By James M. Dorsey
(In)Coherent / Deutsche Welle
A key figure in one militant Islamic European network has joined the ranks of a small but important number of jihadists to have a change of heart, calling on their brethren to abandon violence. The imprisoned Dutch terrorism suspect Jason Walters said in an open letter that he has renounced Islamic radicalism.
"The ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt," Walters said in what he called a "review document" written from the maximum-security prison in Vught. It was published recently in the Dutch daily De Volkskrant.
Walters is a leading member of the jihadist Hofstadgroep, made up of Islamists primarily of Moroccan origin. The group was led by Mohammed Bouyeri, who is serving a life sentence for killing controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.
Observers said Walters' letter offered a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence. It helped to understand why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
Walters' review could also inform the increasingly partisan immigration debate in Germany and other European nations about how to prevent the radicalization of immigrant youth and help them become functioning members of society.
A different denunciation
Walters was accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. He resisted his arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police, injuring four policemen. He has now served four years of his 15-year sentence.
Born in the Netherlands to an African-American soldier and a Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 after the divorce of his parents and his father's subsequent conversion. In 2003, he made his way to Pakistan for training with jihadist groups. He boasted on his return to the Netherlands that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again."
Walters' denunciation is more political and philosophical than that of other jihadist ideologues which employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) or Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, one of the early associates of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command. Walters, on the other hand, takes issue in his letter with the basic tenant of his former worldview.
"The image that the world only exists of believers and infidels, in which the latter are motivated only to destroy the former, is a childish and coarse simplification of reality," Walters said. "It ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich."
Analysts and counter-terrorism authorities say Walters' letter is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe. In a statement, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) described it as "a remarkable document" not seen before in the Netherlands.
Dutch terrorism analyst Edwin Bakker from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael said the letter would serve as "a good tool in the ideological fight against terrorists and Islamists."
A sincere document
Walters' lawyer, Bart Nooitgedagt, rejected allegations that his client had written the letter in an effort to influence his appeal hearing. An Amsterdam court is set to determine whether the throwing of the grenade was a criminal or a terrorist act and whether the Hofstadgroep was a terrorist organization.
The appeals court had ordered new proceedings in response to objections by the public prosecutor to the initial conviction of Walters and his associates on criminal charges only. Of the seven defendants in the original case, Walters is the only one still incarcerated.
Nooitgedagt said Walters had written his letter some time ago, even though he only published it last week.
"Jason anticipated the criticism, but assertions that the letter was inspired by dishonest motives are incorrect," Nooitgedagt said. "The content of the letter is too fundamental for that."
Walters initially signaled his change of heart during the appeals court hearing in July, where he was the only defendant to appear in court in person.
"I was passive and uncooperative in the (lower) court in The Hague," Walters told the court in a reference to his earlier rejection of the Dutch justice system. "But now I will actively defend myself. I have confidence in the competence and the integrity of this court and in the Dutch system."
A warning to youth
Nooitgedagt said Walters' change of heart was sparked by his reading of history books, as well as writings on the theory of evolution and the works of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Popper. In his letter, he explained his recantation with the fact that those nations who were liberated by Islamists ultimately rejected the
Islamist worldview.
"This has forced me to reconsider my views critically, and has led to the realization that they are untenable," Walters said in the letter.
Walters expressed his disappointment with a utopian movement that has fallen short of its ideals.
"I have watched with horror how a once lofty 'struggle for freedom' that should have been the go-ahead signal for a new, just world - especially in Iraq - has turned into a bloody escalation of violence, sectarianism and religious mania," he wrote. "Unheard of cruelty and crimes have been committed in the process."
He said the random killing by Islamists of innocent Muslims had rendered the struggle for Islamic rule "a total failure."
The 25-year-old said he hoped his letter would serve "to warn youth not to be misguided by false promises and ideals." He called on Islamists "to put down their weapons and employ other, productive methods" in order to bring about reforms instead of blaming the United States and the West.
Lessons learned
Dutch commentator and De Volkskrant columnist Pieter Hilhorst noted that Walters, like other recanting Islamists, explained his change of heart in analytical rather than personal terms.
"He doesn't write that he regrets throwing a grenade at the police," Hilhorst said. "He doesn't write that he is ashamed of having glorified the murder of Theo van Gogh. Jason acts as if he was an observer, not a perpetrator."
The lesson from recantations like that of Walters, Hilhorst said, is that appealing to Islamists' compassion in an effort to change their wayward means was meaningless as they "express no empathy with their non-Muslim victims."
"They are only concerned about the nature of the true Muslim and the consequences for Muslims," he said. "This last point is every jihadist's real Achilles Heel. The best way to draw him away from his violent belief is to ask him what he really wants to achieve. That's when facts become more important than divine inclination."
Showing posts with label Jihad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jihad. Show all posts
Monday, November 1, 2010
Monday, October 25, 2010
Dutch Jihadist Recants
A key figure in one of militant Islam’s European networks has joined the ranks of a small but important number of jihadists who have had a change of heart and are calling on their brethren to abandon violence.
Writing from the Vught maximum security prison in the Netherlands, Jason Walters, a leading member of the Hofstad Group that police say was responsible for the 2004 killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, declared that “the ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt.”
Walters’ letter, published in Trouw, a Dutch daily, offers a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence; it contributes to understanding why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
The son of an African-American father and Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 and in 2003 made his way to Pakistan from where he returned to boast that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again." Accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsh Ali, Walters resisted arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police.
Unlike the recantations of jihadist ideologues such as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif who employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, Walters who is serving a 15-year sentence, denounces a basic tenant of his former worldview that holds that in a world of believers and infidels, the infidels seek to destroy the believers. It is a view Walters now describes as “a childish and coarse simplification of reality” that ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich.”
Analysts say Walters’ letter, or review document as he describes it, is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe.
Writing from the Vught maximum security prison in the Netherlands, Jason Walters, a leading member of the Hofstad Group that police say was responsible for the 2004 killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, declared that “the ideals that I once honored have been lost and I have come to realize that they are morally bankrupt.”
Walters’ letter, published in Trouw, a Dutch daily, offers a window into the mind of a man who had dedicated his life to propagating militant Islam through violence; it contributes to understanding why some adopt terrorism and what prompts them to reconsider.
The son of an African-American father and Dutch mother, Walters converted to Islam at age 16 and in 2003 made his way to Pakistan from where he returned to boast that he could "disassemble a Kalashnikov blindfolded and put it back together again." Accused of plotting to kill controversial Dutch parliamentarians Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsh Ali, Walters resisted arrest in 2004 in a 14-hour siege during which he threw a grenade at police.
Unlike the recantations of jihadist ideologues such as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif who employed Islamic theology to explain their change of heart, Walters who is serving a 15-year sentence, denounces a basic tenant of his former worldview that holds that in a world of believers and infidels, the infidels seek to destroy the believers. It is a view Walters now describes as “a childish and coarse simplification of reality” that ignores the complexity and many nuances of which reality is rich.”
Analysts say Walters’ letter, or review document as he describes it, is likely to spark debate in militant Islamist circles and serve as an important tool in efforts to counter jihadists in Europe.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
U.S., Europe Press GCC States on Yemen Membership
By James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
The United States and Europe are pressuring oil-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) to forge closer ties with Yemen in a bid to link the fight against al-Qaida to tangible economic benefits for the Arab world's poorest nation.
U.S. officials say the Obama administration recently conveyed to GCC leaders Yemen's reiteration of its 10-year-old request for GCC membership. The officials believe that U.S. and European endorsement of the request will prompt GCC leaders to respond more favorably when they meet in Abu Dhabi in December.
The U.S. and Europe are exerting pressure against the backdrop of an increasing number of attacks in Yemen on foreign diplomats and nationals. Suspected operatives of al-Qaida's Yemen-based affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), last week fired a rocket at a British embassy vehicle in the capital San'a. Employees of Austrian energy giant OMV were injured in a separate incident. The attacks on foreigners follow scores of incidents targeting Yemeni military and government officials. AQAP has killed some 100 Yemeni security and intelligence personnel in recent months in hit-and-run attacks launched by assassins on motorcycles using grenades and AK-47s.
The GCC's vested interest in ensuring stability in Yemen coupled with the Gulf's reliance for its security on the U.S. -- and to a lesser extent Europe -- militates in favor of the GCC moving beyond its repeated rejections of Yemen's aspirations. Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, see their security threatened by AQAP as well as the Yemeni government's intermittent war against tribal rebels in the north and its fight with secessionists in the south.
The GCC, in a prelude to closer relations, has admitted Yemen to several of its institutions, including its councils of health, education, sports and culture ministers. GCC members also contribute substantially to funding of the Yemeni government's payroll. The GCC agreed last month at a meeting in New York of the Friends of Yemen, which groups 22 nations concerned about the growing strength of jihadists in the country, to open an office in San'a that would "help all donors to plan, coordinate and deliver assistance to Yemen more efficiently." GCC members have held back billions of dollars in aid pledged to Yemen because of concerns that the country would not be able to absorb the funds, and also due to widespread Yemeni corruption -- a weak argument for Gulf states that have transparency issues of their own.
A political marriage between the Gulf states and Yemen is likely to prove difficult for the conservative GCC members. In many ways, Yemen and the GCC states have little in common beyond geography and their Arab identity. Yemen is a republican democracy, at least in name, that ousted its royals in the 1960s; GCC members are all authoritarian monarchies that have forgotten that they once wallowed in the same abject poverty Yemen suffers today. Gulf leaders, particularly in Kuwait, have never really forgiven Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh for his support of Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War, in which U.S.-led forces reversed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni officials concede that in order to persuade the GCC, the government will have to improve the security situation, narrow the economic divide with the Gulf states and significantly reduce the country's addiction to qat, a plant stimulant consumed by a majority of Yemenis that is classified by the World Health Organization as a drug.
In lieu of granting Yemen full membership, the GCC is likely to look at ways of improving employment prospects for Yemenis. Yemen's economic problems were exacerbated in the early 1990s when Saudi Arabia expelled some 1 million Yemeni workers in retaliation for Yemen's support of Saddam. The expulsion deprived Yemen of badly needed remittances that were often invested into small and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the backbone of the Yemeni economy. GCC member states are discussing allowing Yemeni workers to return -- a move that segments of Gulf society, concerned about the high number of foreign, non-Arab workers in their countries, would welcome.
Twenty years on, many Yemeni workers lack the employment skills that Gulf states now require. One way GCC states may seek to compensate for that would be to grant Yemenis access to the same professional and technical training available to Gulf nationals. GCC states are also likely to fund job-creation programs in Yemen. A report commissioned by the Yemeni government recently estimated that Yemen needs to create 4 million new jobs in the next 10 years. A Saudi delegation visited Yemen this weekend as part of a project to develop Yemeni educational programs, prepare Yemeni trainers and help the government draft regulations for the Higher Yemeni Technical Institute, which is funded by the Islamic Development Bank and South Korea.
A recent report (.pdf) by a London School of Economics researcher suggested that stabilizing Yemen was a key GCC interest because the country's problems potentially foreshadow problems that could emerge elsewhere in the Gulf. "Yemen is the canary in the coal mine. It is an indication of what can go wrong when a country fails to develop political legitimacy and build a sustainable, productive non-oil economy," said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, the author of the report. "The challenges to government authority in southern and northern Yemen demonstrate how existing socio-economic discontent and regional marginalization can fracture and fragment social cohesion. Similar fissures and unequal patterns of access to resources exist in the GCC states and could become transmitters of conflict in the future."
The United States and Europe share GCC concerns about Yemen's lack of good governance. Getting the GCC to assume responsibility for helping Yemen ensure that its development aid is put to proper use will have the added advantage of focusing Gulf attention on transparency issues within the GCC itself.
World Politics Review
The United States and Europe are pressuring oil-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) to forge closer ties with Yemen in a bid to link the fight against al-Qaida to tangible economic benefits for the Arab world's poorest nation.
U.S. officials say the Obama administration recently conveyed to GCC leaders Yemen's reiteration of its 10-year-old request for GCC membership. The officials believe that U.S. and European endorsement of the request will prompt GCC leaders to respond more favorably when they meet in Abu Dhabi in December.
The U.S. and Europe are exerting pressure against the backdrop of an increasing number of attacks in Yemen on foreign diplomats and nationals. Suspected operatives of al-Qaida's Yemen-based affiliate, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), last week fired a rocket at a British embassy vehicle in the capital San'a. Employees of Austrian energy giant OMV were injured in a separate incident. The attacks on foreigners follow scores of incidents targeting Yemeni military and government officials. AQAP has killed some 100 Yemeni security and intelligence personnel in recent months in hit-and-run attacks launched by assassins on motorcycles using grenades and AK-47s.
The GCC's vested interest in ensuring stability in Yemen coupled with the Gulf's reliance for its security on the U.S. -- and to a lesser extent Europe -- militates in favor of the GCC moving beyond its repeated rejections of Yemen's aspirations. Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, see their security threatened by AQAP as well as the Yemeni government's intermittent war against tribal rebels in the north and its fight with secessionists in the south.
The GCC, in a prelude to closer relations, has admitted Yemen to several of its institutions, including its councils of health, education, sports and culture ministers. GCC members also contribute substantially to funding of the Yemeni government's payroll. The GCC agreed last month at a meeting in New York of the Friends of Yemen, which groups 22 nations concerned about the growing strength of jihadists in the country, to open an office in San'a that would "help all donors to plan, coordinate and deliver assistance to Yemen more efficiently." GCC members have held back billions of dollars in aid pledged to Yemen because of concerns that the country would not be able to absorb the funds, and also due to widespread Yemeni corruption -- a weak argument for Gulf states that have transparency issues of their own.
A political marriage between the Gulf states and Yemen is likely to prove difficult for the conservative GCC members. In many ways, Yemen and the GCC states have little in common beyond geography and their Arab identity. Yemen is a republican democracy, at least in name, that ousted its royals in the 1960s; GCC members are all authoritarian monarchies that have forgotten that they once wallowed in the same abject poverty Yemen suffers today. Gulf leaders, particularly in Kuwait, have never really forgiven Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh for his support of Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War, in which U.S.-led forces reversed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni officials concede that in order to persuade the GCC, the government will have to improve the security situation, narrow the economic divide with the Gulf states and significantly reduce the country's addiction to qat, a plant stimulant consumed by a majority of Yemenis that is classified by the World Health Organization as a drug.
In lieu of granting Yemen full membership, the GCC is likely to look at ways of improving employment prospects for Yemenis. Yemen's economic problems were exacerbated in the early 1990s when Saudi Arabia expelled some 1 million Yemeni workers in retaliation for Yemen's support of Saddam. The expulsion deprived Yemen of badly needed remittances that were often invested into small and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the backbone of the Yemeni economy. GCC member states are discussing allowing Yemeni workers to return -- a move that segments of Gulf society, concerned about the high number of foreign, non-Arab workers in their countries, would welcome.
Twenty years on, many Yemeni workers lack the employment skills that Gulf states now require. One way GCC states may seek to compensate for that would be to grant Yemenis access to the same professional and technical training available to Gulf nationals. GCC states are also likely to fund job-creation programs in Yemen. A report commissioned by the Yemeni government recently estimated that Yemen needs to create 4 million new jobs in the next 10 years. A Saudi delegation visited Yemen this weekend as part of a project to develop Yemeni educational programs, prepare Yemeni trainers and help the government draft regulations for the Higher Yemeni Technical Institute, which is funded by the Islamic Development Bank and South Korea.
A recent report (.pdf) by a London School of Economics researcher suggested that stabilizing Yemen was a key GCC interest because the country's problems potentially foreshadow problems that could emerge elsewhere in the Gulf. "Yemen is the canary in the coal mine. It is an indication of what can go wrong when a country fails to develop political legitimacy and build a sustainable, productive non-oil economy," said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, the author of the report. "The challenges to government authority in southern and northern Yemen demonstrate how existing socio-economic discontent and regional marginalization can fracture and fragment social cohesion. Similar fissures and unequal patterns of access to resources exist in the GCC states and could become transmitters of conflict in the future."
The United States and Europe share GCC concerns about Yemen's lack of good governance. Getting the GCC to assume responsibility for helping Yemen ensure that its development aid is put to proper use will have the added advantage of focusing Gulf attention on transparency issues within the GCC itself.
Militant Islam gains ground in the Balkans
By James M. Dorsey
Deutsche Welle
It's feared that some Muslim charities could encourage Wahhabism
A recent online music video featuring Macedonians praising Osama bin Laden has fueled fears that Southeastern Europe could be emerging as the latest breeding ground for homegrown Islamist militants.
It has also focused attention on Muslim charities active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and European Union member Bulgaria since the wars in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. Many of those charities are funded by oil-rich Saudi Arabia and propagate Wahhabism - the kingdom's austere and puritan interpretation of Islam.
A majority of Wahhabis favor peaceful proselytizing of Islam while Saudi King Abdullah has been seeking to soften Wahhabi practices as part of his reforms in the kingdom. Militant groups such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, the Taliban and jihadists in Somalia have however embraced significant elements of Wahhabism as part of their ideology.
Jasmin Merdan, a young Bosnian who wrote a book after disassociating himself from Wahhabis groups in Bosnia, warned that "they express their convictions with violence, introduce anarchy in mosques and preach intolerance." Women in the Albanian city of Skadar have reportedly started covering their heads or wearing the niqab, a full body covering that hides everything but the eyes, in newly found religiosity.
The video posted on YouTube is one of several produced by home grown jihadists in the Balkans and circulating in the region. "Oh Osama, annihilate the American army. Oh Osama, raise the Muslims’ honor," a group of Macedonian men chant in Albanian on the video. "In September 2001 you conquered a power. We all pray for you." Similar songs calling on Southeastern European Muslims to join the jihad have been produced in Bosnian.
Governments and security forces fear that that increased Wahhabi activity will produce committed jihadis that could destabilize already fragile nations in southeastern Europe and, in the case of Bulgaria - where one sixth of the country's 7.6 million people is Muslim - produce a pool of jihadists whose EU passports would grant them easy access to Western Europe and allow them to blend into society.
Bulgaria seen as potential breeding ground
Bulgaria is the only EU member whose Muslim population are not recent immigrants. Most Bulgarian Muslims like those elsewhere in the Balkans are descendants of ethnic Turks who arrived during five centuries of Ottoman rule.
Three ethnic Albanian brothers from Macedonia were convicted to life in prison in 2008 on charges of plotting to attack the US Army's Fort Dix military base in New Jersey. A fourth member of the group from Kosovo was sentenced to five years in jail.
Across the Balkans, minority Wahhabi groups seek to convert mainstream Islam to their more militant interpretation through the operation of cultural centers, mosques, schools and at times by battling for control of majority Muslim organizations and community-owned property. A majority of the region's Muslims are secular and analysts caution against overstating the Wahhabi threat.
"It should not be ignored, but neither should it be exaggerated," said Hajrudin Somun a former Bosnian ambassador to Turkey and history professor at Sarajevo's Philip Noel-Baker International University.
The analysts say militant Islam is gaining ground on the fringe of a more general return to religion in the Balkans. Several thousand Orthodox Christian Bulgarians demonstrated in Sofia recently demanding that religious instruction be made compulsory in schools - a demand supported by mainstream Muslim organizations.
Muslim organizations are believed to have spent large amounts of money over the last decade to build some 150 new mosques and educational centers in predominantly Orthodox Bulgaria. A minority are believed to promote Wahhabism.
Analysts say that radical Islam has gained ground in southern and northeastern Bulgaria where militant Islamists, according to former Bulgarian chief mufti Nedim Gendzhev, are seeking to create a "fundamentalist triangle" in areas of Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria's Western Rhodope mountains.
Fears of increasing radicalism
Bulgarian authorities last year arrested a mayor and a village teacher in the south of the country on charges of preaching radical Islam. In 2003, authorities shut down several Islamic centers because they were financed by Saudi-funded Muslim groups believed to have links to militant Islamic organizations and "to prevent terrorists getting a foothold in Bulgaria." Some analysts estimate that 3,000 young Muslims have graduated from militant schools still operating in Bulgaria; it was not immediately clear what they went on to do following their graduation.
Relations are tense between Muslims and Serbs in BosniaThe threat posed by the Wahhabis is a major bone of contention in tense relations between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, which so far has successfully neutralized Wahhabi influence by controlling the appointment of imams in mosques and teachers at Islamic educational institutions and employing law enforcement.
Some Bosnian Wahhabis, estimated to number 3,000, are former foreign fighters who married Bosnian women and stayed in the country after the Bosnian war that ended in 1995. Bosnia recently stepped up its fight against militancy and organized crime to meet an EU requirement for visa-free travel for Bosnians and closer ties with the bloc.
In early September, Bosnian police uncovered a cache of weapons and detained a third suspect as part of their inquiry into a June bomb attack that killed one policeman and injured six others. The attack on a police station in the town of Bugojno was one of the most serious security incidents in Bosnia. Police arrested the suspected mastermind and an aide shortly after the blast.
Bosnia tries to crackdown on militants
Boris Grubesic, a spokesman for the Bosnian prosecutor's office, told reporters in mid-September that prosecutors were investigating several people from Bugojno and Gornja Maoca on suspicion of Wahhabi ties, terrorism and human trafficking.
In February, Bosnian and EU police raided Gornja Maoca and arrested seven men described as Wahhabis because of their beards and shortened trousers. Police said they were detained for suspected illegal possession of arms and threatening the country's "territorial integrity, constitutional order and provoking inter-ethnic and religious hatred."
Gornja Maoca was home to some 30 families who lived by strict Shariah laws, organized schooling in Arabic for their children outside the state system and opposed the primacy of Bosnia's mainstream Islamic Community. Nusret Imamovic, the town's self-proclaimed Wahhabi leader, endorsed suicide attacks on the group's Bosnian language website, saying they should be launched only in "exceptional circumstances." The site features statements by al-Qaeda and Islamic groups fighting in the Caucasus and celebrates suicide bombers as joyful Muslims.
Serbian officials say 12 alleged Wahhabis convicted last year to prison terms of up to 13 years for planning terrorist attacks, including on the US Embassy in Belgrade, had close ties to their brethren in Gornja Maoca. One of the convicted, Adnan Hot, said during the trial that Imamovic was one of only three Muslim leaders that he followed. Four other Wahhabis were sentenced in a separate case to jail terms of up to eight years on charges of planning to bomb a football stadium in the southern Serbian town of Novi Pazar.
In Macedonia, Suleyman Rexhepim Rexhepi, head of the official Islamic Religious Community (IVZ), recently called on the government and the international community to crack down on increasingly influential Wahabbi groups. Rexhepi is locked into a bitter battle with Ramadan Ramadani, the imam of the Isa Beg mosque in Skopje, that has caused a rift in the country's Muslim community.
Ramadani accuses Rexhep of financial msmangement and is seeking his ouster. He organized a petition signed by thousands of his followers supporting his bid for leadership of the community after Rexhepi banned him from organizing prayers. Ramadani denies that Wahhabis are active among Macedonian Muslims who account for roughly one quarter of the population as well as allegations that the pro-bin Laden music video was played in mosques he controls.
A Ramadani associate, radical Kosovo imam Sefket Krasnici, shocked Macedonians, when he recently denounced Mother Teresa, a native of Skopje whom many consider a saint, during a sermon in the Macedonian capital. "She belongs in the middle of Hell because she did not believe in Allah, the prophet and the Koran ... Even if she believed in God her belief was incomplete, with deficiencies. God does not accept such worship," Krasnici said.
Deutsche Welle
It's feared that some Muslim charities could encourage Wahhabism
A recent online music video featuring Macedonians praising Osama bin Laden has fueled fears that Southeastern Europe could be emerging as the latest breeding ground for homegrown Islamist militants.
It has also focused attention on Muslim charities active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and European Union member Bulgaria since the wars in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. Many of those charities are funded by oil-rich Saudi Arabia and propagate Wahhabism - the kingdom's austere and puritan interpretation of Islam.
A majority of Wahhabis favor peaceful proselytizing of Islam while Saudi King Abdullah has been seeking to soften Wahhabi practices as part of his reforms in the kingdom. Militant groups such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, the Taliban and jihadists in Somalia have however embraced significant elements of Wahhabism as part of their ideology.
Jasmin Merdan, a young Bosnian who wrote a book after disassociating himself from Wahhabis groups in Bosnia, warned that "they express their convictions with violence, introduce anarchy in mosques and preach intolerance." Women in the Albanian city of Skadar have reportedly started covering their heads or wearing the niqab, a full body covering that hides everything but the eyes, in newly found religiosity.
The video posted on YouTube is one of several produced by home grown jihadists in the Balkans and circulating in the region. "Oh Osama, annihilate the American army. Oh Osama, raise the Muslims’ honor," a group of Macedonian men chant in Albanian on the video. "In September 2001 you conquered a power. We all pray for you." Similar songs calling on Southeastern European Muslims to join the jihad have been produced in Bosnian.
Governments and security forces fear that that increased Wahhabi activity will produce committed jihadis that could destabilize already fragile nations in southeastern Europe and, in the case of Bulgaria - where one sixth of the country's 7.6 million people is Muslim - produce a pool of jihadists whose EU passports would grant them easy access to Western Europe and allow them to blend into society.
Bulgaria seen as potential breeding ground
Bulgaria is the only EU member whose Muslim population are not recent immigrants. Most Bulgarian Muslims like those elsewhere in the Balkans are descendants of ethnic Turks who arrived during five centuries of Ottoman rule.
Three ethnic Albanian brothers from Macedonia were convicted to life in prison in 2008 on charges of plotting to attack the US Army's Fort Dix military base in New Jersey. A fourth member of the group from Kosovo was sentenced to five years in jail.
Across the Balkans, minority Wahhabi groups seek to convert mainstream Islam to their more militant interpretation through the operation of cultural centers, mosques, schools and at times by battling for control of majority Muslim organizations and community-owned property. A majority of the region's Muslims are secular and analysts caution against overstating the Wahhabi threat.
"It should not be ignored, but neither should it be exaggerated," said Hajrudin Somun a former Bosnian ambassador to Turkey and history professor at Sarajevo's Philip Noel-Baker International University.
The analysts say militant Islam is gaining ground on the fringe of a more general return to religion in the Balkans. Several thousand Orthodox Christian Bulgarians demonstrated in Sofia recently demanding that religious instruction be made compulsory in schools - a demand supported by mainstream Muslim organizations.
Muslim organizations are believed to have spent large amounts of money over the last decade to build some 150 new mosques and educational centers in predominantly Orthodox Bulgaria. A minority are believed to promote Wahhabism.
Analysts say that radical Islam has gained ground in southern and northeastern Bulgaria where militant Islamists, according to former Bulgarian chief mufti Nedim Gendzhev, are seeking to create a "fundamentalist triangle" in areas of Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria's Western Rhodope mountains.
Fears of increasing radicalism
Bulgarian authorities last year arrested a mayor and a village teacher in the south of the country on charges of preaching radical Islam. In 2003, authorities shut down several Islamic centers because they were financed by Saudi-funded Muslim groups believed to have links to militant Islamic organizations and "to prevent terrorists getting a foothold in Bulgaria." Some analysts estimate that 3,000 young Muslims have graduated from militant schools still operating in Bulgaria; it was not immediately clear what they went on to do following their graduation.
Relations are tense between Muslims and Serbs in BosniaThe threat posed by the Wahhabis is a major bone of contention in tense relations between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, which so far has successfully neutralized Wahhabi influence by controlling the appointment of imams in mosques and teachers at Islamic educational institutions and employing law enforcement.
Some Bosnian Wahhabis, estimated to number 3,000, are former foreign fighters who married Bosnian women and stayed in the country after the Bosnian war that ended in 1995. Bosnia recently stepped up its fight against militancy and organized crime to meet an EU requirement for visa-free travel for Bosnians and closer ties with the bloc.
In early September, Bosnian police uncovered a cache of weapons and detained a third suspect as part of their inquiry into a June bomb attack that killed one policeman and injured six others. The attack on a police station in the town of Bugojno was one of the most serious security incidents in Bosnia. Police arrested the suspected mastermind and an aide shortly after the blast.
Bosnia tries to crackdown on militants
Boris Grubesic, a spokesman for the Bosnian prosecutor's office, told reporters in mid-September that prosecutors were investigating several people from Bugojno and Gornja Maoca on suspicion of Wahhabi ties, terrorism and human trafficking.
In February, Bosnian and EU police raided Gornja Maoca and arrested seven men described as Wahhabis because of their beards and shortened trousers. Police said they were detained for suspected illegal possession of arms and threatening the country's "territorial integrity, constitutional order and provoking inter-ethnic and religious hatred."
Gornja Maoca was home to some 30 families who lived by strict Shariah laws, organized schooling in Arabic for their children outside the state system and opposed the primacy of Bosnia's mainstream Islamic Community. Nusret Imamovic, the town's self-proclaimed Wahhabi leader, endorsed suicide attacks on the group's Bosnian language website, saying they should be launched only in "exceptional circumstances." The site features statements by al-Qaeda and Islamic groups fighting in the Caucasus and celebrates suicide bombers as joyful Muslims.
Serbian officials say 12 alleged Wahhabis convicted last year to prison terms of up to 13 years for planning terrorist attacks, including on the US Embassy in Belgrade, had close ties to their brethren in Gornja Maoca. One of the convicted, Adnan Hot, said during the trial that Imamovic was one of only three Muslim leaders that he followed. Four other Wahhabis were sentenced in a separate case to jail terms of up to eight years on charges of planning to bomb a football stadium in the southern Serbian town of Novi Pazar.
In Macedonia, Suleyman Rexhepim Rexhepi, head of the official Islamic Religious Community (IVZ), recently called on the government and the international community to crack down on increasingly influential Wahabbi groups. Rexhepi is locked into a bitter battle with Ramadan Ramadani, the imam of the Isa Beg mosque in Skopje, that has caused a rift in the country's Muslim community.
Ramadani accuses Rexhep of financial msmangement and is seeking his ouster. He organized a petition signed by thousands of his followers supporting his bid for leadership of the community after Rexhepi banned him from organizing prayers. Ramadani denies that Wahhabis are active among Macedonian Muslims who account for roughly one quarter of the population as well as allegations that the pro-bin Laden music video was played in mosques he controls.
A Ramadani associate, radical Kosovo imam Sefket Krasnici, shocked Macedonians, when he recently denounced Mother Teresa, a native of Skopje whom many consider a saint, during a sermon in the Macedonian capital. "She belongs in the middle of Hell because she did not believe in Allah, the prophet and the Koran ... Even if she believed in God her belief was incomplete, with deficiencies. God does not accept such worship," Krasnici said.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Insurance Companies Plan Private Navy Against Piracy
Major London-based maritime insurers as well as shipping companies have joined forces to create a private security force that would shield vessels traversing the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Oceans.
The plan, spearheaded by Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT), comes as a new piracy season opens and amid fears that Islamist forces on both sides of the Red Sea is muscling in on what has become a lucrative business.
British officials said they would consider the creation of a private maritime security force favorably provided it worked closely with the international naval force in the region. Industry sources say the plan is being welcomed by the British and other governments because the international force does not have the resources to fully patrol an area the size of the Indian Ocean and because the British Navy potentially faces severe budget cuts as part of the government’s austerity measures.
The private force would consist of 20 patrol boats carrying armed personnel that would escort vessel and act as a rapid response unit in protection of shipping in the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. Industry sources estimated that establishing the force would cost Euros 12 million, but would substantially reduce insurance costs that currently range per voyage from Euros 60,000 to 360,000 for an large oil tanker as well as ransom payments. Ransom payments and associated costs have cost insurance companies approximately Euros 230 million in the last two years.
The plan, spearheaded by Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT), comes as a new piracy season opens and amid fears that Islamist forces on both sides of the Red Sea is muscling in on what has become a lucrative business.
British officials said they would consider the creation of a private maritime security force favorably provided it worked closely with the international naval force in the region. Industry sources say the plan is being welcomed by the British and other governments because the international force does not have the resources to fully patrol an area the size of the Indian Ocean and because the British Navy potentially faces severe budget cuts as part of the government’s austerity measures.
The private force would consist of 20 patrol boats carrying armed personnel that would escort vessel and act as a rapid response unit in protection of shipping in the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. Industry sources estimated that establishing the force would cost Euros 12 million, but would substantially reduce insurance costs that currently range per voyage from Euros 60,000 to 360,000 for an large oil tanker as well as ransom payments. Ransom payments and associated costs have cost insurance companies approximately Euros 230 million in the last two years.
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Europe Plot Focuses Attention on Laskhar-e-Taibe
A plot to launch commando-style attacks in Britain, France or Germany reinforces Western intelligence concerns for much of this year that the next attack may come from an Al-Qaeda linked group that has faded from public attention: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Pakistani group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks in which ten gunmen killed 166 people in attacks on several targets in the city.
In testimony earlier this year before the US Congress, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair asserted that LeT is "becoming more of a direct threat and is placing Western targets in Europe in its sights." Pointing to the group's ability to raise funds, particularly in the Gulf, and its global logistics, support network and operations in Europe and Asia, Blair said confronting LeT was a high priority for Washington.
Blair made his remarks months after the FBI arrested and charged Pakistani American David Headley with involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and working with LeT on planned attacks in Denmark and India. Danish officials said earlier this year that they believed that LeT was planning an attack on the newspaper that in 2005 published controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.
Headley's interrogation further led to the recent arrest of several LeT operatives in Bangladesh who allegedly were preparing suicide car bombings of the US, British and Indian embassies in the capital Dhaka.
Concern that LeT may be setting its sights on Europe for its next operation were compounded by the group's history of involvement in international terrorism. LeT members have fought in Tajikistan's civil war and Bosnia Herzegovina and operate in Kashmir. US and European officials believe that by targeting India or Indian targets in Europe and Asia, LeT hopes to disrupt fragile efforts by Pakistan and India to resolve their differences and work more closely together in combating militant Islamic groups.
It's believed al Qaeda may be using LeT to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned on a visit in January to New Delhi that al Qaeda was using LeT to provoke renewed conflict between India and Pakistan in a bid to further destabilize Pakistan. Earlier, Gates told the US Senate that al Qaeda was providing LeT with targeting information to help the group plot attacks in India.
In testimony earlier this year before the US Congress, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair asserted that LeT is "becoming more of a direct threat and is placing Western targets in Europe in its sights." Pointing to the group's ability to raise funds, particularly in the Gulf, and its global logistics, support network and operations in Europe and Asia, Blair said confronting LeT was a high priority for Washington.
Blair made his remarks months after the FBI arrested and charged Pakistani American David Headley with involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and working with LeT on planned attacks in Denmark and India. Danish officials said earlier this year that they believed that LeT was planning an attack on the newspaper that in 2005 published controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.
Headley's interrogation further led to the recent arrest of several LeT operatives in Bangladesh who allegedly were preparing suicide car bombings of the US, British and Indian embassies in the capital Dhaka.
Concern that LeT may be setting its sights on Europe for its next operation were compounded by the group's history of involvement in international terrorism. LeT members have fought in Tajikistan's civil war and Bosnia Herzegovina and operate in Kashmir. US and European officials believe that by targeting India or Indian targets in Europe and Asia, LeT hopes to disrupt fragile efforts by Pakistan and India to resolve their differences and work more closely together in combating militant Islamic groups.
It's believed al Qaeda may be using LeT to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned on a visit in January to New Delhi that al Qaeda was using LeT to provoke renewed conflict between India and Pakistan in a bid to further destabilize Pakistan. Earlier, Gates told the US Senate that al Qaeda was providing LeT with targeting information to help the group plot attacks in India.
Monday, September 27, 2010
AQIM Kidnappings Spark Criticism of Ransom Payments
Last week’s kidnapping of five French nationals in northern Niger by an Al Qaeda affiliate is likely to be a watershed in regional and international efforts to combat terrorism in the Sahel.
The kidnapping also threatens to open a rift between European Union members about how to confront the threat to foreign nationals in northern Africa. In an apparent about face following a failed French-Mauritanian attack in July on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al Qaeda affiliate, and the subsequent murder of a French hostage, France has signaled that it is willing to negotiate with the kidnappers of five employees of state-owned Avera, the world’s largest operator of nuclear plants. The apparent reversal of French policy has sparked criticism from Britain as well as Algeria.
Speaking at the United Nations, British Foreign Secretary William Hague warned that paying ransom to hostage takers would only encourage more abductions and killings of foreign nationals. Hague’s remarks constituted not only a shot across the bow of France but also criticism of Spain which is believed to have paid AQIM up to Euros 8 million earlier this year for the release of three Spanish aid workers.
Algerian President Abdelazi Bouteflika for counter terrorism, Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara, told the UN this week that AQIM had earned $25 million from ransoms in the past two years, making it wealthier than its parent. The UN Security Council on Monday issued a statement expressing concern about the rising number of kidnappings and reminding UN members of their duty to prevent the financing of terrorist acts. Analysts note that various international conventions and Security Council resolutions implicitly ban ransom payments, but do not do so explicitly. The African Union last year called for the criminalization of the payment of ransoms, a call that is likely to find enhanced support in the wake of the abductions in Niger.
Analysts say further that the resolution of the French hostage crisis is likely to determine the future of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Tension, they say, could drop if France achieves a negotiated release of the French captives. Military action or the assassination of the hostages by their abductors would, however, likely lead to a more sustained series of clashes with regional and possibly French-led forces in the Sahel.
The kidnapping also threatens to open a rift between European Union members about how to confront the threat to foreign nationals in northern Africa. In an apparent about face following a failed French-Mauritanian attack in July on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al Qaeda affiliate, and the subsequent murder of a French hostage, France has signaled that it is willing to negotiate with the kidnappers of five employees of state-owned Avera, the world’s largest operator of nuclear plants. The apparent reversal of French policy has sparked criticism from Britain as well as Algeria.
Speaking at the United Nations, British Foreign Secretary William Hague warned that paying ransom to hostage takers would only encourage more abductions and killings of foreign nationals. Hague’s remarks constituted not only a shot across the bow of France but also criticism of Spain which is believed to have paid AQIM up to Euros 8 million earlier this year for the release of three Spanish aid workers.
Algerian President Abdelazi Bouteflika for counter terrorism, Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara, told the UN this week that AQIM had earned $25 million from ransoms in the past two years, making it wealthier than its parent. The UN Security Council on Monday issued a statement expressing concern about the rising number of kidnappings and reminding UN members of their duty to prevent the financing of terrorist acts. Analysts note that various international conventions and Security Council resolutions implicitly ban ransom payments, but do not do so explicitly. The African Union last year called for the criminalization of the payment of ransoms, a call that is likely to find enhanced support in the wake of the abductions in Niger.
Analysts say further that the resolution of the French hostage crisis is likely to determine the future of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Tension, they say, could drop if France achieves a negotiated release of the French captives. Military action or the assassination of the hostages by their abductors would, however, likely lead to a more sustained series of clashes with regional and possibly French-led forces in the Sahel.
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Niger Abductions Draw France, EU into Northwest African Conflict
James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
Last week's brazen kidnapping of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, by al-Qaida-linked militants in a uranium mining town in Niger has increased pressure on both France and the European Union to become more militarily involved in the region's fight against jihadists. The kidnapping threatens France's major source of uranium for its nuclear power plants, calls into question the practice by some European governments of paying ransoms to free hostages, and throws down the gauntlet for the EU in its counterterrorism efforts.
In response to the abductions, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and seven of his European counterparts urged EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to increase EU engagement in security and development in the Sahel, one of the world's poorest regions, arguing that the "populations there must have . . . another perspective than that offered by terrorists." Now, France has reportedly deployed 80 troops, including anti-terror and special operations forces, as well as reconnaissance aircraft to Niamey to support efforts to locate the abductees.
France and Spain have already found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict in the Sahel due to a spate of kidnappings of their nationals by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida's northwest African affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.
With no claim of responsibility issued yet, it remains unclear whether the seven, who worked for both the French state-owned nuclear company Areva and a subsidiary of the French contractor Vinci, were abducted by the militants themselves or by Tuareg tribesmen cooperating with the jihadists. A Tuareg leader denied involvement despite Niger government claims that the kidnappers were heard speaking Tamachek, a Tuareg language. Kouchner said the tribesmen may have kidnapped the foreigners to sell them to AQIM.
The kidnappings are the first to strike directly at foreign economic interests. Earlier incidents targeted primarily aid workers and tourists, and were designed to fill AQIM's coffers with the proceeds of ransom payments. Avera's Niger operations produce half of the uranium used in French nuclear reactors. The company employs 2,500 people at the Cominak and Somair uranium mines, as well as at the Imouraren mine still under development. Imouaren, expected to become Africa's biggest uranium mine, will make impoverished Niger the world's second-largest uranium producer when it is brought online in 2014.
Last week's abductions threaten those ambitions. Over the weekend, Avera and Vinci began evacuating foreign nationals from Arlit, the town from which the seven were abducted while asleep in their homes, as well as from other areas threatened by AQIM and rebel tribesmen. The kidnappings also mark a milestone in AQIM operations as they are the first against a hardened target: Arlit is protected by some 350 Nigerien troops, and located in an area in which the militants had not been active. The abductions also constitute a setback for Avera's efforts to reduce widespread local resistance to its operations. Local NGOs and tribesmen accuse the company of bribing Tuareg rebels, polluting underground aquifers, aggravating a chronic water shortage, and exposing its employees to uranium contamination.
Nigerien military officials believe the seven hostages were moved to Mali, where past hostages have been held. Nigerien pilots spotted three vehicles, which they believe were transporting the hostages, moving at high speed toward the Malian border. Mauritanian forces assisted by French reconnaissance have launched an offensive in the area to clear the militants and drug dealers from what is currently a no-man's land. Algerian military officials and local sources say the Mauritanians are encountering stiff resistance from an AQIM field commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, described as radical and inflexible.
The fate of the seven hostages is likely to depend on which of AQIM's rival commanders controls them. In July, a joint French-Mauritanian military operation -- the first against AQIM known to involve Western combat troops -- failed to liberate 78-year-old French hostage Michel Germaneau, who was subsequently killed by the militants. Malian negotiators say the hostages are at greater risk if Abu Zaid, who is believed to be responsible for Germaneau's death as well as for last year's killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer, gains control of them. By contrast, AQIM's leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has emerged in past negotiations as a less dogmatic dealmaker, willing to free hostages in return for a ransom and the release of jailed militants.
AQIM released two Spanish hostages shortly after July's failed military operation in a prisoner exchange with Mauritania that is believed to have also involved a payment of $5 million in ransom to the militants. In a statement, the jihadists said the release of the Spaniards demonstrated that they were still open for business. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel suggested that the group would test whether the killing of Germeneau in retaliation for the July raid had caused France to reconsider its approach.
Earlier this year, France had acquiesced to the release of French hostage Pierre Camette in exchange for the liberation of jailed militants in Mali. In the aftermath of the July raid, Droudkel warned that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had opened "the gates of hell on himself, his people and his nation." In response, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared his country at war with AQIM, and the French Foreign Ministry said that France's military forces were "fully mobilized" to counter "threats uttered by assassins."
Last week's abductions could escalate French and EU involvement in what is increasingly becoming not just an African but also a European problem. They are also likely to strengthen opposition to the paying of ransoms, which serve to embolden the militants while ensuring that they are able to fund further operations.
A 2008 French defense white paper (.pdf) identified the mineral- and oil-rich Sahel as one of four regions crucial to French national security. At the same time, the document and subsequent French defense planning called for reducing the number of France's African bases from four to three. Speaking after the abductions, Sarkozy warned that "the Sahel zone is extremely dangerous. . . . [This] shows that we must redouble vigilance." The recent developments could also lead France to redouble -- or at least maintain -- its presence there, too.
World Politics Review
Last week's brazen kidnapping of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, by al-Qaida-linked militants in a uranium mining town in Niger has increased pressure on both France and the European Union to become more militarily involved in the region's fight against jihadists. The kidnapping threatens France's major source of uranium for its nuclear power plants, calls into question the practice by some European governments of paying ransoms to free hostages, and throws down the gauntlet for the EU in its counterterrorism efforts.
In response to the abductions, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and seven of his European counterparts urged EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to increase EU engagement in security and development in the Sahel, one of the world's poorest regions, arguing that the "populations there must have . . . another perspective than that offered by terrorists." Now, France has reportedly deployed 80 troops, including anti-terror and special operations forces, as well as reconnaissance aircraft to Niamey to support efforts to locate the abductees.
France and Spain have already found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict in the Sahel due to a spate of kidnappings of their nationals by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida's northwest African affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.
With no claim of responsibility issued yet, it remains unclear whether the seven, who worked for both the French state-owned nuclear company Areva and a subsidiary of the French contractor Vinci, were abducted by the militants themselves or by Tuareg tribesmen cooperating with the jihadists. A Tuareg leader denied involvement despite Niger government claims that the kidnappers were heard speaking Tamachek, a Tuareg language. Kouchner said the tribesmen may have kidnapped the foreigners to sell them to AQIM.
The kidnappings are the first to strike directly at foreign economic interests. Earlier incidents targeted primarily aid workers and tourists, and were designed to fill AQIM's coffers with the proceeds of ransom payments. Avera's Niger operations produce half of the uranium used in French nuclear reactors. The company employs 2,500 people at the Cominak and Somair uranium mines, as well as at the Imouraren mine still under development. Imouaren, expected to become Africa's biggest uranium mine, will make impoverished Niger the world's second-largest uranium producer when it is brought online in 2014.
Last week's abductions threaten those ambitions. Over the weekend, Avera and Vinci began evacuating foreign nationals from Arlit, the town from which the seven were abducted while asleep in their homes, as well as from other areas threatened by AQIM and rebel tribesmen. The kidnappings also mark a milestone in AQIM operations as they are the first against a hardened target: Arlit is protected by some 350 Nigerien troops, and located in an area in which the militants had not been active. The abductions also constitute a setback for Avera's efforts to reduce widespread local resistance to its operations. Local NGOs and tribesmen accuse the company of bribing Tuareg rebels, polluting underground aquifers, aggravating a chronic water shortage, and exposing its employees to uranium contamination.
Nigerien military officials believe the seven hostages were moved to Mali, where past hostages have been held. Nigerien pilots spotted three vehicles, which they believe were transporting the hostages, moving at high speed toward the Malian border. Mauritanian forces assisted by French reconnaissance have launched an offensive in the area to clear the militants and drug dealers from what is currently a no-man's land. Algerian military officials and local sources say the Mauritanians are encountering stiff resistance from an AQIM field commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, described as radical and inflexible.
The fate of the seven hostages is likely to depend on which of AQIM's rival commanders controls them. In July, a joint French-Mauritanian military operation -- the first against AQIM known to involve Western combat troops -- failed to liberate 78-year-old French hostage Michel Germaneau, who was subsequently killed by the militants. Malian negotiators say the hostages are at greater risk if Abu Zaid, who is believed to be responsible for Germaneau's death as well as for last year's killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer, gains control of them. By contrast, AQIM's leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has emerged in past negotiations as a less dogmatic dealmaker, willing to free hostages in return for a ransom and the release of jailed militants.
AQIM released two Spanish hostages shortly after July's failed military operation in a prisoner exchange with Mauritania that is believed to have also involved a payment of $5 million in ransom to the militants. In a statement, the jihadists said the release of the Spaniards demonstrated that they were still open for business. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel suggested that the group would test whether the killing of Germeneau in retaliation for the July raid had caused France to reconsider its approach.
Earlier this year, France had acquiesced to the release of French hostage Pierre Camette in exchange for the liberation of jailed militants in Mali. In the aftermath of the July raid, Droudkel warned that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had opened "the gates of hell on himself, his people and his nation." In response, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared his country at war with AQIM, and the French Foreign Ministry said that France's military forces were "fully mobilized" to counter "threats uttered by assassins."
Last week's abductions could escalate French and EU involvement in what is increasingly becoming not just an African but also a European problem. They are also likely to strengthen opposition to the paying of ransoms, which serve to embolden the militants while ensuring that they are able to fund further operations.
A 2008 French defense white paper (.pdf) identified the mineral- and oil-rich Sahel as one of four regions crucial to French national security. At the same time, the document and subsequent French defense planning called for reducing the number of France's African bases from four to three. Speaking after the abductions, Sarkozy warned that "the Sahel zone is extremely dangerous. . . . [This] shows that we must redouble vigilance." The recent developments could also lead France to redouble -- or at least maintain -- its presence there, too.
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Balkans Become Breeding Ground For Militant Islam
Southeastern Europe is emerging as the latest breeding ground for homegrown Islamist militants in the West as a result of missionary work by Saudi-inspired Wahhabis, followers of the strict, puritan interpretation of Islam adopted by oil-rich Saudi Arabia and violently promoted by Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and jihadists in Somalia.
Muslim charities, many of them with Saudi funding or Wahhabist leanings, have been active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and EU member Bulgaria since the wars in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. A recent music online video featuring a group of Macedonians praising Bin Laden in Albanian has focused attention on what Muslim authorities in the region and intelligence agencies say is an alarming trend that threatens not only fragile stability in the region but could produce a pool of terrorists with easy access to the rest of Europe. Similar songs have also emerged in Bosnian.
Beyond building a large number of mosques across southeastern Europe, Wahhabis have also founded a string of schools that lie beyond the control of local authorities. Concern about the rise of militant Islam in southeastern Europe also focuses attention on the broader impact of Saudi-funded Wahhabi missionary work. While Saudi King Abdullah has been seeking to gradually reform Wahhabi practice in the kingdom, militants often exploit its ascetic version of Islam to create a feeding ground for radical Islam.
Analysts say unregulated Wahhabi schools in Bulgaria have produced some 3,000 graduates in the last 20 years. The threat posed by the Wahhabis has become a major bone of contention in the tense relations between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, which so far has been successful in neutralizing Wahhabi influence by controlling the appointment of imams in mosques and teachers at Islamic educational institutions.
A Serbian court last year sentenced 12 militants from the tense region of Sandzak to prison for planning terrorist attacks, including an attack on the US embassy in Belgrade. Moderates and Wahhabis are battling for control of Macedonia’s Islamic Religious Community, one of the country’s major Islamic organizations.
Muslim charities, many of them with Saudi funding or Wahhabist leanings, have been active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and EU member Bulgaria since the wars in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. A recent music online video featuring a group of Macedonians praising Bin Laden in Albanian has focused attention on what Muslim authorities in the region and intelligence agencies say is an alarming trend that threatens not only fragile stability in the region but could produce a pool of terrorists with easy access to the rest of Europe. Similar songs have also emerged in Bosnian.
Beyond building a large number of mosques across southeastern Europe, Wahhabis have also founded a string of schools that lie beyond the control of local authorities. Concern about the rise of militant Islam in southeastern Europe also focuses attention on the broader impact of Saudi-funded Wahhabi missionary work. While Saudi King Abdullah has been seeking to gradually reform Wahhabi practice in the kingdom, militants often exploit its ascetic version of Islam to create a feeding ground for radical Islam.
Analysts say unregulated Wahhabi schools in Bulgaria have produced some 3,000 graduates in the last 20 years. The threat posed by the Wahhabis has become a major bone of contention in the tense relations between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, which so far has been successful in neutralizing Wahhabi influence by controlling the appointment of imams in mosques and teachers at Islamic educational institutions.
A Serbian court last year sentenced 12 militants from the tense region of Sandzak to prison for planning terrorist attacks, including an attack on the US embassy in Belgrade. Moderates and Wahhabis are battling for control of Macedonia’s Islamic Religious Community, one of the country’s major Islamic organizations.
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Donors To Establish Development Fund For Yemen in Fight Against Al Qaeda
In the clearest recognition yet that Islamist militants in Yemen cannot be defeated by military means alone, the United States and its allies are set to create an international fund for development of the impoverished, conflict-ridden Arab nation. Donor countries, including the US, Britain, France and the Gulf states, are expected to launch the fund at a meeting in New York on September 24.
The fund comes as the US military is seeking $1.2 billion to strengthen Yemeni security forces over a five-year period. State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin said earlier this month that the US sees the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Gulf, as a priority. The US has this year allocated $300 million to Yemen, half of which, according to Benjamin, targets the “incubators for extremism” – poverty, weak governance and corruption.
The donors are also expected to discuss ways to stimulate a national dialogue between Yemen’s political forces in a bid to reduce nepotism, make its political system more inclusive, resolve an intermittent insurgency in the north and a growing separatist movement in the south and stem AQAP’s increasing strength.
To a large extent, change in Yemen will however depend on a change in Saudi policy towards Yemen. In many ways, Saudi Arabia, like the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih itself, is as much part of the solution as it is part of the solution. The Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which groups the region’s six oil-rich states has already taken steps to build closer ties with Yemen. The GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, could ease Yemen’s economic pain by agreeing on the free movement of labor in the region. This would reduce unemployment, increase the flow of remittances and stem illegal border crossings.
To counter the inward looking, xenophobic, conservative environment on which AQAP feeds, Saudi Arabia will however also have to strengthen the Yemeni government by halting the buying of tribal fealty at the expense of the government and controlling Saudi-funded missionary work that has significantly increased the influence of a militant, ascetic interpretation of Islam among Yemenis as well as among the large number of Somali refugees in the country.
The fund comes as the US military is seeking $1.2 billion to strengthen Yemeni security forces over a five-year period. State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin said earlier this month that the US sees the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Gulf, as a priority. The US has this year allocated $300 million to Yemen, half of which, according to Benjamin, targets the “incubators for extremism” – poverty, weak governance and corruption.
The donors are also expected to discuss ways to stimulate a national dialogue between Yemen’s political forces in a bid to reduce nepotism, make its political system more inclusive, resolve an intermittent insurgency in the north and a growing separatist movement in the south and stem AQAP’s increasing strength.
To a large extent, change in Yemen will however depend on a change in Saudi policy towards Yemen. In many ways, Saudi Arabia, like the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih itself, is as much part of the solution as it is part of the solution. The Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which groups the region’s six oil-rich states has already taken steps to build closer ties with Yemen. The GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, could ease Yemen’s economic pain by agreeing on the free movement of labor in the region. This would reduce unemployment, increase the flow of remittances and stem illegal border crossings.
To counter the inward looking, xenophobic, conservative environment on which AQAP feeds, Saudi Arabia will however also have to strengthen the Yemeni government by halting the buying of tribal fealty at the expense of the government and controlling Saudi-funded missionary work that has significantly increased the influence of a militant, ascetic interpretation of Islam among Yemenis as well as among the large number of Somali refugees in the country.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Release of Spanish Hostages: Questions and Insights
This week’s release of two Spanish hostages by an Al Qaeda affiliate in North Africa raises questions about the steadfastness of the refusal by Western nations to negotiate with terrorists. It also constitutes a victory for the group’s Algerian faction focused more on kidnapping of foreigners as a business than on achieving political goals.
In a statement to Spanish newspaper El Pais, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritainia, Mali and Niger suggested that Spain had met its demand for payment of a $5 million ransom for the hostages. The Spanish government has declined to comment on whether it had cut a deal with the militants. The hostages were kidnapped in Mauritania in November while riding in a convoy delivering supplies to poor villages.
It became apparent that the two hostages, Albert Vilalta and Roque Pascual, were about to be released after Mauritania last week threw the jihadists a bone by extraditing to Mali a key Malian AQIM operative, Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma. Hamma had been convicted to 12 years in prison for kidnapping the two Spaniards as well as Alicia Gomez, a third Spaniard who was released in March. His release had been part of AQIM’s demands.
Spain's ransom payment and Hamma's release would not be the first time European and West African authorities have entered into negotiations with AQIM. Mali released four Islamists earlier this year in an apparent swap for French hostage Pierre Camatte, freed by AQIM in February. The release soured its relations with Algeria, Mauritania and Niger who accused Mali of being soft on terrorism.
The group, which grew out of the Salafist movement in Algeria and has since shifted south into the vast and lawless Sahel, also killed British captive Edwin Dyer last year after London refused to give in to its demands.
Analysts and Malian officials say Hamma’s release was as much designed to achieve the release of the remaining hostages as it was to deepen divisions within the Al Qaeda affiliate and complicate its relations with allied rebel Tuareg tribesmen. The Tuareg accuse the Malian government of failing to implement a 2008 agreement that was supposed to end their tribal insurgency and grant the Tuareg greater rights.
Relations between Al Qaeda and the Tuareg became strained last month when an AQIM commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, accused the Tuareg of assisting a French-Mauritainian attack that last month failed to liberate 78-year old French hostage Michel Germaneau and killed six jihadists. Abu Zaid charged that the Tuareg had pinpointed the whereabouts of the AQIM operatives. In retaliation, Abu Zaid abducted and killed Mirzag Ag El Housseini, a Tuareg customs officer whose brother is senior commander in the Malian army. In a statement, AQIM’s leader in Mauritania, Abu Anas al-Shanqiti, warned that his group would retaliate against the “traitorous apostates, children and agents of Christian France” who had cooperated in the raid. The French Foreign Ministry says its forces are “fully mobilized” to counter “threats uttered by assassins.”
Abu Zaid had been urging the commander of AQIM’s wing in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, under whose control the Spaniards were, to execute them in retaliation for the French-Mauritanian raid. Mali had been quietly negotiating the release of the Spanish hostages with Belmokhtar. Malian officials say that the extradition of Hamma enabled Belmokhtar to cut a deal and claim political success. Hamma’s extradition contrasts starkly with Mauritania’s participation in the French-led raid and its past refusal to negotiate with the jihadists.
In its statement, AQIM said the release of the hostages demonstrated to France that "it was possible to deal rationally with the Mujahedeen (Islamic fighters). It was possible to avoid the aggravation, irritation and anger that led to the killing of their national."
In a statement to Spanish newspaper El Pais, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritainia, Mali and Niger suggested that Spain had met its demand for payment of a $5 million ransom for the hostages. The Spanish government has declined to comment on whether it had cut a deal with the militants. The hostages were kidnapped in Mauritania in November while riding in a convoy delivering supplies to poor villages.
It became apparent that the two hostages, Albert Vilalta and Roque Pascual, were about to be released after Mauritania last week threw the jihadists a bone by extraditing to Mali a key Malian AQIM operative, Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma. Hamma had been convicted to 12 years in prison for kidnapping the two Spaniards as well as Alicia Gomez, a third Spaniard who was released in March. His release had been part of AQIM’s demands.
Spain's ransom payment and Hamma's release would not be the first time European and West African authorities have entered into negotiations with AQIM. Mali released four Islamists earlier this year in an apparent swap for French hostage Pierre Camatte, freed by AQIM in February. The release soured its relations with Algeria, Mauritania and Niger who accused Mali of being soft on terrorism.
The group, which grew out of the Salafist movement in Algeria and has since shifted south into the vast and lawless Sahel, also killed British captive Edwin Dyer last year after London refused to give in to its demands.
Analysts and Malian officials say Hamma’s release was as much designed to achieve the release of the remaining hostages as it was to deepen divisions within the Al Qaeda affiliate and complicate its relations with allied rebel Tuareg tribesmen. The Tuareg accuse the Malian government of failing to implement a 2008 agreement that was supposed to end their tribal insurgency and grant the Tuareg greater rights.
Relations between Al Qaeda and the Tuareg became strained last month when an AQIM commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, accused the Tuareg of assisting a French-Mauritainian attack that last month failed to liberate 78-year old French hostage Michel Germaneau and killed six jihadists. Abu Zaid charged that the Tuareg had pinpointed the whereabouts of the AQIM operatives. In retaliation, Abu Zaid abducted and killed Mirzag Ag El Housseini, a Tuareg customs officer whose brother is senior commander in the Malian army. In a statement, AQIM’s leader in Mauritania, Abu Anas al-Shanqiti, warned that his group would retaliate against the “traitorous apostates, children and agents of Christian France” who had cooperated in the raid. The French Foreign Ministry says its forces are “fully mobilized” to counter “threats uttered by assassins.”
Abu Zaid had been urging the commander of AQIM’s wing in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, under whose control the Spaniards were, to execute them in retaliation for the French-Mauritanian raid. Mali had been quietly negotiating the release of the Spanish hostages with Belmokhtar. Malian officials say that the extradition of Hamma enabled Belmokhtar to cut a deal and claim political success. Hamma’s extradition contrasts starkly with Mauritania’s participation in the French-led raid and its past refusal to negotiate with the jihadists.
In its statement, AQIM said the release of the hostages demonstrated to France that "it was possible to deal rationally with the Mujahedeen (Islamic fighters). It was possible to avoid the aggravation, irritation and anger that led to the killing of their national."
Friday, August 20, 2010
French Raid on Al Qaeda Paves Way for Spanish Hostage Release
Last month’s French-Mauritanian attack on Al Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa failed to liberate a 78-year old French hostage, but in an unexpected twist, has driven a wedge between the jihadists and their Tuareg tribal allies in the region and is fomenting tension between Al Qaeda commanders, according to Western and West African intelligence sources.
The emerging divide between the affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Tuareg who accuse the Malian government of failing to implement a 2008 agreement that was supposed to end their tribal insurgency and grant the Tuareg greater rights offers President Amadou Toumani Toure as well as US, French and British counterterrorism efforts in the region an opportunity to substantially weaken the jihadists to whom local tribes provide a crucial lifeline. It has also provided an opening for the release of two Spanish hostages held by the jihadists.
AQIM commander Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid has accused the Tuareg of assisting the French-led attack in which six jihadists were killed by pinpointing the whereabouts of the AQIM operatives. To revenge the betrayal, Abu Zaid last week abducted and killed Mirzag Ag El Housseini, a Tuareg customs officer whose brother is senior commander in the Malian army. In a statement, AQIM’s leader in Mauritania, Abu Anas al-Shanqiti, warned that his group would retaliate against the “traitorous apostates, children and agents of Christian France” who had cooperated in the raid. The French Foreign Ministry says its forces are “fully mobilized” to counter “threats uttered by assassins.”
Mauritania, despite the threats, this week threw the jihadists a bone by extraditing to Mali a key Malian AQIM operative, Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma, who was convicted to 12 years in prison for kidnapping three Spaniards last November. Alicia Gomez, one of the hostages, was released in March. Analysts say the extradition was designed to set the stage for the release of the two remaining Spanish hostages and fuel differences of opinion between AQIM commanders about the fate of the Spaniards. The analysts and Malian officials say Abu Zaid is urging AQIM’s leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, under whose control the Spaniards are, to execute them in retaliation for the French-Mauritanian raid.
Mali has been quietly negotiating with Belmokhtar the release of the hostages. Malian officials say that the extradition of Hamma may enable Belmokhtar, who is demanding a ransom, to cut a deal and claim political success. Hamma’s extradition contrasts starkly with Mauritania’s participation in the French-led raid and its past refusal to negotiate with the jihadists. Mauritanian relations with Mali soured earlier this year after the government in Nouakchott accused Mali of being soft on terrorism by releasing in February four AQIM operatives in exchange for French hostage Pierre Camatte.
The emerging divide between the affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Tuareg who accuse the Malian government of failing to implement a 2008 agreement that was supposed to end their tribal insurgency and grant the Tuareg greater rights offers President Amadou Toumani Toure as well as US, French and British counterterrorism efforts in the region an opportunity to substantially weaken the jihadists to whom local tribes provide a crucial lifeline. It has also provided an opening for the release of two Spanish hostages held by the jihadists.
AQIM commander Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid has accused the Tuareg of assisting the French-led attack in which six jihadists were killed by pinpointing the whereabouts of the AQIM operatives. To revenge the betrayal, Abu Zaid last week abducted and killed Mirzag Ag El Housseini, a Tuareg customs officer whose brother is senior commander in the Malian army. In a statement, AQIM’s leader in Mauritania, Abu Anas al-Shanqiti, warned that his group would retaliate against the “traitorous apostates, children and agents of Christian France” who had cooperated in the raid. The French Foreign Ministry says its forces are “fully mobilized” to counter “threats uttered by assassins.”
Mauritania, despite the threats, this week threw the jihadists a bone by extraditing to Mali a key Malian AQIM operative, Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma, who was convicted to 12 years in prison for kidnapping three Spaniards last November. Alicia Gomez, one of the hostages, was released in March. Analysts say the extradition was designed to set the stage for the release of the two remaining Spanish hostages and fuel differences of opinion between AQIM commanders about the fate of the Spaniards. The analysts and Malian officials say Abu Zaid is urging AQIM’s leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, under whose control the Spaniards are, to execute them in retaliation for the French-Mauritanian raid.
Mali has been quietly negotiating with Belmokhtar the release of the hostages. Malian officials say that the extradition of Hamma may enable Belmokhtar, who is demanding a ransom, to cut a deal and claim political success. Hamma’s extradition contrasts starkly with Mauritania’s participation in the French-led raid and its past refusal to negotiate with the jihadists. Mauritanian relations with Mali soured earlier this year after the government in Nouakchott accused Mali of being soft on terrorism by releasing in February four AQIM operatives in exchange for French hostage Pierre Camatte.
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
Pakistan Floods Provide Political Boon to Islamic Militants
James M. Dorsey | 11 Aug 2010
World Politics Review
Pakistan's worst flooding in almost a century may well be remembered as much for the magnitude of the disaster as for the fact that it constituted a major setback in the government's efforts -- backed by its Western and Muslim allies -- to defeat Islamist militants allied with al-Qaida and the Taliban.
There is a long list of natural and man-made disasters in Islamic countries in which militant Islamists have garnered popularity by quickly and effectively responding with relief and emergency aid, in stark contrast to governments that were slow to react and unable to provide services to victims. By launching immediate and effective aid operations, the militants bolster their contention that governments perceived as corrupt, authoritarian and heavily dependent on foreign aid cannot be trusted to serve the people. Past disasters in Pakistan itself as well as in countries like Egypt, Lebanon, Indonesia and Bangladesh demonstrate that such crises provide an opportunity for militants to build political capital.
This history is repeating itself with the Pakistani floods. In areas where the Pakistani government is competing with militants for control, militant Islamist charities, some associated with groups designated by the United Nations or the United States as terrorist organizations, provided aid to thousands displaced and made homeless by the floods days before government and foreign aid started to arrive. Meanwhile, rather than staying at home to coordinate relief efforts, already unpopular President Asif Ali Zardari visited France and Britain during the floods.
Charities like Falah-e-Insaniyat (Foundation for the Welfare of Humanity), the charity arm of Lashkar-e-Taibe, widely suspected of being responsible for the Mumbai attacks in 2008, have for the second time in five years emerged as the most effective providers of relief in disaster-stricken areas of Pakistan. The charities' performance emulates their success in the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir where their immediate and efficient relief efforts served as a recruitment tool for their militant backers. The 2005 experience did not translate into votes for religious parties in Pakistan's 2008 elections, but the Islamists' latest success with the floods and widespread criticism of the government threatens to undermine popular support for the U.S.-backed government's military campaign against al-Qaida and homegrown Taliban militants in the northwest of the country.
The lesson to be learned from the floods and past disasters is that economic competition with militant Islamists is as important a component in the struggle to defeat faith-inspired political violence as is military strength and law enforcement. An examination of the world's most sustainable and lethal faith-based terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taibe, Palestine' s Hamas, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Taliban in Afghanistan, shows that economic competition may hold the key to substantially weakening, if not defeating these groups.
These groups are effective at providing such aid because they trace their origins to being faith-based service providers. Eli Berman, a former member of the Israeli military's elite Golani brigade who is now a University of California economist, calls such groups "economic clubs." Only at a later stage of their development, and sometimes only reluctantly, did they bolt a military apparatus onto their civil activity.
"The government may defeat the insurgent military cadre, but, with few exceptions, insurgencies do not end until case-specific root causes are addressed: The kind of grassroots support necessary to build and sustain an insurgency is fed on social, economic, and political discontent," concludes a recently published Rand Corporation study on how insurgencies end.
The problem for Western governments and their allies is translating from theory into practice the realization that they need to compete economically, not only militarily with militants. As is evident with the Pakistani floods, the cost-benefit analysis of that realization and the organizational implications it has for U.S. and other Western militaries has yet to sink in. Adapting the organization of armed forces so that they can effectively incorporate economic competition in their strategy is a slow process that contrasts starkly with the speed in which militants like Lashkar-e-Taibe are able to demonstrate institutional flexibility. Western military officials and U.N. and other aid workers grapple in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, with the fact that the military is structured as a fighting machine rather than a development agency and aid organizations are not geared to defending themselves -- a combination of skills and ability inherent to successful militant groups.
Yet, the sooner the United States and its allies like Pakistan are able to adapt to a comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy that involves economic competition, the sooner they will likely produce sustainable rather than immediate but perishable results and the more prepared they will be when disaster strikes next. "Concentrating on capturing or killing every last terrorist (or buying off some warlord to do so) can probably only succeed in the short run, since the underlying conditions of weak governance and/or weak service provision will likely continue to generate new terrorist clubs," Berman argues. "The challenge is then to find a way to sustainably stabilize allied governments in countries currently generating terrorism, not by merely improving their coercive capability but by also enhancing the ability of local government to provide basic services that replace those provided by clubs."
World Politics Review
Pakistan's worst flooding in almost a century may well be remembered as much for the magnitude of the disaster as for the fact that it constituted a major setback in the government's efforts -- backed by its Western and Muslim allies -- to defeat Islamist militants allied with al-Qaida and the Taliban.
There is a long list of natural and man-made disasters in Islamic countries in which militant Islamists have garnered popularity by quickly and effectively responding with relief and emergency aid, in stark contrast to governments that were slow to react and unable to provide services to victims. By launching immediate and effective aid operations, the militants bolster their contention that governments perceived as corrupt, authoritarian and heavily dependent on foreign aid cannot be trusted to serve the people. Past disasters in Pakistan itself as well as in countries like Egypt, Lebanon, Indonesia and Bangladesh demonstrate that such crises provide an opportunity for militants to build political capital.
This history is repeating itself with the Pakistani floods. In areas where the Pakistani government is competing with militants for control, militant Islamist charities, some associated with groups designated by the United Nations or the United States as terrorist organizations, provided aid to thousands displaced and made homeless by the floods days before government and foreign aid started to arrive. Meanwhile, rather than staying at home to coordinate relief efforts, already unpopular President Asif Ali Zardari visited France and Britain during the floods.
Charities like Falah-e-Insaniyat (Foundation for the Welfare of Humanity), the charity arm of Lashkar-e-Taibe, widely suspected of being responsible for the Mumbai attacks in 2008, have for the second time in five years emerged as the most effective providers of relief in disaster-stricken areas of Pakistan. The charities' performance emulates their success in the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir where their immediate and efficient relief efforts served as a recruitment tool for their militant backers. The 2005 experience did not translate into votes for religious parties in Pakistan's 2008 elections, but the Islamists' latest success with the floods and widespread criticism of the government threatens to undermine popular support for the U.S.-backed government's military campaign against al-Qaida and homegrown Taliban militants in the northwest of the country.
The lesson to be learned from the floods and past disasters is that economic competition with militant Islamists is as important a component in the struggle to defeat faith-inspired political violence as is military strength and law enforcement. An examination of the world's most sustainable and lethal faith-based terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taibe, Palestine' s Hamas, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Taliban in Afghanistan, shows that economic competition may hold the key to substantially weakening, if not defeating these groups.
These groups are effective at providing such aid because they trace their origins to being faith-based service providers. Eli Berman, a former member of the Israeli military's elite Golani brigade who is now a University of California economist, calls such groups "economic clubs." Only at a later stage of their development, and sometimes only reluctantly, did they bolt a military apparatus onto their civil activity.
"The government may defeat the insurgent military cadre, but, with few exceptions, insurgencies do not end until case-specific root causes are addressed: The kind of grassroots support necessary to build and sustain an insurgency is fed on social, economic, and political discontent," concludes a recently published Rand Corporation study on how insurgencies end.
The problem for Western governments and their allies is translating from theory into practice the realization that they need to compete economically, not only militarily with militants. As is evident with the Pakistani floods, the cost-benefit analysis of that realization and the organizational implications it has for U.S. and other Western militaries has yet to sink in. Adapting the organization of armed forces so that they can effectively incorporate economic competition in their strategy is a slow process that contrasts starkly with the speed in which militants like Lashkar-e-Taibe are able to demonstrate institutional flexibility. Western military officials and U.N. and other aid workers grapple in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, with the fact that the military is structured as a fighting machine rather than a development agency and aid organizations are not geared to defending themselves -- a combination of skills and ability inherent to successful militant groups.
Yet, the sooner the United States and its allies like Pakistan are able to adapt to a comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy that involves economic competition, the sooner they will likely produce sustainable rather than immediate but perishable results and the more prepared they will be when disaster strikes next. "Concentrating on capturing or killing every last terrorist (or buying off some warlord to do so) can probably only succeed in the short run, since the underlying conditions of weak governance and/or weak service provision will likely continue to generate new terrorist clubs," Berman argues. "The challenge is then to find a way to sustainably stabilize allied governments in countries currently generating terrorism, not by merely improving their coercive capability but by also enhancing the ability of local government to provide basic services that replace those provided by clubs."
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Soccer vs. Islam: Football and Militant Islam Compete For Hearts and Minds
By James M. Dorsey
Nowhere does football enthusiasm involve a greater act of courage and defiance than in the war-ravaged, football-mad Arab nation of Somalia. With large chunks of the country controlled by al Qaeda-linked al-Shabab jihadists, football is often a question of life or death. Players and enthusiasts risk execution, arrest and torture -- and not just in Somalia. More than 70 people in neighboring Uganda were killed earlier this month when al-Shabab suicide bombers hit popular spots where fans were watching the World Cup final between Spain and the Netherlands.
The bombings, the first major attacks by al-Shabab beyond Somalia’s borders, sought to persuade Uganda to withdraw its 3,000 troops from the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia and reconsider its plans to send reinforcements. But by targeting football, they also highlighted militant Islam’s love-hate relationship with the game -- a useful bonding and recruitment tool capable of competing with militant Islamists for hearts and minds.
Backed by radical Saudi clerics, some jihadists denounce football as a satanic game designed to take the faithful away from devotion to Islam. Somali jihadists see football as competition for recruits in the world’s foremost failed state where unemployment is rampant and youth have little to look forward to. Youngsters are rustled from the pitch and forced to join the ranks of the jihadis. Jihadists have repeatedly warned the Somali football federation to halt organization of tournaments. In the country’s only football stadium in the partly jihadi-controlled capital Mogadishu, Somalia’s national team clears the pitch of bullets and bodies before training sessions. Threats forced private broadcaster Shabelle to move its operations to Mogadishu’s African Union-protected airport from where it broadcast the World Cup opening ceremony.
In the Middle East and North Africa, a part of the world pockmarked by repressive regimes, football competes with political Islam as a venue to release frustration against authoritarian leaders. As a result, some Islamists seek to co-opt the game while others aim to suppress it. In a controversial religious ruling in 2005, militant Saudi clerics condemned football as an infidel invention and redrafted its International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) rules to differentiate the game from what they described as ‘the heretics.’ The ruling did things like ban the words “foul,” “goal,” “penalty,” and clothes like shorts and T-shirts, and ordered players to spit on anyone who scored a goal. “All fun is bootless except the playing of a man with his wife, his son and his horse,” said Sheikh Abu Ishaaq al Huweni-Huweni. “Thus, if someone sits in front of the television to watch football…he will be committing bootless fun…We have to be a serious nation, not a playing nation,” he said citing the hadith, the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, but ignoring the prophet’s endorsement of physical exercise.
The fatwa was condemned by more mainstream Saudi clerics, who recognize that Saudis are football-mad and passionate about their national team, which historically has fared well in FIFA competitions. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s religious police, afraid that believers would forget their daily prayers during the World Cup, rolled out mobile mosques on trucks and prayer mats in front of popular cafes where men gathered to watch matches. More sensitive is the issue of women’s sports, including football. With Saudi Arabia threatened with suspension by the International Olympic Committee if it does not this year create frameworks for women’s sports, debate is raging among the country’s powerful clergy and in the media. Physical education classes are banned in state-run Saudi girls schools and female athletes are not allowed to participate in the Olympics. Women's games and marathons are often canceled if the clergy gets wind of them. Clerics argue that women’s sports are corrupting and satanic and would spread decadence. Nonetheless, women have quietly been establishing their own football and other sports teams with the backing of members of the ruling Al Saud family and under the wings of hospitals or ‘health club.’
Football, despite the condemnation by militant Islam’s most radical fringe, has served Islamists well. Foreigners who fought in Afghanistan organized football matches after the Soviet withdrawal to maintain contact. The perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid subway bombings played football together and a number of Hamas’ suicide bombers trace their roots to the same football club in Hebron. “A reliable predictor of whether or not someone joins the Jihad is being a member of an action-oriented group of friends,” Scholar Scott Atran told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March. “It's surprising how many soccer buddies join together.”
Osama Bin Laden is said to enjoy playing center forward. Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh played defense for one of the Gaza’s local clubs. Haniyeh recently employed football in efforts to heal the rift between Hamas and their secular rivals in Fatah. When Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, it also took over the administration of all Gaza clubs, prompting a rupture with the West Bank-based, Fatah-dominated Palestinian Football Association (PFA) that halted association football in the strip. In a tentative step earlier this year toward Palestinian reconciliation, Hamas and Fatah agreed to jointly administer the Gaza football federation. This allowed for competitive matches in Gaza for the first time in three years. For Gazans, football matches constitute a rare opportunity in a politically restrictive society to release pent-up emotions.
Nowhere is soccer more of a political football than in relations between the Egyptian government and the Islamist opposition. Football passions exploded late last year with violent clashes between Egyptian and Algerian fans on three continents and -- for the first time since the 1969 football war between Honduras and El Salvador -- brought the world to the brink of a soccer-inspired conflict. Egypt recalled its ambassador to Algeria while Algeria slapped Egyptian-owned Orascom telecom’s Algerian operation with a tax bill for more than half a billion dollars, prompting Libyan leader Col. Moammer Gadaffi to intervene to prevent the dispute from escalating. The Egyptian government was quick to fan the flames and ride the tide of emotion in a rare opportunity to bolster its image at the expense of the Islamists. “The violence expressed years of depression of a population that constantly witnesses social, financial and political failure,” said Ahmed al-Aqabawi, a professor at Azhar University. “Soccer is their only ray of light.”
Nowhere does football enthusiasm involve a greater act of courage and defiance than in the war-ravaged, football-mad Arab nation of Somalia. With large chunks of the country controlled by al Qaeda-linked al-Shabab jihadists, football is often a question of life or death. Players and enthusiasts risk execution, arrest and torture -- and not just in Somalia. More than 70 people in neighboring Uganda were killed earlier this month when al-Shabab suicide bombers hit popular spots where fans were watching the World Cup final between Spain and the Netherlands.
The bombings, the first major attacks by al-Shabab beyond Somalia’s borders, sought to persuade Uganda to withdraw its 3,000 troops from the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia and reconsider its plans to send reinforcements. But by targeting football, they also highlighted militant Islam’s love-hate relationship with the game -- a useful bonding and recruitment tool capable of competing with militant Islamists for hearts and minds.
Backed by radical Saudi clerics, some jihadists denounce football as a satanic game designed to take the faithful away from devotion to Islam. Somali jihadists see football as competition for recruits in the world’s foremost failed state where unemployment is rampant and youth have little to look forward to. Youngsters are rustled from the pitch and forced to join the ranks of the jihadis. Jihadists have repeatedly warned the Somali football federation to halt organization of tournaments. In the country’s only football stadium in the partly jihadi-controlled capital Mogadishu, Somalia’s national team clears the pitch of bullets and bodies before training sessions. Threats forced private broadcaster Shabelle to move its operations to Mogadishu’s African Union-protected airport from where it broadcast the World Cup opening ceremony.
In the Middle East and North Africa, a part of the world pockmarked by repressive regimes, football competes with political Islam as a venue to release frustration against authoritarian leaders. As a result, some Islamists seek to co-opt the game while others aim to suppress it. In a controversial religious ruling in 2005, militant Saudi clerics condemned football as an infidel invention and redrafted its International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) rules to differentiate the game from what they described as ‘the heretics.’ The ruling did things like ban the words “foul,” “goal,” “penalty,” and clothes like shorts and T-shirts, and ordered players to spit on anyone who scored a goal. “All fun is bootless except the playing of a man with his wife, his son and his horse,” said Sheikh Abu Ishaaq al Huweni-Huweni. “Thus, if someone sits in front of the television to watch football…he will be committing bootless fun…We have to be a serious nation, not a playing nation,” he said citing the hadith, the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, but ignoring the prophet’s endorsement of physical exercise.
The fatwa was condemned by more mainstream Saudi clerics, who recognize that Saudis are football-mad and passionate about their national team, which historically has fared well in FIFA competitions. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s religious police, afraid that believers would forget their daily prayers during the World Cup, rolled out mobile mosques on trucks and prayer mats in front of popular cafes where men gathered to watch matches. More sensitive is the issue of women’s sports, including football. With Saudi Arabia threatened with suspension by the International Olympic Committee if it does not this year create frameworks for women’s sports, debate is raging among the country’s powerful clergy and in the media. Physical education classes are banned in state-run Saudi girls schools and female athletes are not allowed to participate in the Olympics. Women's games and marathons are often canceled if the clergy gets wind of them. Clerics argue that women’s sports are corrupting and satanic and would spread decadence. Nonetheless, women have quietly been establishing their own football and other sports teams with the backing of members of the ruling Al Saud family and under the wings of hospitals or ‘health club.’
Football, despite the condemnation by militant Islam’s most radical fringe, has served Islamists well. Foreigners who fought in Afghanistan organized football matches after the Soviet withdrawal to maintain contact. The perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid subway bombings played football together and a number of Hamas’ suicide bombers trace their roots to the same football club in Hebron. “A reliable predictor of whether or not someone joins the Jihad is being a member of an action-oriented group of friends,” Scholar Scott Atran told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March. “It's surprising how many soccer buddies join together.”
Osama Bin Laden is said to enjoy playing center forward. Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh played defense for one of the Gaza’s local clubs. Haniyeh recently employed football in efforts to heal the rift between Hamas and their secular rivals in Fatah. When Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, it also took over the administration of all Gaza clubs, prompting a rupture with the West Bank-based, Fatah-dominated Palestinian Football Association (PFA) that halted association football in the strip. In a tentative step earlier this year toward Palestinian reconciliation, Hamas and Fatah agreed to jointly administer the Gaza football federation. This allowed for competitive matches in Gaza for the first time in three years. For Gazans, football matches constitute a rare opportunity in a politically restrictive society to release pent-up emotions.
Nowhere is soccer more of a political football than in relations between the Egyptian government and the Islamist opposition. Football passions exploded late last year with violent clashes between Egyptian and Algerian fans on three continents and -- for the first time since the 1969 football war between Honduras and El Salvador -- brought the world to the brink of a soccer-inspired conflict. Egypt recalled its ambassador to Algeria while Algeria slapped Egyptian-owned Orascom telecom’s Algerian operation with a tax bill for more than half a billion dollars, prompting Libyan leader Col. Moammer Gadaffi to intervene to prevent the dispute from escalating. The Egyptian government was quick to fan the flames and ride the tide of emotion in a rare opportunity to bolster its image at the expense of the Islamists. “The violence expressed years of depression of a population that constantly witnesses social, financial and political failure,” said Ahmed al-Aqabawi, a professor at Azhar University. “Soccer is their only ray of light.”
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