Twin Threats of Protests and Cessation Set Stage for Change in MidEast and North Africa

By James M. Dorsey

A rare wave of protests across the Arab world against widespread economic mismanagement, unemployment, corruption and lack of civil liberties as well as the probable partition of Sudan potentially set the stage for the redrawing of the political map of the Middle East and North Africa.

The protests and referendum likely to establish oil-rich southern Sudan as an independent state spotlight the failure of most Middle Eastern and North African regimes to provide economic prospects for their populations and guarantee security and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities. A spate of recent deadly attacks targeting Christians in Iraq and Egypt has further focused attention on inflamed religious and ethnic tensions and the region’s lack of minority rights.

Middle Eastern governments fear, according to officials and Western diplomats, that an independent southern Sudan will fuel nationalist aspirations of rebels in Darfur, secessionists in southern Yemen; Shiite rebels in northern Yemen; non-Islamist controlled parts of Somalia; Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey; Berbers across North Africa and Azerbaijanis in northern Iran. The region’s military and security dominated regimes also worry that the protests will further embolden their populations to vent boiling anger and pent-up frustration with long-standing authoritarian, corrupt and incompetent rule. Last week’s warning by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that record food prices are likely to increase even more as a result of erratic global weather patterns threatens to further tempers and tensions.

Several Arab states have moved to curb commodity prices in a bid to prevent the riots from spreading to their countries. Libya abolished taxes and custom duties on wheat-based products, rice, vegetable oil, sugar and infant milk. Morocco has begun subsidizing imports to ensure that the price of soft milling wheat does not rise in tunes with hikes on world markets.

Jordanian King Abdullah in a bid to prevent an escalation of mounting tension between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians this week ordered his government to reduce prices of commodities, particularly rice and sugar, freeze plans to raise public transportation fees and accelerate initiation of job creation projects. The order came as Jordanian trade unions called for nationwide demonstrations on Friday to demand better living standards and the resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifai. Jordan’s Islamist opposition said it had yet to decide whether it would support the protest, but warned that price hikes would spark “an unprecedented explosion” similar to the turmoil in Tunisia and Algeria.

“The government is seeking to contain mounting public resentment. Events in Tunisia and Algeria are forcing it to act because Jordanians have seen that protests produce results,” says Mohammed Masri, an analyst at the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies. Masri was referring to Algeria’s weekend decision to reduce commodity prices in response to sustained daily protests that left at least three people dead, the Tunisian government’s inability to quell a month of demonstrations in which so far up to 50 people are believed to have been killed and Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali’s bid this week to meet some of the protestor’s demands by announcing that he would not again run for office when his term ends in 2014, firing his interior minister, promising to release detained demonstrators and launching an investigation into corruption. “Price hikes are certain to increase anger at the government’s policies,” said Zaki Bani Rsheid, a Jordanian Islamic Action Front spokesman.

While the demonstrations in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt as well as recent soccer riots in Jordan and Iran and human rights-related protests in Kuwait are unlikely to immediately overturn governments, they signal a growing popular refusal across the region to continue to accept the status quo. Even in Saudi Arabia where public protests are particularly rare, unemployed teachers are publicly protesting government job creation policies. Tunisian trade unions have said they would continue their protests despite Ben Ali’s announced concessions.

The hardening of the region’s social and economic battle lines creates stark choices for both Middle Eastern and Western governments. Desperate to cling to power, Middle Eastern regimes are likely to increase repression coupled with window dressing measures that create the impression of responding to widespread discontent rather than opt for real political, economic and social reform. This week’s concessions by Ben Ali come after the president’s efforts to squash the protests by charging that the protesters were being manipulated by foreign terrorists failed. Ben Ali’s assertion contrasted starkly with the fact that Al Qaeda’s North African affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has been conspicuously silent about the ongoing turmoil in its theater of operations and the fact that the protests were void of any Islamist tint.

Western diplomats say that the fact that a majority of the dead in Tunisia were killed by security forces after the Obama administration, the European Union and the United Nations called on Tunisia to exercise restraint in the use of force and respect fundamental freedoms point to a sense of alarm within the government that makes it less susceptible to US and European pressure. “It’s inconceivable that they are not worried that this is the beginning of the end,” one diplomat said.

On a visit to Qatar this week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton nonetheless signaled that the United States and its European allies may be less persistent in their long-standing preference for stability in the Middle East and North Africa rather than democracy that could initially bring Islamic and more nationalist forces to power – a policy that has fueled anti-Western sentiment among large segments of the region’s population.

Addressing the Forum for the Future launched in 2004 by the G-8 group of industrial nations as a way to promote growth of nongovernmental civil group, Clinton bluntly challenged Middle Eastern leaders to open their political systems and economies and warned that "the region's foundations are sinking into the sand." Clinton said the region's governments need to share power with civic and volunteer groups to tackle issues like exploding populations, stagnant economies and declining natural resources. Pointing to unemployment rates of 20% and up, the secretary said "people have grown tired of corrupt institutions and a stagnant political order" and are demanding reforms, including eradication of corruption.

Saudi Arabia Prepares to Hand Power to a Younger Generation

These are uncertain times for Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer and a key ally in the struggle against militant Islam. The conservative kingdom is balancing on the cuff of a change in leadership that threatens to introduce a period of volatility as the health of its most senior, octogenarian royals falters. At risk, is continued reform designed to curb the sharp ends of the kingdom’s puritan interpretation of Islam and create greater economic and social prospects and opportunity.

Fuelling the uncertainty is the fact that understanding the inner workings of the ruling royal family is akin to the art of reading tea leaves. That art is in high demand with 86-year old reformist King Abdullah recuperating in New York from an operation to relieve haematoma resulting from a prolapsed disc. Abdullah’s illness is not life-threatening, but has raised the spectre of a Saudi Arabia ruled by a succession of short-lived monarchs. The king’s medical treatment comes weeks after he appointed his son as commander of the National Guard, the Bedouin force responsible for the royal family’s security, and the return to the kingdom of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the United States who is a consummate dealmaker. Taken together, these developments suggest that Saudi Arabia’s ruling family may be preparing for a gradual transfer of power to its next generation.

The stakes for Saudi Arabia as well as its western allies are high. Concern focuses on whether Abdullah’s reforms intended to defeat militant Islam, liberalize the economy, reduce unemployment, fight corruption, limit the power of the conservative, religious establishment and reform the judiciary have taken sufficient root to survive his rule. The reforms challenge basic tenants of the powerful clergy’s puritan interpretation of Islam that coupled with the lack of economic opportunity creates a breeding ground for religious militants. Saud Arabia’s recent announcement of the arrest of 149 primarily Saudi members of Al Qaeda and revelations that the curriculum of some 40 Saudi schools in Britain and Ireland preach hatred, racism and incitement to violence underlines the urgency of continued reform in the kingdom.

In an absolute monarchy in which passes down the line of aging sons of King Abdulaziz, the kingdom’s founder, Abdullah’s most probable immediate successors are grappling with health issues of their own. 84-year old Crown Prince and Defence Minister Prince Sultan, returned to Saudi Arabia on the eve of Abdullah’s departure from a two-year absence due to illness. Their younger brother, Prince Nayef, the 76 year-old interior minister who is third in line, may not be healthy enough to fully take over the reins of power when his time comes. Nayef, moreover, is widely viewed as a hard line and conservative, raising questions about whether he would pursue reform with the same zeal as Abdullah.

Tension between Sultan and Nayef could well erupt in a post-Abdullah Saudi Arabia as the kingdom prepares to hand the reins to the next generation, Abdulaziz’s grandsons who may not be as amenable as their elders to compromise in the competition for power. Abdullah’s creation in 2006 of an Allegiance Council made up of Abdulaziz’s surviving sons and grandsons to confirm the nomination of crown princes was intended to formally involve the next generation in the succession process. It could well serve as a platform to fuel their ambitions.

The creation of the council signalled that Saudi leaders were envisioning the day on which power would pass to their sons. Abdullah reinforced this view by in November appointing Prince Mutaib, his 57-year old son to replace him as commander of the National Guard. In a country in which senior prince’s run their ministries as family fiefdoms, the appointment was widely seen as Abdullah emphasizing that it was time to start turning over power to the next generation and possibly kick starting changes in anticipation of a changing of the guard while at the same time reducing the risk of a power struggle within the family.

In this scenario, Prince Sultan would step down as defence minister in favour of Khalid bin Sultan, his deputy and son who gained prominence as commander of Arab forces during the 1991 expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. Critics hold Khalid responsible for tactical mistakes that caused higher than necessary Saudi casualties in fighting last year against rebels in Yemeni tribal areas bordering on the kingdom. Further change would involve the succession of ailing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal by his brother, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence who served as ambassador to Britain and then the United States. Similarly, Prince Nayef would is likely succeeded as interior minister by Prince Mohammed, his son and deputy minister who has earned praise for his leadership in battling the Islamists.

The envisioned changes leave open the question of who will ultimately emerge as the monarch to steer Saudi Arabia through continued reform designed to eradicate the grounds on which the militants feed and ensure that the economy can compete in the 21st century. For much of the past decade, reformers and Western officials saw the 74-year old long-standing governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, a full brother of Prince Nayef, as their preferred candidate. Recently, however, Prince Khalid al-Faisal, the 69-year old governor of Mecca, an accomplished poet and painter known for his friendship with Britain’s Prince Charles and his successful administration of the province of Asir, home to several of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, appears to be emerging as a compromise candidate.

All of this amounts to little more than reading tea leaves. The good news, however, is that Saudi Arabia’s most powerful princes appear determined to reduce the risk of volatility by seeking to ensure a smooth generational transition that would allow the kingdom to push ahead with the reforms needed to create a more open, competitive economy capable of offering Saudis prospects that compete with the dire alternative put forward by Islamist militants.

Al Qaeda Threat Heightens Need to Resolve Western Sahara

It’s hard to see the United States’ faltering efforts to resolve the seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a model for conflict resolution. Yet, parallels between the Middle East conflict and the Arab world’s other seemingly intractable dispute in the Western Sahara that has soured relations between Morocco and Algeria, suggest otherwise.

Resolution of the 35-year old conflict, one of Africa’s longest festering disputes, has become more urgent with the realization that lack of cooperation between North African and Sahel nations undermines efforts to stem the rise of Al Qaida’s affiliate in the region, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The need to align North African nations was driven home by AQIM’s brazen kidnapping in Niger in September of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, that threatens France's major source of uranium. Algeria, which backs Polisario, the Sahrawi liberation movement in its dispute with Morocco, last month refused to participate in a meeting in the Malian capital Bamako organized by the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group to discuss AQIM because of the presence of Moroccan representatives.

While there are obvious differences between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the conflict in the Western Sahara, similarities between the two suggest that the most recent Middle East peacemaking experience may be applicable.

At the heart of both conflicts is annexation of territory that has displaced population groups and subjected them to occupation. The parties to both conflicts pay lip service to international peace efforts but in practice act to subvert them. Both conflicts position a Western-backed ally against a liberation movement supported by influential regional powers. The United States and Europe, despite their support for the occupying power in both conflicts, pay lip service to the rights of the dispossessed.

It is these similarities that positions Middle East peacemaking as a model for preventing the festering conflict in the Sahara from playing into AQIM’s hands. The Obama’s administration message to Israel that security can only be achieved by accommodating Palestinian national aspirations is applicable to Morocco too: regional security demands a two-state solution. Morocco and the Sahrawis need to agree on a formula that balances Moroccan claims of sovereignty with Sahrawi demands for independence.

The roadmap adopted by the Middle East Quartet, which groups the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia is equally applicable to the Western Sahara based on UN Security Council resolutions that call for a negotiated solution and recognition of the Sahrawi right to self-determination. A Saharan roadmap would allow the international community to empower former US diplomat and current UN envoy Chris Ross with the same mandate given to US Middle East peace negotiator George Mitchell: impose a one-year deadline within which the parties seriously negotiate a resolution of their seemingly intractable differences.

To provide the roadmap, the international community would have to come together as it did in the case of the Middle East rather than ignoring the dispute in the Sahara or adopting contradictory policies.In the past the United States was the only power seeking to bring the parties to the negotiating table with little support from its fellow council members. That is no longer a tenable situation with AQIM’s increasingly brazen operations and threats by Polisario, the Saharan liberation movement, to revive its armed struggle.

U.S., Europe Press GCC States on Yemen Membership

By James M. Dorsey

World Politics Review

The United States and Europe are pressuring oil-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) to forge closer ties with Yemen in a bid to link the fight against al-Qaida to tangible economic benefits for the Arab world's poorest nation.

U.S. officials say the Obama administration recently conveyed to GCC leaders Yemen's reiteration of its 10-year-old request for GCC membership. The officials believe that U.S. and European endorsement of the request will prompt GCC leaders to respond more favorably when they meet in Abu Dhabi in December.

The U.S. and Europe are exerting pressure against the backdrop of an increasing number of attacks in Yemen on foreign diplomats and nationals. Suspected operatives of al-Qaida's Yemen-based affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), last week fired a rocket at a British embassy vehicle in the capital San'a. Employees of Austrian energy giant OMV were injured in a separate incident. The attacks on foreigners follow scores of incidents targeting Yemeni military and government officials. AQAP has killed some 100 Yemeni security and intelligence personnel in recent months in hit-and-run attacks launched by assassins on motorcycles using grenades and AK-47s.

The GCC's vested interest in ensuring stability in Yemen coupled with the Gulf's reliance for its security on the U.S. -- and to a lesser extent Europe -- militates in favor of the GCC moving beyond its repeated rejections of Yemen's aspirations. Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, see their security threatened by AQAP as well as the Yemeni government's intermittent war against tribal rebels in the north and its fight with secessionists in the south.

The GCC, in a prelude to closer relations, has admitted Yemen to several of its institutions, including its councils of health, education, sports and culture ministers. GCC members also contribute substantially to funding of the Yemeni government's payroll. The GCC agreed last month at a meeting in New York of the Friends of Yemen, which groups 22 nations concerned about the growing strength of jihadists in the country, to open an office in San'a that would "help all donors to plan, coordinate and deliver assistance to Yemen more efficiently." GCC members have held back billions of dollars in aid pledged to Yemen because of concerns that the country would not be able to absorb the funds, and also due to widespread Yemeni corruption -- a weak argument for Gulf states that have transparency issues of their own.

A political marriage between the Gulf states and Yemen is likely to prove difficult for the conservative GCC members. In many ways, Yemen and the GCC states have little in common beyond geography and their Arab identity. Yemen is a republican democracy, at least in name, that ousted its royals in the 1960s; GCC members are all authoritarian monarchies that have forgotten that they once wallowed in the same abject poverty Yemen suffers today. Gulf leaders, particularly in Kuwait, have never really forgiven Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh for his support of Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War, in which U.S.-led forces reversed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni officials concede that in order to persuade the GCC, the government will have to improve the security situation, narrow the economic divide with the Gulf states and significantly reduce the country's addiction to qat, a plant stimulant consumed by a majority of Yemenis that is classified by the World Health Organization as a drug.

In lieu of granting Yemen full membership, the GCC is likely to look at ways of improving employment prospects for Yemenis. Yemen's economic problems were exacerbated in the early 1990s when Saudi Arabia expelled some 1 million Yemeni workers in retaliation for Yemen's support of Saddam. The expulsion deprived Yemen of badly needed remittances that were often invested into small and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the backbone of the Yemeni economy. GCC member states are discussing allowing Yemeni workers to return -- a move that segments of Gulf society, concerned about the high number of foreign, non-Arab workers in their countries, would welcome.

Twenty years on, many Yemeni workers lack the employment skills that Gulf states now require. One way GCC states may seek to compensate for that would be to grant Yemenis access to the same professional and technical training available to Gulf nationals. GCC states are also likely to fund job-creation programs in Yemen. A report commissioned by the Yemeni government recently estimated that Yemen needs to create 4 million new jobs in the next 10 years. A Saudi delegation visited Yemen this weekend as part of a project to develop Yemeni educational programs, prepare Yemeni trainers and help the government draft regulations for the Higher Yemeni Technical Institute, which is funded by the Islamic Development Bank and South Korea.

A recent report (.pdf) by a London School of Economics researcher suggested that stabilizing Yemen was a key GCC interest because the country's problems potentially foreshadow problems that could emerge elsewhere in the Gulf. "Yemen is the canary in the coal mine. It is an indication of what can go wrong when a country fails to develop political legitimacy and build a sustainable, productive non-oil economy," said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, the author of the report. "The challenges to government authority in southern and northern Yemen demonstrate how existing socio-economic discontent and regional marginalization can fracture and fragment social cohesion. Similar fissures and unequal patterns of access to resources exist in the GCC states and could become transmitters of conflict in the future."

The United States and Europe share GCC concerns about Yemen's lack of good governance. Getting the GCC to assume responsibility for helping Yemen ensure that its development aid is put to proper use will have the added advantage of focusing Gulf attention on transparency issues within the GCC itself.

Europe Plot Focuses Attention on Laskhar-e-Taibe

A plot to launch commando-style attacks in Britain, France or Germany reinforces Western intelligence concerns for much of this year that the next attack may come from an Al-Qaeda linked group that has faded from public attention: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Pakistani group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks in which ten gunmen killed 166 people in attacks on several targets in the city.

In testimony earlier this year before the US Congress, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair asserted that LeT is "becoming more of a direct threat and is placing Western targets in Europe in its sights." Pointing to the group's ability to raise funds, particularly in the Gulf, and its global logistics, support network and operations in Europe and Asia, Blair said confronting LeT was a high priority for Washington.

Blair made his remarks months after the FBI arrested and charged Pakistani American David Headley with involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and working with LeT on planned attacks in Denmark and India. Danish officials said earlier this year that they believed that LeT was planning an attack on the newspaper that in 2005 published controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.

Headley's interrogation further led to the recent arrest of several LeT operatives in Bangladesh who allegedly were preparing suicide car bombings of the US, British and Indian embassies in the capital Dhaka.

Concern that LeT may be setting its sights on Europe for its next operation were compounded by the group's history of involvement in international terrorism. LeT members have fought in Tajikistan's civil war and Bosnia Herzegovina and operate in Kashmir. US and European officials believe that by targeting India or Indian targets in Europe and Asia, LeT hopes to disrupt fragile efforts by Pakistan and India to resolve their differences and work more closely together in combating militant Islamic groups.

It's believed al Qaeda may be using LeT to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned on a visit in January to New Delhi that al Qaeda was using LeT to provoke renewed conflict between India and Pakistan in a bid to further destabilize Pakistan. Earlier, Gates told the US Senate that al Qaeda was providing LeT with targeting information to help the group plot attacks in India.

AQIM Kidnappings Spark Criticism of Ransom Payments

Last week’s kidnapping of five French nationals in northern Niger by an Al Qaeda affiliate is likely to be a watershed in regional and international efforts to combat terrorism in the Sahel.

The kidnapping also threatens to open a rift between European Union members about how to confront the threat to foreign nationals in northern Africa. In an apparent about face following a failed French-Mauritanian attack in July on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al Qaeda affiliate, and the subsequent murder of a French hostage, France has signaled that it is willing to negotiate with the kidnappers of five employees of state-owned Avera, the world’s largest operator of nuclear plants. The apparent reversal of French policy has sparked criticism from Britain as well as Algeria.

Speaking at the United Nations, British Foreign Secretary William Hague warned that paying ransom to hostage takers would only encourage more abductions and killings of foreign nationals. Hague’s remarks constituted not only a shot across the bow of France but also criticism of Spain which is believed to have paid AQIM up to Euros 8 million earlier this year for the release of three Spanish aid workers.

Algerian President Abdelazi Bouteflika for counter terrorism, Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara, told the UN this week that AQIM had earned $25 million from ransoms in the past two years, making it wealthier than its parent. The UN Security Council on Monday issued a statement expressing concern about the rising number of kidnappings and reminding UN members of their duty to prevent the financing of terrorist acts. Analysts note that various international conventions and Security Council resolutions implicitly ban ransom payments, but do not do so explicitly. The African Union last year called for the criminalization of the payment of ransoms, a call that is likely to find enhanced support in the wake of the abductions in Niger.

Analysts say further that the resolution of the French hostage crisis is likely to determine the future of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Tension, they say, could drop if France achieves a negotiated release of the French captives. Military action or the assassination of the hostages by their abductors would, however, likely lead to a more sustained series of clashes with regional and possibly French-led forces in the Sahel.

Niger Abductions Draw France, EU into Northwest African Conflict

James M. Dorsey

World Politics Review

Last week's brazen kidnapping of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, by al-Qaida-linked militants in a uranium mining town in Niger has increased pressure on both France and the European Union to become more militarily involved in the region's fight against jihadists. The kidnapping threatens France's major source of uranium for its nuclear power plants, calls into question the practice by some European governments of paying ransoms to free hostages, and throws down the gauntlet for the EU in its counterterrorism efforts.

In response to the abductions, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and seven of his European counterparts urged EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to increase EU engagement in security and development in the Sahel, one of the world's poorest regions, arguing that the "populations there must have . . . another perspective than that offered by terrorists." Now, France has reportedly deployed 80 troops, including anti-terror and special operations forces, as well as reconnaissance aircraft to Niamey to support efforts to locate the abductees.

France and Spain have already found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict in the Sahel due to a spate of kidnappings of their nationals by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida's northwest African affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.

With no claim of responsibility issued yet, it remains unclear whether the seven, who worked for both the French state-owned nuclear company Areva and a subsidiary of the French contractor Vinci, were abducted by the militants themselves or by Tuareg tribesmen cooperating with the jihadists. A Tuareg leader denied involvement despite Niger government claims that the kidnappers were heard speaking Tamachek, a Tuareg language. Kouchner said the tribesmen may have kidnapped the foreigners to sell them to AQIM.

The kidnappings are the first to strike directly at foreign economic interests. Earlier incidents targeted primarily aid workers and tourists, and were designed to fill AQIM's coffers with the proceeds of ransom payments. Avera's Niger operations produce half of the uranium used in French nuclear reactors. The company employs 2,500 people at the Cominak and Somair uranium mines, as well as at the Imouraren mine still under development. Imouaren, expected to become Africa's biggest uranium mine, will make impoverished Niger the world's second-largest uranium producer when it is brought online in 2014.

Last week's abductions threaten those ambitions. Over the weekend, Avera and Vinci began evacuating foreign nationals from Arlit, the town from which the seven were abducted while asleep in their homes, as well as from other areas threatened by AQIM and rebel tribesmen. The kidnappings also mark a milestone in AQIM operations as they are the first against a hardened target: Arlit is protected by some 350 Nigerien troops, and located in an area in which the militants had not been active. The abductions also constitute a setback for Avera's efforts to reduce widespread local resistance to its operations. Local NGOs and tribesmen accuse the company of bribing Tuareg rebels, polluting underground aquifers, aggravating a chronic water shortage, and exposing its employees to uranium contamination.

Nigerien military officials believe the seven hostages were moved to Mali, where past hostages have been held. Nigerien pilots spotted three vehicles, which they believe were transporting the hostages, moving at high speed toward the Malian border. Mauritanian forces assisted by French reconnaissance have launched an offensive in the area to clear the militants and drug dealers from what is currently a no-man's land. Algerian military officials and local sources say the Mauritanians are encountering stiff resistance from an AQIM field commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, described as radical and inflexible.

The fate of the seven hostages is likely to depend on which of AQIM's rival commanders controls them. In July, a joint French-Mauritanian military operation -- the first against AQIM known to involve Western combat troops -- failed to liberate 78-year-old French hostage Michel Germaneau, who was subsequently killed by the militants. Malian negotiators say the hostages are at greater risk if Abu Zaid, who is believed to be responsible for Germaneau's death as well as for last year's killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer, gains control of them. By contrast, AQIM's leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has emerged in past negotiations as a less dogmatic dealmaker, willing to free hostages in return for a ransom and the release of jailed militants.

AQIM released two Spanish hostages shortly after July's failed military operation in a prisoner exchange with Mauritania that is believed to have also involved a payment of $5 million in ransom to the militants. In a statement, the jihadists said the release of the Spaniards demonstrated that they were still open for business. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel suggested that the group would test whether the killing of Germeneau in retaliation for the July raid had caused France to reconsider its approach.

Earlier this year, France had acquiesced to the release of French hostage Pierre Camette in exchange for the liberation of jailed militants in Mali. In the aftermath of the July raid, Droudkel warned that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had opened "the gates of hell on himself, his people and his nation." In response, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared his country at war with AQIM, and the French Foreign Ministry said that France's military forces were "fully mobilized" to counter "threats uttered by assassins."

Last week's abductions could escalate French and EU involvement in what is increasingly becoming not just an African but also a European problem. They are also likely to strengthen opposition to the paying of ransoms, which serve to embolden the militants while ensuring that they are able to fund further operations.

A 2008 French defense white paper (.pdf) identified the mineral- and oil-rich Sahel as one of four regions crucial to French national security. At the same time, the document and subsequent French defense planning called for reducing the number of France's African bases from four to three. Speaking after the abductions, Sarkozy warned that "the Sahel zone is extremely dangerous. . . . [This] shows that we must redouble vigilance." The recent developments could also lead France to redouble -- or at least maintain -- its presence there, too.

Donors To Establish Development Fund For Yemen in Fight Against Al Qaeda

In the clearest recognition yet that Islamist militants in Yemen cannot be defeated by military means alone, the United States and its allies are set to create an international fund for development of the impoverished, conflict-ridden Arab nation. Donor countries, including the US, Britain, France and the Gulf states, are expected to launch the fund at a meeting in New York on September 24.

The fund comes as the US military is seeking $1.2 billion to strengthen Yemeni security forces over a five-year period. State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin said earlier this month that the US sees the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Gulf, as a priority. The US has this year allocated $300 million to Yemen, half of which, according to Benjamin, targets the “incubators for extremism” – poverty, weak governance and corruption.

The donors are also expected to discuss ways to stimulate a national dialogue between Yemen’s political forces in a bid to reduce nepotism, make its political system more inclusive, resolve an intermittent insurgency in the north and a growing separatist movement in the south and stem AQAP’s increasing strength.

To a large extent, change in Yemen will however depend on a change in Saudi policy towards Yemen. In many ways, Saudi Arabia, like the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih itself, is as much part of the solution as it is part of the solution. The Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which groups the region’s six oil-rich states has already taken steps to build closer ties with Yemen. The GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, could ease Yemen’s economic pain by agreeing on the free movement of labor in the region. This would reduce unemployment, increase the flow of remittances and stem illegal border crossings.

To counter the inward looking, xenophobic, conservative environment on which AQAP feeds, Saudi Arabia will however also have to strengthen the Yemeni government by halting the buying of tribal fealty at the expense of the government and controlling Saudi-funded missionary work that has significantly increased the influence of a militant, ascetic interpretation of Islam among Yemenis as well as among the large number of Somali refugees in the country.

Release of Spanish Hostages: Questions and Insights

This week’s release of two Spanish hostages by an Al Qaeda affiliate in North Africa raises questions about the steadfastness of the refusal by Western nations to negotiate with terrorists. It also constitutes a victory for the group’s Algerian faction focused more on kidnapping of foreigners as a business than on achieving political goals.

In a statement to Spanish newspaper El Pais, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritainia, Mali and Niger suggested that Spain had met its demand for payment of a $5 million ransom for the hostages. The Spanish government has declined to comment on whether it had cut a deal with the militants. The hostages were kidnapped in Mauritania in November while riding in a convoy delivering supplies to poor villages.

It became apparent that the two hostages, Albert Vilalta and Roque Pascual, were about to be released after Mauritania last week threw the jihadists a bone by extraditing to Mali a key Malian AQIM operative, Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma. Hamma had been convicted to 12 years in prison for kidnapping the two Spaniards as well as Alicia Gomez, a third Spaniard who was released in March. His release had been part of AQIM’s demands.

Spain's ransom payment and Hamma's release would not be the first time European and West African authorities have entered into negotiations with AQIM. Mali released four Islamists earlier this year in an apparent swap for French hostage Pierre Camatte, freed by AQIM in February. The release soured its relations with Algeria, Mauritania and Niger who accused Mali of being soft on terrorism.

The group, which grew out of the Salafist movement in Algeria and has since shifted south into the vast and lawless Sahel, also killed British captive Edwin Dyer last year after London refused to give in to its demands.


Analysts and Malian officials say Hamma’s release was as much designed to achieve the release of the remaining hostages as it was to deepen divisions within the Al Qaeda affiliate and complicate its relations with allied rebel Tuareg tribesmen. The Tuareg accuse the Malian government of failing to implement a 2008 agreement that was supposed to end their tribal insurgency and grant the Tuareg greater rights.

Relations between Al Qaeda and the Tuareg became strained last month when an AQIM commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, accused the Tuareg of assisting a French-Mauritainian attack that last month failed to liberate 78-year old French hostage Michel Germaneau and killed six jihadists. Abu Zaid charged that the Tuareg had pinpointed the whereabouts of the AQIM operatives. In retaliation, Abu Zaid abducted and killed Mirzag Ag El Housseini, a Tuareg customs officer whose brother is senior commander in the Malian army. In a statement, AQIM’s leader in Mauritania, Abu Anas al-Shanqiti, warned that his group would retaliate against the “traitorous apostates, children and agents of Christian France” who had cooperated in the raid. The French Foreign Ministry says its forces are “fully mobilized” to counter “threats uttered by assassins.”

Abu Zaid had been urging the commander of AQIM’s wing in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, under whose control the Spaniards were, to execute them in retaliation for the French-Mauritanian raid. Mali had been quietly negotiating the release of the Spanish hostages with Belmokhtar. Malian officials say that the extradition of Hamma enabled Belmokhtar to cut a deal and claim political success. Hamma’s extradition contrasts starkly with Mauritania’s participation in the French-led raid and its past refusal to negotiate with the jihadists.

In its statement, AQIM said the release of the hostages demonstrated to France that "it was possible to deal rationally with the Mujahedeen (Islamic fighters). It was possible to avoid the aggravation, irritation and anger that led to the killing of their national."

French Raid on Al Qaeda Paves Way for Spanish Hostage Release

Last month’s French-Mauritanian attack on Al Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa failed to liberate a 78-year old French hostage, but in an unexpected twist, has driven a wedge between the jihadists and their Tuareg tribal allies in the region and is fomenting tension between Al Qaeda commanders, according to Western and West African intelligence sources.

The emerging divide between the affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Tuareg who accuse the Malian government of failing to implement a 2008 agreement that was supposed to end their tribal insurgency and grant the Tuareg greater rights offers President Amadou Toumani Toure as well as US, French and British counterterrorism efforts in the region an opportunity to substantially weaken the jihadists to whom local tribes provide a crucial lifeline. It has also provided an opening for the release of two Spanish hostages held by the jihadists.

AQIM commander Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid has accused the Tuareg of assisting the French-led attack in which six jihadists were killed by pinpointing the whereabouts of the AQIM operatives. To revenge the betrayal, Abu Zaid last week abducted and killed Mirzag Ag El Housseini, a Tuareg customs officer whose brother is senior commander in the Malian army. In a statement, AQIM’s leader in Mauritania, Abu Anas al-Shanqiti, warned that his group would retaliate against the “traitorous apostates, children and agents of Christian France” who had cooperated in the raid. The French Foreign Ministry says its forces are “fully mobilized” to counter “threats uttered by assassins.”

Mauritania, despite the threats, this week threw the jihadists a bone by extraditing to Mali a key Malian AQIM operative, Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma, who was convicted to 12 years in prison for kidnapping three Spaniards last November. Alicia Gomez, one of the hostages, was released in March. Analysts say the extradition was designed to set the stage for the release of the two remaining Spanish hostages and fuel differences of opinion between AQIM commanders about the fate of the Spaniards. The analysts and Malian officials say Abu Zaid is urging AQIM’s leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, under whose control the Spaniards are, to execute them in retaliation for the French-Mauritanian raid.

Mali has been quietly negotiating with Belmokhtar the release of the hostages. Malian officials say that the extradition of Hamma may enable Belmokhtar, who is demanding a ransom, to cut a deal and claim political success. Hamma’s extradition contrasts starkly with Mauritania’s participation in the French-led raid and its past refusal to negotiate with the jihadists. Mauritanian relations with Mali soured earlier this year after the government in Nouakchott accused Mali of being soft on terrorism by releasing in February four AQIM operatives in exchange for French hostage Pierre Camatte.

Israel, Jordan Rocket Attacks Raise Specter of Renewed Sinai Violence

James M. Dorsey | 12 Aug 2010

World Politics Review

A recent rocket attack on the twin Red Sea resorts of Eilat in Israel and Aqaba in Jordan raises the specter of renewed Bedouin violence in Egypt's Sinai peninsula, where security forces are struggling to fight crime, illegal immigration and terrorist threats, as well as to protect oil and gas pipelines.

In the wake of the attacks, an Egyptian security operation aimed at uprooting militant Palestinian and Bedouin groups as well as jihadist elements confirmed Israeli and Jordanian claims that the rockets had been launched from Sinai. It was the second such attack in four months. Security forces discovered evidence of a misfired Grad-type rocket during the operation that focused on the mountains near the resort of Taba as well as areas near Sinai's border with Gaza that have been declared off limits to foreigners. Days before the attacks, security forces reportedly arrested three men in a bomb-laden vehicle they intended to explode in the resort of Sharm el Sheikh.

Egypt has long had difficulty maintaining law and order in the Sinai, crucial to the country's tourism industry. Bedouin tribesmen operate an extensive smuggling network that tunnels supplies into the beleaguered Gaza Strip and sneaks African migrants across the border into Israel. Tribesmen assisted in a spate of bombings of tourism resorts in the Sinai between 2004 and 2006 in which 145 people were killed. A group believed to be linked to al-Qaida claimed responsibility in 2005 for rocket launched from Sinai at U.S. war ships docked in the port of Aqaba, and Egypt has since announced various arrests of Palestinians seeking to launch projectiles from the peninsula.

Authorities in Egypt and Israel fear that the rocket attacks signal an increase in jihadist activity in the Sinai and radicalization of Bedouin groups. The rocket attacks add to mounting tension on Israel's borders in the wake of the first clash between Israeli and Lebanese forces since Israel attacked the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah in 2006 and as Arab states seek to ensure that the imminent announcement of the results of an international inquiry into the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri does not plunge Lebanon into renewed civil strife. The inquiry is expected to conclude that Hezbollah operatives were involved in the assassination.

The rocket attacks were likely designed to maintain pressure on the Egyptian government to make good on promises to address Bedouin grievances and to reassert the Bedouin's role as suppliers to the Gaza Strip at a moment that their business is threatened by Israel's decision to significantly loosen its blockade of Gaza. Bedouin militancy stems from racial discrimination as well as a sense that the government has failed to follow through on promises to invest in economic and social development. Of the $22 billion pledged in 1994 by the government for Sinai development, only $2 billion has so far been invested, primarily in the construction of tourism facilities in the south and in securing the border with Gaza. The Bedouin say they have benefited little from those investments. Tourism is a $10.8 billion business that accounts for one in eight jobs in Egypt.

The rockets were fired barely two weeks after Egyptian Interior Minister Habib Adli met with tribal leaders in a bid to ease tension and fend off Bedouin threats to sabotage oil and gas pipelines, including a natural-gas line that supplies Israel. Adli agreed to release scores of detained Bedouins, including prominent activist and blogger Mossad Abu Fajr. Some 370 Bedouin activists are believed to be lingering in Egyptian jails. Adli also promised to rollback repressive measures and initiate development projects that would create jobs in the Sinai in return for Bedouin cooperation in apprehending terrorists and fugitive Bedouin militants.

In support of Adli's promises, the Egyptian oil ministry announced that it was establishing an oil services company in the Sinai that would create jobs by drilling wells, laying pipelines and building storage tanks across the peninsula. The ministry said half of the company's employees would be local hires. Nonetheless, more radical Bedouin leaders denounced the meeting with Adli, charging that the tribal leaders he met were government appointees who did not represent the local population.

The meeting with Adli followed an ambush of police forces in which tribesmen freed Bedouin leader Salim Lafy. Two policemen were killed in the incident. Lafy and some 30 other tribesmen remain at large and have threatened to attack government installations if security forces continue to raid their homes. The tribesmen also attacked a Gaza-bound humanitarian convoy, set fire to tires near a natural gas pipeline that supplies Syria and Jordan and disrupted trade along the border with Israel.

In a letter last month to an Egyptian newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm, fugitive Bedouin leader Moussa el-Dalah blamed the smuggling and violence on the government's treatment of the tribesmen as a security problem rather than as full-fledged citizens with economic and social grievances. "Bedouins are compelled to use violence to show that the use of excessive force to quell us will not work. The government has to find another way to deal with us if it genuinely believes we are part of a single nation with one common destiny," El-Dalah wrote. "We hear about social and economic development, but we hardly see meaning to it here in Sinai. . . . We are forced to use illicit methods to secure a livelihood for the government has left us with no alternative. Instead, it has chosen to shape our communities by handpicking our tribal chiefs and recruiting our younger men as undercover agents."

Rocket Attack Points To Egypt's Bedouins

A recent rocket attack on the twin Red Sea resorts of Eilat in Israel and Aqaba in Jordan focuses attention on long-simmering discontent among Egypt’s Bedouins in the Sinai peninsula. Both Egypt and Jordan have charged that the rockets that killed one person in Aqaba were launched from the Sinai - the second such attack in the last three months. Egypt has denied the allegation arguing that its border with Israel is heavily monitored. Egyptian security forces have nonetheless launched a security sweep of Sinai, acknowledging that Palestinian and Bedouin groups are active in the region. Egyptian and Israeli authorities charge that Bedouin tribesmen are part of a smuggling network that tunnels supplies into the Gaza Strip and sneaks African migrants across the border into Israel. In an ominous development, the attacks signal increased militant activity in the Sinai and radicalization of local Bedouin groups. The rocket incident adds to mounting tension on Israel’s borders in a week in which Israeli and Lebanese forces clashed for the first time since Israel attacked the Lebanese Shiite militia Hizbollah in 2006 and Arab states are seeking to ensure that an international inquiry into the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri that reportedly will point the finger at Hizbollah operatives does not plunge Lebanon into renewed civil strife. The rocket attack was launched barely two weeks after Egyptian Interior Minister Habib Adli agreed in a meeting with tribal leaders to release scores of detained Bedouins, including prominent activist and blogger Mossad Abu Fajr, in a bid to ease tension with the Sinai residents and neutralize Bedouin threats to sabotage oil and gas pipelines, including a natural-gas line that supplies Israel. In return for cooperation in apprehending terrorists, the government also promised to rollback repressive measures and initiate development projects that would create jobs in the Sinai. In June, security forces clashed with Bedouins after a police operation to capture unidentified fugitives failed. Egypt has long had difficulty in maintaining law and order in the Sinai, crucial to the country’s tourism industry. In 2004, twin bombings at resorts in Taba and Ras al-Shitan killed at least 34 people. A year later, 88 people died in bomb attacks in Sharm el Sheikh, and in 2006 at least 23 people were killed in blasts in Dahab. Bedouins, cooperating with various militant groups, including Hamas, Hizbollah and Al-Qaeda linked cells, are believed to have been involved in the attacks.