It’s hard to see the United States’ faltering efforts to resolve the seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a model for conflict resolution. Yet, parallels between the Middle East conflict and the Arab world’s other seemingly intractable dispute in the Western Sahara that has soured relations between Morocco and Algeria, suggest otherwise.
Resolution of the 35-year old conflict, one of Africa’s longest festering disputes, has become more urgent with the realization that lack of cooperation between North African and Sahel nations undermines efforts to stem the rise of Al Qaida’s affiliate in the region, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The need to align North African nations was driven home by AQIM’s brazen kidnapping in Niger in September of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, that threatens France's major source of uranium. Algeria, which backs Polisario, the Sahrawi liberation movement in its dispute with Morocco, last month refused to participate in a meeting in the Malian capital Bamako organized by the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group to discuss AQIM because of the presence of Moroccan representatives.
While there are obvious differences between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the conflict in the Western Sahara, similarities between the two suggest that the most recent Middle East peacemaking experience may be applicable.
At the heart of both conflicts is annexation of territory that has displaced population groups and subjected them to occupation. The parties to both conflicts pay lip service to international peace efforts but in practice act to subvert them. Both conflicts position a Western-backed ally against a liberation movement supported by influential regional powers. The United States and Europe, despite their support for the occupying power in both conflicts, pay lip service to the rights of the dispossessed.
It is these similarities that positions Middle East peacemaking as a model for preventing the festering conflict in the Sahara from playing into AQIM’s hands. The Obama’s administration message to Israel that security can only be achieved by accommodating Palestinian national aspirations is applicable to Morocco too: regional security demands a two-state solution. Morocco and the Sahrawis need to agree on a formula that balances Moroccan claims of sovereignty with Sahrawi demands for independence.
The roadmap adopted by the Middle East Quartet, which groups the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia is equally applicable to the Western Sahara based on UN Security Council resolutions that call for a negotiated solution and recognition of the Sahrawi right to self-determination. A Saharan roadmap would allow the international community to empower former US diplomat and current UN envoy Chris Ross with the same mandate given to US Middle East peace negotiator George Mitchell: impose a one-year deadline within which the parties seriously negotiate a resolution of their seemingly intractable differences.
To provide the roadmap, the international community would have to come together as it did in the case of the Middle East rather than ignoring the dispute in the Sahara or adopting contradictory policies.In the past the United States was the only power seeking to bring the parties to the negotiating table with little support from its fellow council members. That is no longer a tenable situation with AQIM’s increasingly brazen operations and threats by Polisario, the Saharan liberation movement, to revive its armed struggle.
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Monday, November 1, 2010
Turkish Opposition To NATO Missile Shield Fuels Tension
A proposed $280 million NATO missile defense system upgrade is straining relations between the United States and Turkey in the run-up to a NATO summit in Lisbon later this month.
Turkish officials say they will only agree to basing radar components of the system on Turkish soil if NATO abstains from identifying any potential target of the system and promises not to share intelligence with non-NATO members.
The Turkish demands reflect a mounting divergence in US and Turkish foreign policy with Turkey no longer signing up to Western policies simply to align itself with the West but making a cost-benefit analysis a key element of its decision-making. As a result, Turkey is demanding a quid-pro-quid for its accommodation of the proposed missile defense shield upgrade that could put it between a rock and a hard place. If Turkey rejects the upgrade, it risks angering its US and NATO allies; if it joins the shield, it would upset Iran, a neighbor and major energy supplier, and could complicate its relations with Russia, which opposed the upgrade when it was first proposed by US President George W. Bush.
The Turkish demand that NATO refrain from identifying the system’s target strikes at declared US policy: a White House fact sheet recently described Iran as the threat the proposed shield would be designed to counter. Turkey, concerned that any US or Israeli military effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program would further destabilize the Middle East, further wants assurances that any intelligence garnered from radars on its territory will not be shared with Israel.
Analysts say the quid-pro-quid Turkey is seeking for possible accommodation of NATO is US pressure on France and Germany to reverse policies that are preventing progress in negotiations for Turkish European Union membership. They note that the agenda of a US-EU summit scheduled immediately after the NATO gathering features Turkish EU membership high on its agenda.
Some analysts suggest the United States’ perceived preoccupation with security risks posed by the Middle East and China at the expense of its past focus on Europe may help sway France and Germany, where calls for a new European security architecture that would put a greater emphasis on the role of Turkey as well as Russia are gaining momentum.
Turkish officials say they will only agree to basing radar components of the system on Turkish soil if NATO abstains from identifying any potential target of the system and promises not to share intelligence with non-NATO members.
The Turkish demands reflect a mounting divergence in US and Turkish foreign policy with Turkey no longer signing up to Western policies simply to align itself with the West but making a cost-benefit analysis a key element of its decision-making. As a result, Turkey is demanding a quid-pro-quid for its accommodation of the proposed missile defense shield upgrade that could put it between a rock and a hard place. If Turkey rejects the upgrade, it risks angering its US and NATO allies; if it joins the shield, it would upset Iran, a neighbor and major energy supplier, and could complicate its relations with Russia, which opposed the upgrade when it was first proposed by US President George W. Bush.
The Turkish demand that NATO refrain from identifying the system’s target strikes at declared US policy: a White House fact sheet recently described Iran as the threat the proposed shield would be designed to counter. Turkey, concerned that any US or Israeli military effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program would further destabilize the Middle East, further wants assurances that any intelligence garnered from radars on its territory will not be shared with Israel.
Analysts say the quid-pro-quid Turkey is seeking for possible accommodation of NATO is US pressure on France and Germany to reverse policies that are preventing progress in negotiations for Turkish European Union membership. They note that the agenda of a US-EU summit scheduled immediately after the NATO gathering features Turkish EU membership high on its agenda.
Some analysts suggest the United States’ perceived preoccupation with security risks posed by the Middle East and China at the expense of its past focus on Europe may help sway France and Germany, where calls for a new European security architecture that would put a greater emphasis on the role of Turkey as well as Russia are gaining momentum.
Monday, September 27, 2010
AQIM Kidnappings Spark Criticism of Ransom Payments
Last week’s kidnapping of five French nationals in northern Niger by an Al Qaeda affiliate is likely to be a watershed in regional and international efforts to combat terrorism in the Sahel.
The kidnapping also threatens to open a rift between European Union members about how to confront the threat to foreign nationals in northern Africa. In an apparent about face following a failed French-Mauritanian attack in July on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al Qaeda affiliate, and the subsequent murder of a French hostage, France has signaled that it is willing to negotiate with the kidnappers of five employees of state-owned Avera, the world’s largest operator of nuclear plants. The apparent reversal of French policy has sparked criticism from Britain as well as Algeria.
Speaking at the United Nations, British Foreign Secretary William Hague warned that paying ransom to hostage takers would only encourage more abductions and killings of foreign nationals. Hague’s remarks constituted not only a shot across the bow of France but also criticism of Spain which is believed to have paid AQIM up to Euros 8 million earlier this year for the release of three Spanish aid workers.
Algerian President Abdelazi Bouteflika for counter terrorism, Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara, told the UN this week that AQIM had earned $25 million from ransoms in the past two years, making it wealthier than its parent. The UN Security Council on Monday issued a statement expressing concern about the rising number of kidnappings and reminding UN members of their duty to prevent the financing of terrorist acts. Analysts note that various international conventions and Security Council resolutions implicitly ban ransom payments, but do not do so explicitly. The African Union last year called for the criminalization of the payment of ransoms, a call that is likely to find enhanced support in the wake of the abductions in Niger.
Analysts say further that the resolution of the French hostage crisis is likely to determine the future of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Tension, they say, could drop if France achieves a negotiated release of the French captives. Military action or the assassination of the hostages by their abductors would, however, likely lead to a more sustained series of clashes with regional and possibly French-led forces in the Sahel.
The kidnapping also threatens to open a rift between European Union members about how to confront the threat to foreign nationals in northern Africa. In an apparent about face following a failed French-Mauritanian attack in July on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al Qaeda affiliate, and the subsequent murder of a French hostage, France has signaled that it is willing to negotiate with the kidnappers of five employees of state-owned Avera, the world’s largest operator of nuclear plants. The apparent reversal of French policy has sparked criticism from Britain as well as Algeria.
Speaking at the United Nations, British Foreign Secretary William Hague warned that paying ransom to hostage takers would only encourage more abductions and killings of foreign nationals. Hague’s remarks constituted not only a shot across the bow of France but also criticism of Spain which is believed to have paid AQIM up to Euros 8 million earlier this year for the release of three Spanish aid workers.
Algerian President Abdelazi Bouteflika for counter terrorism, Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara, told the UN this week that AQIM had earned $25 million from ransoms in the past two years, making it wealthier than its parent. The UN Security Council on Monday issued a statement expressing concern about the rising number of kidnappings and reminding UN members of their duty to prevent the financing of terrorist acts. Analysts note that various international conventions and Security Council resolutions implicitly ban ransom payments, but do not do so explicitly. The African Union last year called for the criminalization of the payment of ransoms, a call that is likely to find enhanced support in the wake of the abductions in Niger.
Analysts say further that the resolution of the French hostage crisis is likely to determine the future of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Tension, they say, could drop if France achieves a negotiated release of the French captives. Military action or the assassination of the hostages by their abductors would, however, likely lead to a more sustained series of clashes with regional and possibly French-led forces in the Sahel.
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Niger Abductions Draw France, EU into Northwest African Conflict
James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
Last week's brazen kidnapping of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, by al-Qaida-linked militants in a uranium mining town in Niger has increased pressure on both France and the European Union to become more militarily involved in the region's fight against jihadists. The kidnapping threatens France's major source of uranium for its nuclear power plants, calls into question the practice by some European governments of paying ransoms to free hostages, and throws down the gauntlet for the EU in its counterterrorism efforts.
In response to the abductions, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and seven of his European counterparts urged EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to increase EU engagement in security and development in the Sahel, one of the world's poorest regions, arguing that the "populations there must have . . . another perspective than that offered by terrorists." Now, France has reportedly deployed 80 troops, including anti-terror and special operations forces, as well as reconnaissance aircraft to Niamey to support efforts to locate the abductees.
France and Spain have already found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict in the Sahel due to a spate of kidnappings of their nationals by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida's northwest African affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.
With no claim of responsibility issued yet, it remains unclear whether the seven, who worked for both the French state-owned nuclear company Areva and a subsidiary of the French contractor Vinci, were abducted by the militants themselves or by Tuareg tribesmen cooperating with the jihadists. A Tuareg leader denied involvement despite Niger government claims that the kidnappers were heard speaking Tamachek, a Tuareg language. Kouchner said the tribesmen may have kidnapped the foreigners to sell them to AQIM.
The kidnappings are the first to strike directly at foreign economic interests. Earlier incidents targeted primarily aid workers and tourists, and were designed to fill AQIM's coffers with the proceeds of ransom payments. Avera's Niger operations produce half of the uranium used in French nuclear reactors. The company employs 2,500 people at the Cominak and Somair uranium mines, as well as at the Imouraren mine still under development. Imouaren, expected to become Africa's biggest uranium mine, will make impoverished Niger the world's second-largest uranium producer when it is brought online in 2014.
Last week's abductions threaten those ambitions. Over the weekend, Avera and Vinci began evacuating foreign nationals from Arlit, the town from which the seven were abducted while asleep in their homes, as well as from other areas threatened by AQIM and rebel tribesmen. The kidnappings also mark a milestone in AQIM operations as they are the first against a hardened target: Arlit is protected by some 350 Nigerien troops, and located in an area in which the militants had not been active. The abductions also constitute a setback for Avera's efforts to reduce widespread local resistance to its operations. Local NGOs and tribesmen accuse the company of bribing Tuareg rebels, polluting underground aquifers, aggravating a chronic water shortage, and exposing its employees to uranium contamination.
Nigerien military officials believe the seven hostages were moved to Mali, where past hostages have been held. Nigerien pilots spotted three vehicles, which they believe were transporting the hostages, moving at high speed toward the Malian border. Mauritanian forces assisted by French reconnaissance have launched an offensive in the area to clear the militants and drug dealers from what is currently a no-man's land. Algerian military officials and local sources say the Mauritanians are encountering stiff resistance from an AQIM field commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, described as radical and inflexible.
The fate of the seven hostages is likely to depend on which of AQIM's rival commanders controls them. In July, a joint French-Mauritanian military operation -- the first against AQIM known to involve Western combat troops -- failed to liberate 78-year-old French hostage Michel Germaneau, who was subsequently killed by the militants. Malian negotiators say the hostages are at greater risk if Abu Zaid, who is believed to be responsible for Germaneau's death as well as for last year's killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer, gains control of them. By contrast, AQIM's leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has emerged in past negotiations as a less dogmatic dealmaker, willing to free hostages in return for a ransom and the release of jailed militants.
AQIM released two Spanish hostages shortly after July's failed military operation in a prisoner exchange with Mauritania that is believed to have also involved a payment of $5 million in ransom to the militants. In a statement, the jihadists said the release of the Spaniards demonstrated that they were still open for business. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel suggested that the group would test whether the killing of Germeneau in retaliation for the July raid had caused France to reconsider its approach.
Earlier this year, France had acquiesced to the release of French hostage Pierre Camette in exchange for the liberation of jailed militants in Mali. In the aftermath of the July raid, Droudkel warned that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had opened "the gates of hell on himself, his people and his nation." In response, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared his country at war with AQIM, and the French Foreign Ministry said that France's military forces were "fully mobilized" to counter "threats uttered by assassins."
Last week's abductions could escalate French and EU involvement in what is increasingly becoming not just an African but also a European problem. They are also likely to strengthen opposition to the paying of ransoms, which serve to embolden the militants while ensuring that they are able to fund further operations.
A 2008 French defense white paper (.pdf) identified the mineral- and oil-rich Sahel as one of four regions crucial to French national security. At the same time, the document and subsequent French defense planning called for reducing the number of France's African bases from four to three. Speaking after the abductions, Sarkozy warned that "the Sahel zone is extremely dangerous. . . . [This] shows that we must redouble vigilance." The recent developments could also lead France to redouble -- or at least maintain -- its presence there, too.
World Politics Review
Last week's brazen kidnapping of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, by al-Qaida-linked militants in a uranium mining town in Niger has increased pressure on both France and the European Union to become more militarily involved in the region's fight against jihadists. The kidnapping threatens France's major source of uranium for its nuclear power plants, calls into question the practice by some European governments of paying ransoms to free hostages, and throws down the gauntlet for the EU in its counterterrorism efforts.
In response to the abductions, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and seven of his European counterparts urged EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to increase EU engagement in security and development in the Sahel, one of the world's poorest regions, arguing that the "populations there must have . . . another perspective than that offered by terrorists." Now, France has reportedly deployed 80 troops, including anti-terror and special operations forces, as well as reconnaissance aircraft to Niamey to support efforts to locate the abductees.
France and Spain have already found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict in the Sahel due to a spate of kidnappings of their nationals by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida's northwest African affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.
With no claim of responsibility issued yet, it remains unclear whether the seven, who worked for both the French state-owned nuclear company Areva and a subsidiary of the French contractor Vinci, were abducted by the militants themselves or by Tuareg tribesmen cooperating with the jihadists. A Tuareg leader denied involvement despite Niger government claims that the kidnappers were heard speaking Tamachek, a Tuareg language. Kouchner said the tribesmen may have kidnapped the foreigners to sell them to AQIM.
The kidnappings are the first to strike directly at foreign economic interests. Earlier incidents targeted primarily aid workers and tourists, and were designed to fill AQIM's coffers with the proceeds of ransom payments. Avera's Niger operations produce half of the uranium used in French nuclear reactors. The company employs 2,500 people at the Cominak and Somair uranium mines, as well as at the Imouraren mine still under development. Imouaren, expected to become Africa's biggest uranium mine, will make impoverished Niger the world's second-largest uranium producer when it is brought online in 2014.
Last week's abductions threaten those ambitions. Over the weekend, Avera and Vinci began evacuating foreign nationals from Arlit, the town from which the seven were abducted while asleep in their homes, as well as from other areas threatened by AQIM and rebel tribesmen. The kidnappings also mark a milestone in AQIM operations as they are the first against a hardened target: Arlit is protected by some 350 Nigerien troops, and located in an area in which the militants had not been active. The abductions also constitute a setback for Avera's efforts to reduce widespread local resistance to its operations. Local NGOs and tribesmen accuse the company of bribing Tuareg rebels, polluting underground aquifers, aggravating a chronic water shortage, and exposing its employees to uranium contamination.
Nigerien military officials believe the seven hostages were moved to Mali, where past hostages have been held. Nigerien pilots spotted three vehicles, which they believe were transporting the hostages, moving at high speed toward the Malian border. Mauritanian forces assisted by French reconnaissance have launched an offensive in the area to clear the militants and drug dealers from what is currently a no-man's land. Algerian military officials and local sources say the Mauritanians are encountering stiff resistance from an AQIM field commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, described as radical and inflexible.
The fate of the seven hostages is likely to depend on which of AQIM's rival commanders controls them. In July, a joint French-Mauritanian military operation -- the first against AQIM known to involve Western combat troops -- failed to liberate 78-year-old French hostage Michel Germaneau, who was subsequently killed by the militants. Malian negotiators say the hostages are at greater risk if Abu Zaid, who is believed to be responsible for Germaneau's death as well as for last year's killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer, gains control of them. By contrast, AQIM's leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has emerged in past negotiations as a less dogmatic dealmaker, willing to free hostages in return for a ransom and the release of jailed militants.
AQIM released two Spanish hostages shortly after July's failed military operation in a prisoner exchange with Mauritania that is believed to have also involved a payment of $5 million in ransom to the militants. In a statement, the jihadists said the release of the Spaniards demonstrated that they were still open for business. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel suggested that the group would test whether the killing of Germeneau in retaliation for the July raid had caused France to reconsider its approach.
Earlier this year, France had acquiesced to the release of French hostage Pierre Camette in exchange for the liberation of jailed militants in Mali. In the aftermath of the July raid, Droudkel warned that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had opened "the gates of hell on himself, his people and his nation." In response, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared his country at war with AQIM, and the French Foreign Ministry said that France's military forces were "fully mobilized" to counter "threats uttered by assassins."
Last week's abductions could escalate French and EU involvement in what is increasingly becoming not just an African but also a European problem. They are also likely to strengthen opposition to the paying of ransoms, which serve to embolden the militants while ensuring that they are able to fund further operations.
A 2008 French defense white paper (.pdf) identified the mineral- and oil-rich Sahel as one of four regions crucial to French national security. At the same time, the document and subsequent French defense planning called for reducing the number of France's African bases from four to three. Speaking after the abductions, Sarkozy warned that "the Sahel zone is extremely dangerous. . . . [This] shows that we must redouble vigilance." The recent developments could also lead France to redouble -- or at least maintain -- its presence there, too.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
Lebanon-Israel Tensions Create Dilemma for U.S. and France
By James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
A covert Israeli-Lebanese intelligence war, combined with tension along the two countries' border and fears of renewed Lebanese civil strife, has created policy dilemmas for the United States and France as they seek to strengthen the Lebanese government while isolating Hezbollah. The Shiite militia-cum-political party, which the U.S. and France have both designated as a terrorist organization, occupies two cabinet posts in Lebanon's constitutionally mandated power-sharing arrangement.
The intelligence war as well as a recent Lebanese-Israeli border clash in which five people were killed have persuaded Lebanese President Michael Sulaiman and Prime Minister Saad Hariri to increase coordination between Lebanon's national armed forces and intelligence services and Hezbollah, which maintains its own armed militia. The goal is to thwart Israel's apparently extensive infiltration of Lebanon, to expand the presence of Lebanese regular forces along the largely Hezbollah-controlled Lebanese side of the border with Israel, and to prevent Lebanon from sliding into civil war. Expectations that a United Nations inquiry will implicate Hezbollah operatives in the 2005 assassination of Hariri's father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, have fueled fears of renewed Lebanese civil strife.
Lebanon has compiled a list of 150 cases of Israeli espionage, which it intends to submit to the U.N. Security Council. Scores of alleged Israeli spies -- including government and army officials, phone company executives and a car dealer who allegedly sold Hezbollah SUVs equipped with tracking devices that allowed Israel to follow their movements -- have been arrested in the last two years. The Lebanese government has also helped Hezbollah bust alleged Israeli spy cells by granting it access to tools and tradecraft acquired from its U.S. and European allies. Just in the last month, Lebanese courts have charged an army colonel and telecom executive with spying for Israel and sentenced two men to death, bringing to five the number of people handed the death penalty in the past year for spying for Israel. Lebanese authorities also arrested a prominent politician and a retired general who had headed the army's counterterrorism and espionage unit.
The spy war and clash with the Israelis have left Hezbollah little choice but to welcome the closer intelligence and military cooperation, which is to some degree likely to curtail its freedom to operate independently. The militia is smaller than the Lebanese army in terms of men, but better-equipped and more battle-hardened. The stepped-up cooperation would reverse Lebanon's past policy of keeping its army away from the southern border due to concerns that it lacked firepower and could spark renewed sectarian fighting. The move also breaks with fears that the army -- which split during Lebanon's 15-year-long civil war and was reunited in 1990 to include Christians and Muslims -- could be torn apart again were it to be fully deployed along the Israeli border.
Closer cooperation between the army and Hezbollah could have potential benefits for Western nations as well as for Israel, by limiting Hezbollah's ability to retaliate for a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, members of the U.S. Congress have forced the Obama administration to put a hold on $100 million in military aid for Humvees, small arms, and maintenance support to Lebanon -- the second-largest recipient of American military aid per capita after Israel -- pending a review of the Lebanese military's relationship with Hezbollah.
Lurking in the background of the review are concerns that Hezbollah is increasing its influence within the Lebanese military by inducting into the army Shiite fighters who have first served for two years in the militia. Israeli intelligence also asserts that Iranian intelligence and commando officers were allowed to tour the border area where Lebanese and Israeli forces had clashed, escorted by commanders of the Lebanese army unit involved in the incident. The Lebanese government called the U.S. hold on aid unwarranted. Iran, supported by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, has offered to step in with military assistance.
Closer military and intelligence ties with Hezbollah also threaten to scuttle plans for a defense cooperation treaty with France that would increase French-Lebanese cooperation in combating organized crime, drug trafficking and money laundering, because of French fears that Hezbollah would benefit from the agreement. Those fears were fueled by Lebanese demands that the treaty adopt the Arab distinction between terrorism and resistance, which would have allowed Hezbollah to be classified as a legitimate movement. Hezbollah supporters in southern Lebanon have clashed in recent weeks with French members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), after Hezbollah accused the peacekeeping force of gathering intelligence on Israel's behalf. French animosity to Hezbollah dates back to 1983, when Shiite suicide bombings in Beirut killed 242 U.S. and 58 French soldiers.
Parallel to its offer of increased cooperation, the Lebanese government last week reaffirmed its new resolve by announcing that it had formed a commission to tackle arms possession in a country where ethno-sectarian militias remain prevalent. "From now on, the military and security forces, the army and internal security forces, will assume the responsibility of controlling security, and will track down anyone who may provoke problems in this country," Hariri said in a statement. The decision followed clashes in a Beirut neighborhood between Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian Sunni group, Al-Ahbash, killing at least three people. Rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns were used in the skirmish, the worst since sectarian fighting in May 2008 that killed at least 80 people.
Too weak to intervene in the 2008 fighting, the Lebanese army watched from its Western-made armored vehicles as Hezbollah and pro-Syrian forces humiliated the more Western-leaning militias loyal to Hariri. Now, with Hariri moderating his positions toward Hezbollah as well as Syria, the refusal by the U.S. and France to give the Lebanese military what it needs to position itself as a symbol of national unity could wind up undermining Western interests in Lebanon more than Hariri's unavoidable cooperation with Hezbollah.
World Politics Review
A covert Israeli-Lebanese intelligence war, combined with tension along the two countries' border and fears of renewed Lebanese civil strife, has created policy dilemmas for the United States and France as they seek to strengthen the Lebanese government while isolating Hezbollah. The Shiite militia-cum-political party, which the U.S. and France have both designated as a terrorist organization, occupies two cabinet posts in Lebanon's constitutionally mandated power-sharing arrangement.
The intelligence war as well as a recent Lebanese-Israeli border clash in which five people were killed have persuaded Lebanese President Michael Sulaiman and Prime Minister Saad Hariri to increase coordination between Lebanon's national armed forces and intelligence services and Hezbollah, which maintains its own armed militia. The goal is to thwart Israel's apparently extensive infiltration of Lebanon, to expand the presence of Lebanese regular forces along the largely Hezbollah-controlled Lebanese side of the border with Israel, and to prevent Lebanon from sliding into civil war. Expectations that a United Nations inquiry will implicate Hezbollah operatives in the 2005 assassination of Hariri's father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, have fueled fears of renewed Lebanese civil strife.
Lebanon has compiled a list of 150 cases of Israeli espionage, which it intends to submit to the U.N. Security Council. Scores of alleged Israeli spies -- including government and army officials, phone company executives and a car dealer who allegedly sold Hezbollah SUVs equipped with tracking devices that allowed Israel to follow their movements -- have been arrested in the last two years. The Lebanese government has also helped Hezbollah bust alleged Israeli spy cells by granting it access to tools and tradecraft acquired from its U.S. and European allies. Just in the last month, Lebanese courts have charged an army colonel and telecom executive with spying for Israel and sentenced two men to death, bringing to five the number of people handed the death penalty in the past year for spying for Israel. Lebanese authorities also arrested a prominent politician and a retired general who had headed the army's counterterrorism and espionage unit.
The spy war and clash with the Israelis have left Hezbollah little choice but to welcome the closer intelligence and military cooperation, which is to some degree likely to curtail its freedom to operate independently. The militia is smaller than the Lebanese army in terms of men, but better-equipped and more battle-hardened. The stepped-up cooperation would reverse Lebanon's past policy of keeping its army away from the southern border due to concerns that it lacked firepower and could spark renewed sectarian fighting. The move also breaks with fears that the army -- which split during Lebanon's 15-year-long civil war and was reunited in 1990 to include Christians and Muslims -- could be torn apart again were it to be fully deployed along the Israeli border.
Closer cooperation between the army and Hezbollah could have potential benefits for Western nations as well as for Israel, by limiting Hezbollah's ability to retaliate for a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, members of the U.S. Congress have forced the Obama administration to put a hold on $100 million in military aid for Humvees, small arms, and maintenance support to Lebanon -- the second-largest recipient of American military aid per capita after Israel -- pending a review of the Lebanese military's relationship with Hezbollah.
Lurking in the background of the review are concerns that Hezbollah is increasing its influence within the Lebanese military by inducting into the army Shiite fighters who have first served for two years in the militia. Israeli intelligence also asserts that Iranian intelligence and commando officers were allowed to tour the border area where Lebanese and Israeli forces had clashed, escorted by commanders of the Lebanese army unit involved in the incident. The Lebanese government called the U.S. hold on aid unwarranted. Iran, supported by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, has offered to step in with military assistance.
Closer military and intelligence ties with Hezbollah also threaten to scuttle plans for a defense cooperation treaty with France that would increase French-Lebanese cooperation in combating organized crime, drug trafficking and money laundering, because of French fears that Hezbollah would benefit from the agreement. Those fears were fueled by Lebanese demands that the treaty adopt the Arab distinction between terrorism and resistance, which would have allowed Hezbollah to be classified as a legitimate movement. Hezbollah supporters in southern Lebanon have clashed in recent weeks with French members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), after Hezbollah accused the peacekeeping force of gathering intelligence on Israel's behalf. French animosity to Hezbollah dates back to 1983, when Shiite suicide bombings in Beirut killed 242 U.S. and 58 French soldiers.
Parallel to its offer of increased cooperation, the Lebanese government last week reaffirmed its new resolve by announcing that it had formed a commission to tackle arms possession in a country where ethno-sectarian militias remain prevalent. "From now on, the military and security forces, the army and internal security forces, will assume the responsibility of controlling security, and will track down anyone who may provoke problems in this country," Hariri said in a statement. The decision followed clashes in a Beirut neighborhood between Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian Sunni group, Al-Ahbash, killing at least three people. Rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns were used in the skirmish, the worst since sectarian fighting in May 2008 that killed at least 80 people.
Too weak to intervene in the 2008 fighting, the Lebanese army watched from its Western-made armored vehicles as Hezbollah and pro-Syrian forces humiliated the more Western-leaning militias loyal to Hariri. Now, with Hariri moderating his positions toward Hezbollah as well as Syria, the refusal by the U.S. and France to give the Lebanese military what it needs to position itself as a symbol of national unity could wind up undermining Western interests in Lebanon more than Hariri's unavoidable cooperation with Hezbollah.
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