting divergence in US and Turkish foreign policy with Turkey no longer signing up to Western policies simply to align itself with the West but making a cost-benefit analysis a key element of its decision-making. As a result, Turkey is demanding a quid-pro-quid for its accommodation of the proposed missile defense shield upgrade that could put it between a rock and a hard place. If Turkey rejects the upgrade, it risks angering its US and NATO allies; if it joins the shield, it would upset Iran, a neighbor and major energy supplier, and could complicate its relations with Russia, which opposed the upgrade when it was first proposed by US President George W. Bush.
The Turkish demand that NATO refrain from identifying the system’s target strikes at declared US policy: a White House fact sheet recently described Iran as the threat the proposed shield would be designed to counter. Turkey, concerned that any US or Israeli military effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program would further destabilize the Middle East, further wants assurances that any intelligence garnered from radars on its territory will not be shared with Israel.
Analysts say the quid-pro-quid Turkey is seeking for possible accommodation of NATO is US pressure on France and Germany to reverse policies that are preventing progress in negotiations for Turkish European Union membership. They note that the agenda of a US-EU summit scheduled immediately after the NATO gathering features Turkish EU membership high on its agenda.
Some analysts suggest the United States’ perceived preoccupation with security risks posed by the Middle East and China at the expense of its past focus on Europe may help sway France and Germany, where calls for a new European security architecture that would put a greater emphasis on the role of Turkey as well as Russia are gaining momentum.
Turkish officials say they will only agree to basing radar components of the system on Turkish soil if NATO abstains from identifying any potential target of the system and promises not to share intelligence with non-NATO members.
The Turkish demands reflect a mounting divergence in US and Turkish foreign policy with Turkey no longer signing up to Western policies simply to align itself with the West but making a cost-benefit analysis a key element of its decision-making. As a result, Turkey is demanding a quid-pro-quid for its accommodation of the proposed missile defense shield upgrade that could put it between a rock and a hard place. If Turkey rejects the upgrade, it risks angering its US and NATO allies; if it joins the shield, it would upset Iran, a neighbor and major energy supplier, and could complicate its relations with Russia, which opposed the upgrade when it was first proposed by US President George W. Bush.
The Turkish demand that NATO refrain from identifying the system’s target strikes at declared US policy: a White House fact sheet recently described Iran as the threat the proposed shield would be designed to counter. Turkey, concerned that any US or Israeli military effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program would further destabilize the Middle East, further wants assurances that any intelligence garnered from radars on its territory will not be shared with Israel.
Analysts say the quid-pro-quid Turkey is seeking for possible accommodation of NATO is US pressure on France and Germany to reverse policies that are preventing progress in negotiations for Turkish European Union membership. They note that the agenda of a US-EU summit scheduled immediately after the NATO gathering features Turkish EU membership high on its agenda.
Some analysts suggest the United States’ perceived preoccupation with security risks posed by the Middle East and China at the expense of its past focus on Europe may help sway France and Germany, where calls for a new European security architecture that would put a greater emphasis on the role of Turkey as well as Russia are gaining momentum.
Saturday, October 30, 2010
New York Court Rejects Awal Bank Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
A New York bankruptcy court has rejected a petition for limited Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection by Bahrain-based Awal Bank, a subsidiary of Saudi Arabia’s embattled Saad Group owned by Saudi billionaire Maan al-Sanea. The court’s decision offers temporary relief to creditors who stood to be left high and dry if the court had ruled in favor of Awal’s request, which would have allowed the troubled bank to keep information confidential and would have exempted it from creating a U.S. creditors committee
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper however kept the door open for Awal to repetition the court provided it the bank agreed to establish such a committee. Groper told David Molton of Brown Rudnick LLP, the lawyers for Awal’s Bahrain Central Bank appointed administrator, Charles Russel LLP, that the committee was needed as a watchdog because US courts do not appoint administrators.
Groper suggested the request be resubmitted by Nov. 1, the deadline for the U.S. Trustee, which oversees U.S. bankruptcies, to seek candidates for a creditors committee. Alisdair Haythornthwaite of Bell Pottinger Middle East (UAE), speaking on behalf of Charles Russel said the administrator intended to follow the judge’s advice and reapply for Chapter 11 protection. Awal had argued that a U.S. creditors committee would duplicate proceedings in the Cayman Islands and the Middle East involving the bank’s largest creditors.
Awal Bank’s request for Chapter 11 came little more than a year after it had filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy in the same court. Chapter 15 bankruptcy seeks to protect companies from U.S. litigation while they reorganize in a non-U.S. court. Molton told the court that Awal Bank needed Chapter 11 protection to help it recover what it called “avoidable” transfers out of the estate prior to bankruptcy.
Defaults on loans last year by Awal Bank as well as Saudi conglomerate, Ahmad Hamad Al-Gosaibi & Brothers Co. set off a bitter legal battle on three continents between the two groups that are related by al Sanea’s marriage to a daughter of the Ghosaibi family. Gosaibi has accused Al-Sanea in court filings on three continents of siphoning off $10 billion from his in-laws.
Awal’s Chapter 11 court filing suggested that it would it file a reorganization plan or opt for liquidation in Bahrain rather than the United States. Even though the court papers kept reorganization on the table, the Chapter 11 filing suggests that liquidation is the more likely option. According to its court filing, Awal has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Under Bahrain law, the administrator has until the summer of next year to decide whether to liquidate Awal or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
Al-Gosaibi is seeking to recover $9.2 billion in lawsuits in the Cayman Islands against al-Sanea and Awal subsidiaries. The lawsuits were stayed after al-Sanea challenged the Cayman court’s jurisdiction, and an appeal of that decision is set to be heard in November. In July, New York State Supreme Judge Hon. Richard B. Lowe dismissed a lawsuit Al-Gosaibi had filed against Awal and al- Sanea, on grounds of that court being an improper forum. Court proceedings involving Awal are also ongoing in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Britain.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper however kept the door open for Awal to repetition the court provided it the bank agreed to establish such a committee. Groper told David Molton of Brown Rudnick LLP, the lawyers for Awal’s Bahrain Central Bank appointed administrator, Charles Russel LLP, that the committee was needed as a watchdog because US courts do not appoint administrators.
Groper suggested the request be resubmitted by Nov. 1, the deadline for the U.S. Trustee, which oversees U.S. bankruptcies, to seek candidates for a creditors committee. Alisdair Haythornthwaite of Bell Pottinger Middle East (UAE), speaking on behalf of Charles Russel said the administrator intended to follow the judge’s advice and reapply for Chapter 11 protection. Awal had argued that a U.S. creditors committee would duplicate proceedings in the Cayman Islands and the Middle East involving the bank’s largest creditors.
Awal Bank’s request for Chapter 11 came little more than a year after it had filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy in the same court. Chapter 15 bankruptcy seeks to protect companies from U.S. litigation while they reorganize in a non-U.S. court. Molton told the court that Awal Bank needed Chapter 11 protection to help it recover what it called “avoidable” transfers out of the estate prior to bankruptcy.
Defaults on loans last year by Awal Bank as well as Saudi conglomerate, Ahmad Hamad Al-Gosaibi & Brothers Co. set off a bitter legal battle on three continents between the two groups that are related by al Sanea’s marriage to a daughter of the Ghosaibi family. Gosaibi has accused Al-Sanea in court filings on three continents of siphoning off $10 billion from his in-laws.
Awal’s Chapter 11 court filing suggested that it would it file a reorganization plan or opt for liquidation in Bahrain rather than the United States. Even though the court papers kept reorganization on the table, the Chapter 11 filing suggests that liquidation is the more likely option. According to its court filing, Awal has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Under Bahrain law, the administrator has until the summer of next year to decide whether to liquidate Awal or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
Al-Gosaibi is seeking to recover $9.2 billion in lawsuits in the Cayman Islands against al-Sanea and Awal subsidiaries. The lawsuits were stayed after al-Sanea challenged the Cayman court’s jurisdiction, and an appeal of that decision is set to be heard in November. In July, New York State Supreme Judge Hon. Richard B. Lowe dismissed a lawsuit Al-Gosaibi had filed against Awal and al- Sanea, on grounds of that court being an improper forum. Court proceedings involving Awal are also ongoing in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Britain.
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Boomerangs in Yemen, Somalia
By James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
U.S. and European efforts to stabilize Yemen and Somalia are boomeranging. Rather than weakening militants in both countries, Western counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies are fueling radicalism and turning wide swathes of the population against the West.
With little real effort to economically and politically stabilize the two countries, U.S. military and security support for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the embattled head of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, exacerbates local fault lines and strengthens deep-seated anti-Americanism.
The backfiring of Western policies is compounded by a one-size-fits-all approach and a failure to address local grievances. To be sure, the Saleh and Ahmed governments are as much a part of the problem as they are part of the solution. This, and differences between the goals of Western nations and those of their regional allies, complicates efforts to embed security and military policy within initiatives to improve the population's economic lot and enhance good governance. Nonetheless, the incentive to get the policy right is compelling: Together Yemen and Somalia control key oil-export routes through the Gulf of Aden; mounting instability in both countries threatens regional stability in the oil-rich gulf and surrounding resource-rich African nations.
Western policy assumes that ungoverned spaces fuel instability and provide oxygen to al-Qaida's Yemeni affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and to al-Shabab in Somalia, rather than viewing both countries as territories with alternative power structures that, if properly engaged, could potentially further Western interests and undermine support for the militants. A recent Chatham House report (.pdf) concludes that "no amount of international support can compensate for the TFG's lack of internal legitimacy," a shortcoming clearly illustrated by the desertion of TFG military recruits to al-Shabab. By contrast, the emergence of stable forms of local government in Somalia based on reconciliation among clans calls into question assumptions that a lack of central-government control in Yemen must necessarily result in tribal safe havens for AQAP.
Western policy assumptions also fail to adequately distinguish between AQAP's global ambitions, which were demonstrated by the failed Christmas 2009 bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner, with al-Shabab's continued focus on regional, rather than Western targets. For instance, al-Shabab's twin attacks in June on soccer fans in Kampala, which killed 74 people, were aimed to persuade Uganda to withdraw its troops from the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia. Western policymakers also see Somali refugees as potential jihadist recruits, ignoring the fact that most of those who have fled the country did so to escape the Islamists.
The Obama administration earlier this year took a step toward expanding its regional focus beyond piracy to address the emergence of lucrative networks engaged in human trafficking as well as the smuggling of arms, drugs and fuel. To move against these networks, which often operate with the connivance of government and security officials, the administration imposed sanctions on Yemeni and Somali arms merchants with close government ties, coupled with increased efforts to strengthen the coast-guard capabilities of Yemen and Somaliland, a self-declared republic in northwest Somalia. Yet, such actions are likely to have limited effect as long as they fail to similarly align the interests of the Yemeni navy, controlled by the Defense Ministry, and the coast guard, reporting to the interior minister. They must also guarantee that these forces are complemented by an effective customs service and ensure that Somaliland anti-piracy efforts move beyond targeting only those activities that threaten the interests of government ministers.
The threat posed by misguided Western policy extends beyond the borders of Yemen and Somalia into their extensive diaspora communities. Yemenis and Somalis increasingly see the U.S. and Europe as aggressors seeking to exclude domestic actors, rather than enhancing their ability to resolve local issues and build a system that provides greater accountability. The Somali community in the United States is proving to be a fertile al-Shabab recruiting ground, while Somali-Americans constitute the largest contingent of U.S. nationals suspected of joining al-Qaida affiliates. Britain's MI5 Director-General Jonathan Evans warned last year that terrorist plots hatched in Somalia and Yemen pose an increasing threat to U.K. security.
Increasingly, Yemen and Somalia demonstrate the need for finding and supporting creative measures that involve the private sector and civic groups in efforts to deradicalize individuals and groups. Such measures do exist. One campaign backed by FIFA, soccer's world body, and local Somali businessmen has shown success at luring child soldiers away from the jihadists with a program whose slogan is "Put down the gun, pick up the ball."
Another key to a successful policy is to align Western interests and those of regional allies. In Yemen, a division of labor between the U.S. and the U.K. has emerged, whereby Washington focuses on security and London on economic issues. However, Saudi Arabia, Yemen's single largest donor, has no clear Yemen policy and simply wants to keep the country afloat. In their new book, "Yemen On the Brink," the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Marina Ottaway and Christopher Boucek caution, "Without strong pressure to address the systemic challenges facing the country, it is extremely doubtful that the Yemeni government will make any serious efforts to curb corruption, improve governance or address political grievances, which are directed against the government itself. As long as donors remain divided, there can be no such pressure on the government of Yemen."
International donors have already begun to use badly needed foreign assistance as leverage to force the Yemeni government to address the issues fueling radicalism. At a meeting earlier this year, they demanded that Yemen clearly explain how aid will be managed before monies are transferred. But such aid must also be coherently designed and integrated if it is to provide a perspective of change to significant chunks of the population and, with it, an alternative to militant Islam.
World Politics Review
U.S. and European efforts to stabilize Yemen and Somalia are boomeranging. Rather than weakening militants in both countries, Western counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies are fueling radicalism and turning wide swathes of the population against the West.
With little real effort to economically and politically stabilize the two countries, U.S. military and security support for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the embattled head of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, exacerbates local fault lines and strengthens deep-seated anti-Americanism.
The backfiring of Western policies is compounded by a one-size-fits-all approach and a failure to address local grievances. To be sure, the Saleh and Ahmed governments are as much a part of the problem as they are part of the solution. This, and differences between the goals of Western nations and those of their regional allies, complicates efforts to embed security and military policy within initiatives to improve the population's economic lot and enhance good governance. Nonetheless, the incentive to get the policy right is compelling: Together Yemen and Somalia control key oil-export routes through the Gulf of Aden; mounting instability in both countries threatens regional stability in the oil-rich gulf and surrounding resource-rich African nations.
Western policy assumes that ungoverned spaces fuel instability and provide oxygen to al-Qaida's Yemeni affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and to al-Shabab in Somalia, rather than viewing both countries as territories with alternative power structures that, if properly engaged, could potentially further Western interests and undermine support for the militants. A recent Chatham House report (.pdf) concludes that "no amount of international support can compensate for the TFG's lack of internal legitimacy," a shortcoming clearly illustrated by the desertion of TFG military recruits to al-Shabab. By contrast, the emergence of stable forms of local government in Somalia based on reconciliation among clans calls into question assumptions that a lack of central-government control in Yemen must necessarily result in tribal safe havens for AQAP.
Western policy assumptions also fail to adequately distinguish between AQAP's global ambitions, which were demonstrated by the failed Christmas 2009 bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner, with al-Shabab's continued focus on regional, rather than Western targets. For instance, al-Shabab's twin attacks in June on soccer fans in Kampala, which killed 74 people, were aimed to persuade Uganda to withdraw its troops from the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia. Western policymakers also see Somali refugees as potential jihadist recruits, ignoring the fact that most of those who have fled the country did so to escape the Islamists.
The Obama administration earlier this year took a step toward expanding its regional focus beyond piracy to address the emergence of lucrative networks engaged in human trafficking as well as the smuggling of arms, drugs and fuel. To move against these networks, which often operate with the connivance of government and security officials, the administration imposed sanctions on Yemeni and Somali arms merchants with close government ties, coupled with increased efforts to strengthen the coast-guard capabilities of Yemen and Somaliland, a self-declared republic in northwest Somalia. Yet, such actions are likely to have limited effect as long as they fail to similarly align the interests of the Yemeni navy, controlled by the Defense Ministry, and the coast guard, reporting to the interior minister. They must also guarantee that these forces are complemented by an effective customs service and ensure that Somaliland anti-piracy efforts move beyond targeting only those activities that threaten the interests of government ministers.
The threat posed by misguided Western policy extends beyond the borders of Yemen and Somalia into their extensive diaspora communities. Yemenis and Somalis increasingly see the U.S. and Europe as aggressors seeking to exclude domestic actors, rather than enhancing their ability to resolve local issues and build a system that provides greater accountability. The Somali community in the United States is proving to be a fertile al-Shabab recruiting ground, while Somali-Americans constitute the largest contingent of U.S. nationals suspected of joining al-Qaida affiliates. Britain's MI5 Director-General Jonathan Evans warned last year that terrorist plots hatched in Somalia and Yemen pose an increasing threat to U.K. security.
Increasingly, Yemen and Somalia demonstrate the need for finding and supporting creative measures that involve the private sector and civic groups in efforts to deradicalize individuals and groups. Such measures do exist. One campaign backed by FIFA, soccer's world body, and local Somali businessmen has shown success at luring child soldiers away from the jihadists with a program whose slogan is "Put down the gun, pick up the ball."
Another key to a successful policy is to align Western interests and those of regional allies. In Yemen, a division of labor between the U.S. and the U.K. has emerged, whereby Washington focuses on security and London on economic issues. However, Saudi Arabia, Yemen's single largest donor, has no clear Yemen policy and simply wants to keep the country afloat. In their new book, "Yemen On the Brink," the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Marina Ottaway and Christopher Boucek caution, "Without strong pressure to address the systemic challenges facing the country, it is extremely doubtful that the Yemeni government will make any serious efforts to curb corruption, improve governance or address political grievances, which are directed against the government itself. As long as donors remain divided, there can be no such pressure on the government of Yemen."
International donors have already begun to use badly needed foreign assistance as leverage to force the Yemeni government to address the issues fueling radicalism. At a meeting earlier this year, they demanded that Yemen clearly explain how aid will be managed before monies are transferred. But such aid must also be coherently designed and integrated if it is to provide a perspective of change to significant chunks of the population and, with it, an alternative to militant Islam.
Monday, October 25, 2010
Oil Deposits Fuel Tension in Eastern Mediterranean
Oil and gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean are notching up tension in a region that already has its fair share of pernicious disputes. Rival communities on the divided island of Cyprus as well as Turkey and arch enemies Lebanon and Israel are racing to stake their claims in what is one of the world’s newest oil frontiers.
The deposits may be minor compared to those of the oil-majors in the Gulf, but for small nations in the eastern Mediterranean they promise to be substantial. Yet, rather than providing an opportunity to enhance stability through economic cooperation, the discoveries are raising the specter of renewed conflict as the parties strike deals to start exploration.
Complicating matters is the fact that the deposits are all in international waters, historically a reason to call in the gun boats in the absence of a production-sharing agreement. The potential threat is heightened by the fact that Israel and Lebanon are locked into a state of war while Turkey backs its Turkish Cypriot brethren in their communal dispute with the majority Greek islanders. While Israel and Lebanon have warned that their economic rights in the eastern Mediterranean could constitute a casus belli, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities have so far steered clear of military threats in their perennial disputes over oil and gas.
Tension is nonetheless mounting with last week’s Turkish announcement that it is about to start exploring for oil off the coast of northern Cyprus, the breakaway Turkish Cypriot states that hosts an estimated 40,000 Turkish troops. For its part, the internationally recognized government of Greek Cyprus is negotiating oil exploration deals with Lebanon.
For now, Israel may be the party laughing all the way to the bank. Lebanon has yet to achieve agreement with Cyprus and Syria on its economic boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Israel has completed preliminary exploration on the back of an agreement with Cyprus and is preparing to begin extracting black gold. Lebanon will no doubt assert that Israel is drilling in Lebanese territory, but will need years to prove its claim and given Israeli military superiority is unlikely to be able to do much about it.
Nonetheless, the race for resources will only complicate efforts to reduce tension in a region that already has sufficient flash points.
The deposits may be minor compared to those of the oil-majors in the Gulf, but for small nations in the eastern Mediterranean they promise to be substantial. Yet, rather than providing an opportunity to enhance stability through economic cooperation, the discoveries are raising the specter of renewed conflict as the parties strike deals to start exploration.
Complicating matters is the fact that the deposits are all in international waters, historically a reason to call in the gun boats in the absence of a production-sharing agreement. The potential threat is heightened by the fact that Israel and Lebanon are locked into a state of war while Turkey backs its Turkish Cypriot brethren in their communal dispute with the majority Greek islanders. While Israel and Lebanon have warned that their economic rights in the eastern Mediterranean could constitute a casus belli, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities have so far steered clear of military threats in their perennial disputes over oil and gas.
Tension is nonetheless mounting with last week’s Turkish announcement that it is about to start exploring for oil off the coast of northern Cyprus, the breakaway Turkish Cypriot states that hosts an estimated 40,000 Turkish troops. For its part, the internationally recognized government of Greek Cyprus is negotiating oil exploration deals with Lebanon.
For now, Israel may be the party laughing all the way to the bank. Lebanon has yet to achieve agreement with Cyprus and Syria on its economic boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Israel has completed preliminary exploration on the back of an agreement with Cyprus and is preparing to begin extracting black gold. Lebanon will no doubt assert that Israel is drilling in Lebanese territory, but will need years to prove its claim and given Israeli military superiority is unlikely to be able to do much about it.
Nonetheless, the race for resources will only complicate efforts to reduce tension in a region that already has sufficient flash points.
Dutch Jihadist Recants
A key figure in one of militant Islam’s European networks has joined the ranks of a small but important number of jihadists who have had a change of heart and are calling on their brethren to abandon violence.
Writing from the Vught maximum security prison in the Netherlands, Jason Walters, a leading member of the Hofstad Group that police say was responsible for the 2004 killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, declared that “the ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt.”
Walters’ letter, published in Trouw, a Dutch daily, offers a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence; it contributes to understanding why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
The son of an African-American father and Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 and in 2003 made his way to Pakistan from where he returned to boast that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again." Accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsh Ali, Walters resisted arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police.
Unlike the recantations of jihadist ideologues such as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif who employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, Walters who is serving a 15-year sentence, denounces a basic tenant of his former worldview that holds that in a world of believers and infidels, the infidels seek to destroy the believers. It is a view Walters now describes as “a childish and coarse simplification of reality” that ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich.”
Analysts say Walters’ letter, or review document as he describes it, is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe.
Writing from the Vught maximum security prison in the Netherlands, Jason Walters, a leading member of the Hofstad Group that police say was responsible for the 2004 killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, declared that “the ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt.”
Walters’ letter, published in Trouw, a Dutch daily, offers a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence; it contributes to understanding why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
The son of an African-American father and Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 and in 2003 made his way to Pakistan from where he returned to boast that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again." Accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsh Ali, Walters resisted arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police.
Unlike the recantations of jihadist ideologues such as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif who employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, Walters who is serving a 15-year sentence, denounces a basic tenant of his former worldview that holds that in a world of believers and infidels, the infidels seek to destroy the believers. It is a view Walters now describes as “a childish and coarse simplification of reality” that ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich.”
Analysts say Walters’ letter, or review document as he describes it, is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe.
A Rarely Told Story: Muslims Save Jews
A Jewish community synagogue in Missouri is focusing attention on a rarely told story about Muslims who saved Jews amid controversy in the United States over plans to build an Islamic cultural center near Ground Zero in New York and mounting anti-Muslim fervor in Europe.
Temple Emmanuel in Creve Couer, a small town in St. Louis County, is hosting an exhibition that explains why predominantly Muslim Albania emerged from World War Two as the only European country to boast a larger number of Jews than it had housed prior to the Holocaust.
The exhibition tells the virtually unknown story through the pictures of fine art photographer Norman H. Gershman, who on visits to Albania and Kosovo found some 150 Muslim families who had taken part in the rescue of Jews under Nazi occupation. It is a story of Muslims who risked their lives to live by a code of faith and honor they call Besa and that saved the lives of more than 2,000 Albanian Jews and Jewish refugees.
Besa, says Dr. Ghazala Hayat, a St. Louis University neurologist and Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis spokesperson, is Albanian for the Islamic code that requires Muslims to endanger their own lives if necessary to save the life of those seeking asylum; it is code that remains a moral law in Albania that supersedes religious differences and blood feuds.
Emmanuel Temple Rabbi Justin Kerber says his community is hosting the exhibition because “at this time of tension over Islam, there is so much more to understanding Islam."
Gershman’s pictures tell a lifetime of stories. "I did nothing special. All Jews are our brothers," says a man portrayed in the exhibition, who was among those hid Jews from the Nazis. A leader of the Bektashis, a primarily Balkan and Turkish Muslim sect that blends Shiite and Sufi concepts, recalls an Albanian prime minister secretly ordering during the German occupation that “all Jewish children will sleep with your children, all will eat the same food, and all will live as one family."
Temple Emmanuel in Creve Couer, a small town in St. Louis County, is hosting an exhibition that explains why predominantly Muslim Albania emerged from World War Two as the only European country to boast a larger number of Jews than it had housed prior to the Holocaust.
The exhibition tells the virtually unknown story through the pictures of fine art photographer Norman H. Gershman, who on visits to Albania and Kosovo found some 150 Muslim families who had taken part in the rescue of Jews under Nazi occupation. It is a story of Muslims who risked their lives to live by a code of faith and honor they call Besa and that saved the lives of more than 2,000 Albanian Jews and Jewish refugees.
Besa, says Dr. Ghazala Hayat, a St. Louis University neurologist and Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis spokesperson, is Albanian for the Islamic code that requires Muslims to endanger their own lives if necessary to save the life of those seeking asylum; it is code that remains a moral law in Albania that supersedes religious differences and blood feuds.
Emmanuel Temple Rabbi Justin Kerber says his community is hosting the exhibition because “at this time of tension over Islam, there is so much more to understanding Islam."
Gershman’s pictures tell a lifetime of stories. "I did nothing special. All Jews are our brothers," says a man portrayed in the exhibition, who was among those hid Jews from the Nazis. A leader of the Bektashis, a primarily Balkan and Turkish Muslim sect that blends Shiite and Sufi concepts, recalls an Albanian prime minister secretly ordering during the German occupation that “all Jewish children will sleep with your children, all will eat the same food, and all will live as one family."
Friday, October 22, 2010
Saad-owned Bahrain Bank Files for Bankruptcy
In a move that is likely to leave creditors high and dry, Awal Bank BSC, a Bahrain-based subsidiary of Saudi Arabia’s embattled Saad group, has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in a New York bankruptcy court. The filing comes little more than a year after the bank sought US court protection from US creditors and is in line with recommendations made in a report by Ernst & Young.
According to its court filing, Awal Bank has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Bahrain’s central bank last summer appointed an administrator for Awal Bank, owned by Saudi billionaire Maan al-Sanea, after it had defaulted on loans in a sequence of defaults that has sparked a bitter legal battle across continents between Al Sanea’s Saad Group and Saudi conglomerate Ahmad Hamad Al-Gosaibi & Brothers Co. Under Bahrain law, the Bahrain central Bank-appointed administrator has until the summer of next year to decide whether to liquidate Awal bank or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal Bank is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal Bank asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
According to its court filing, Awal Bank has assets valued at most at $100 million and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Bahrain’s central bank last summer appointed an administrator for Awal Bank, owned by Saudi billionaire Maan al-Sanea, after it had defaulted on loans in a sequence of defaults that has sparked a bitter legal battle across continents between Al Sanea’s Saad Group and Saudi conglomerate Ahmad Hamad Al-Gosaibi & Brothers Co. Under Bahrain law, the Bahrain central Bank-appointed administrator has until the summer of next year to decide whether to liquidate Awal bank or return it to its owners.
Assuming that the bankruptcy filing was made with the consent of the Bahrain Central Bank, the filing suggests that Bahrain has decided that Awal Bank is beyond salvation and should be liquidated. In its filing, Awal Bank asserts that after payment of the administrators and other immediate expenses, it will not be able to compensate its unsecured creditors, who number somewhere between 60 and 100 and include: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Bank of Montreal, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Boubyan Bank, Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Fortis Bank, Gulf International Bank, HSBC, HSH Nordbank AG, JP Morgan, Kuwait Finance House and The International Banking Corporation.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Turkish-Syrian Cooperation Sparks Crackdown on PKK
Even Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has expressed surprised at the speed at which Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyeb Erdogan is pushing cooperation between the two erstwhile enemies, one a member of NATO, the other Iran’s closest ally and a supporter of militant Islamic groups.
Close cooperation between Turkey and Syria, which almost went to war a decade ago because of Syrian support for the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), is fueling mounting concern in Western capitals about a newly-found Turkish foreign policy focus on the Arab and Islamic world.
But closer ties with Syria have already produced results for Turkey: Syria is cracking down on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that has been waging an intermittent guerrilla war in southeastern Turkey since the early 1980s that has cost some 40,000 lives. Syrian authorities have arrested hundreds of Kurds in recent months on suspicion of ties to the PKK, which has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.
Erdogan paid a visit to Damascus this week to discuss cooperation between the two countries with Iran and Iraq in a bid to persuade them to join the crackdown on the Turkish Kurdish militants. Turkey has rewarded Syria with trade and tourism agreements and the lifting of visa requirements for Syrian nationals travelling to Turkey.
Stepped-up Turkish-Syrian cooperation comes as the Turkish parliament discusses extending the government’s mandate to conduct cross-border raids on PKK bases in predominantly Kurdish northern Iraq. Turkey has vowed to continue its fight against the militants despite the declaration in September of a unilateral ceasefire by the PKK.
The Turkish refusal and the raids are straining relations between Turkey and autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan and threaten to undermine Turkish efforts to normalize relations with the Iraqi Kurds and ensure stability on its southeastern border.
Close cooperation between Turkey and Syria, which almost went to war a decade ago because of Syrian support for the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), is fueling mounting concern in Western capitals about a newly-found Turkish foreign policy focus on the Arab and Islamic world.
But closer ties with Syria have already produced results for Turkey: Syria is cracking down on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that has been waging an intermittent guerrilla war in southeastern Turkey since the early 1980s that has cost some 40,000 lives. Syrian authorities have arrested hundreds of Kurds in recent months on suspicion of ties to the PKK, which has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.
Erdogan paid a visit to Damascus this week to discuss cooperation between the two countries with Iran and Iraq in a bid to persuade them to join the crackdown on the Turkish Kurdish militants. Turkey has rewarded Syria with trade and tourism agreements and the lifting of visa requirements for Syrian nationals travelling to Turkey.
Stepped-up Turkish-Syrian cooperation comes as the Turkish parliament discusses extending the government’s mandate to conduct cross-border raids on PKK bases in predominantly Kurdish northern Iraq. Turkey has vowed to continue its fight against the militants despite the declaration in September of a unilateral ceasefire by the PKK.
The Turkish refusal and the raids are straining relations between Turkey and autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan and threaten to undermine Turkish efforts to normalize relations with the Iraqi Kurds and ensure stability on its southeastern border.
U.S., Europe Press GCC States on Yemen Membership
By James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
The United States and Europe are pressuring oil-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) to forge closer ties with Yemen in a bid to link the fight against al-Qaida to tangible economic benefits for the Arab world's poorest nation.
U.S. officials say the Obama administration recently conveyed to GCC leaders Yemen's reiteration of its 10-year-old request for GCC membership. The officials believe that U.S. and European endorsement of the request will prompt GCC leaders to respond more favorably when they meet in Abu Dhabi in December.
The U.S. and Europe are exerting pressure against the backdrop of an increasing number of attacks in Yemen on foreign diplomats and nationals. Suspected operatives of al-Qaida's Yemen-based affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), last week fired a rocket at a British embassy vehicle in the capital San'a. Employees of Austrian energy giant OMV were injured in a separate incident. The attacks on foreigners follow scores of incidents targeting Yemeni military and government officials. AQAP has killed some 100 Yemeni security and intelligence personnel in recent months in hit-and-run attacks launched by assassins on motorcycles using grenades and AK-47s.
The GCC's vested interest in ensuring stability in Yemen coupled with the Gulf's reliance for its security on the U.S. -- and to a lesser extent Europe -- militates in favor of the GCC moving beyond its repeated rejections of Yemen's aspirations. Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, see their security threatened by AQAP as well as the Yemeni government's intermittent war against tribal rebels in the north and its fight with secessionists in the south.
The GCC, in a prelude to closer relations, has admitted Yemen to several of its institutions, including its councils of health, education, sports and culture ministers. GCC members also contribute substantially to funding of the Yemeni government's payroll. The GCC agreed last month at a meeting in New York of the Friends of Yemen, which groups 22 nations concerned about the growing strength of jihadists in the country, to open an office in San'a that would "help all donors to plan, coordinate and deliver assistance to Yemen more efficiently." GCC members have held back billions of dollars in aid pledged to Yemen because of concerns that the country would not be able to absorb the funds, and also due to widespread Yemeni corruption -- a weak argument for Gulf states that have transparency issues of their own.
A political marriage between the Gulf states and Yemen is likely to prove difficult for the conservative GCC members. In many ways, Yemen and the GCC states have little in common beyond geography and their Arab identity. Yemen is a republican democracy, at least in name, that ousted its royals in the 1960s; GCC members are all authoritarian monarchies that have forgotten that they once wallowed in the same abject poverty Yemen suffers today. Gulf leaders, particularly in Kuwait, have never really forgiven Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh for his support of Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War, in which U.S.-led forces reversed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni officials concede that in order to persuade the GCC, the government will have to improve the security situation, narrow the economic divide with the Gulf states and significantly reduce the country's addiction to qat, a plant stimulant consumed by a majority of Yemenis that is classified by the World Health Organization as a drug.
In lieu of granting Yemen full membership, the GCC is likely to look at ways of improving employment prospects for Yemenis. Yemen's economic problems were exacerbated in the early 1990s when Saudi Arabia expelled some 1 million Yemeni workers in retaliation for Yemen's support of Saddam. The expulsion deprived Yemen of badly needed remittances that were often invested into small and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the backbone of the Yemeni economy. GCC member states are discussing allowing Yemeni workers to return -- a move that segments of Gulf society, concerned about the high number of foreign, non-Arab workers in their countries, would welcome.
Twenty years on, many Yemeni workers lack the employment skills that Gulf states now require. One way GCC states may seek to compensate for that would be to grant Yemenis access to the same professional and technical training available to Gulf nationals. GCC states are also likely to fund job-creation programs in Yemen. A report commissioned by the Yemeni government recently estimated that Yemen needs to create 4 million new jobs in the next 10 years. A Saudi delegation visited Yemen this weekend as part of a project to develop Yemeni educational programs, prepare Yemeni trainers and help the government draft regulations for the Higher Yemeni Technical Institute, which is funded by the Islamic Development Bank and South Korea.
A recent report (.pdf) by a London School of Economics researcher suggested that stabilizing Yemen was a key GCC interest because the country's problems potentially foreshadow problems that could emerge elsewhere in the Gulf. "Yemen is the canary in the coal mine. It is an indication of what can go wrong when a country fails to develop political legitimacy and build a sustainable, productive non-oil economy," said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, the author of the report. "The challenges to government authority in southern and northern Yemen demonstrate how existing socio-economic discontent and regional marginalization can fracture and fragment social cohesion. Similar fissures and unequal patterns of access to resources exist in the GCC states and could become transmitters of conflict in the future."
The United States and Europe share GCC concerns about Yemen's lack of good governance. Getting the GCC to assume responsibility for helping Yemen ensure that its development aid is put to proper use will have the added advantage of focusing Gulf attention on transparency issues within the GCC itself.
World Politics Review
The United States and Europe are pressuring oil-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) to forge closer ties with Yemen in a bid to link the fight against al-Qaida to tangible economic benefits for the Arab world's poorest nation.
U.S. officials say the Obama administration recently conveyed to GCC leaders Yemen's reiteration of its 10-year-old request for GCC membership. The officials believe that U.S. and European endorsement of the request will prompt GCC leaders to respond more favorably when they meet in Abu Dhabi in December.
The U.S. and Europe are exerting pressure against the backdrop of an increasing number of attacks in Yemen on foreign diplomats and nationals. Suspected operatives of al-Qaida's Yemen-based affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), last week fired a rocket at a British embassy vehicle in the capital San'a. Employees of Austrian energy giant OMV were injured in a separate incident. The attacks on foreigners follow scores of incidents targeting Yemeni military and government officials. AQAP has killed some 100 Yemeni security and intelligence personnel in recent months in hit-and-run attacks launched by assassins on motorcycles using grenades and AK-47s.
The GCC's vested interest in ensuring stability in Yemen coupled with the Gulf's reliance for its security on the U.S. -- and to a lesser extent Europe -- militates in favor of the GCC moving beyond its repeated rejections of Yemen's aspirations. Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, see their security threatened by AQAP as well as the Yemeni government's intermittent war against tribal rebels in the north and its fight with secessionists in the south.
The GCC, in a prelude to closer relations, has admitted Yemen to several of its institutions, including its councils of health, education, sports and culture ministers. GCC members also contribute substantially to funding of the Yemeni government's payroll. The GCC agreed last month at a meeting in New York of the Friends of Yemen, which groups 22 nations concerned about the growing strength of jihadists in the country, to open an office in San'a that would "help all donors to plan, coordinate and deliver assistance to Yemen more efficiently." GCC members have held back billions of dollars in aid pledged to Yemen because of concerns that the country would not be able to absorb the funds, and also due to widespread Yemeni corruption -- a weak argument for Gulf states that have transparency issues of their own.
A political marriage between the Gulf states and Yemen is likely to prove difficult for the conservative GCC members. In many ways, Yemen and the GCC states have little in common beyond geography and their Arab identity. Yemen is a republican democracy, at least in name, that ousted its royals in the 1960s; GCC members are all authoritarian monarchies that have forgotten that they once wallowed in the same abject poverty Yemen suffers today. Gulf leaders, particularly in Kuwait, have never really forgiven Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh for his support of Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War, in which U.S.-led forces reversed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni officials concede that in order to persuade the GCC, the government will have to improve the security situation, narrow the economic divide with the Gulf states and significantly reduce the country's addiction to qat, a plant stimulant consumed by a majority of Yemenis that is classified by the World Health Organization as a drug.
In lieu of granting Yemen full membership, the GCC is likely to look at ways of improving employment prospects for Yemenis. Yemen's economic problems were exacerbated in the early 1990s when Saudi Arabia expelled some 1 million Yemeni workers in retaliation for Yemen's support of Saddam. The expulsion deprived Yemen of badly needed remittances that were often invested into small and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the backbone of the Yemeni economy. GCC member states are discussing allowing Yemeni workers to return -- a move that segments of Gulf society, concerned about the high number of foreign, non-Arab workers in their countries, would welcome.
Twenty years on, many Yemeni workers lack the employment skills that Gulf states now require. One way GCC states may seek to compensate for that would be to grant Yemenis access to the same professional and technical training available to Gulf nationals. GCC states are also likely to fund job-creation programs in Yemen. A report commissioned by the Yemeni government recently estimated that Yemen needs to create 4 million new jobs in the next 10 years. A Saudi delegation visited Yemen this weekend as part of a project to develop Yemeni educational programs, prepare Yemeni trainers and help the government draft regulations for the Higher Yemeni Technical Institute, which is funded by the Islamic Development Bank and South Korea.
A recent report (.pdf) by a London School of Economics researcher suggested that stabilizing Yemen was a key GCC interest because the country's problems potentially foreshadow problems that could emerge elsewhere in the Gulf. "Yemen is the canary in the coal mine. It is an indication of what can go wrong when a country fails to develop political legitimacy and build a sustainable, productive non-oil economy," said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, the author of the report. "The challenges to government authority in southern and northern Yemen demonstrate how existing socio-economic discontent and regional marginalization can fracture and fragment social cohesion. Similar fissures and unequal patterns of access to resources exist in the GCC states and could become transmitters of conflict in the future."
The United States and Europe share GCC concerns about Yemen's lack of good governance. Getting the GCC to assume responsibility for helping Yemen ensure that its development aid is put to proper use will have the added advantage of focusing Gulf attention on transparency issues within the GCC itself.
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