James M. Dorsey
World Politics Review
Last week's brazen kidnapping of seven foreigners, including five Frenchmen, by al-Qaida-linked militants in a uranium mining town in Niger has increased pressure on both France and the European Union to become more militarily involved in the region's fight against jihadists. The kidnapping threatens France's major source of uranium for its nuclear power plants, calls into question the practice by some European governments of paying ransoms to free hostages, and throws down the gauntlet for the EU in its counterterrorism efforts.
In response to the abductions, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and seven of his European counterparts urged EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to increase EU engagement in security and development in the Sahel, one of the world's poorest regions, arguing that the "populations there must have . . . another perspective than that offered by terrorists." Now, France has reportedly deployed 80 troops, including anti-terror and special operations forces, as well as reconnaissance aircraft to Niamey to support efforts to locate the abductees.
France and Spain have already found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict in the Sahel due to a spate of kidnappings of their nationals by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida's northwest African affiliate that operates primarily in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.
With no claim of responsibility issued yet, it remains unclear whether the seven, who worked for both the French state-owned nuclear company Areva and a subsidiary of the French contractor Vinci, were abducted by the militants themselves or by Tuareg tribesmen cooperating with the jihadists. A Tuareg leader denied involvement despite Niger government claims that the kidnappers were heard speaking Tamachek, a Tuareg language. Kouchner said the tribesmen may have kidnapped the foreigners to sell them to AQIM.
The kidnappings are the first to strike directly at foreign economic interests. Earlier incidents targeted primarily aid workers and tourists, and were designed to fill AQIM's coffers with the proceeds of ransom payments. Avera's Niger operations produce half of the uranium used in French nuclear reactors. The company employs 2,500 people at the Cominak and Somair uranium mines, as well as at the Imouraren mine still under development. Imouaren, expected to become Africa's biggest uranium mine, will make impoverished Niger the world's second-largest uranium producer when it is brought online in 2014.
Last week's abductions threaten those ambitions. Over the weekend, Avera and Vinci began evacuating foreign nationals from Arlit, the town from which the seven were abducted while asleep in their homes, as well as from other areas threatened by AQIM and rebel tribesmen. The kidnappings also mark a milestone in AQIM operations as they are the first against a hardened target: Arlit is protected by some 350 Nigerien troops, and located in an area in which the militants had not been active. The abductions also constitute a setback for Avera's efforts to reduce widespread local resistance to its operations. Local NGOs and tribesmen accuse the company of bribing Tuareg rebels, polluting underground aquifers, aggravating a chronic water shortage, and exposing its employees to uranium contamination.
Nigerien military officials believe the seven hostages were moved to Mali, where past hostages have been held. Nigerien pilots spotted three vehicles, which they believe were transporting the hostages, moving at high speed toward the Malian border. Mauritanian forces assisted by French reconnaissance have launched an offensive in the area to clear the militants and drug dealers from what is currently a no-man's land. Algerian military officials and local sources say the Mauritanians are encountering stiff resistance from an AQIM field commander, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zaid, described as radical and inflexible.
The fate of the seven hostages is likely to depend on which of AQIM's rival commanders controls them. In July, a joint French-Mauritanian military operation -- the first against AQIM known to involve Western combat troops -- failed to liberate 78-year-old French hostage Michel Germaneau, who was subsequently killed by the militants. Malian negotiators say the hostages are at greater risk if Abu Zaid, who is believed to be responsible for Germaneau's death as well as for last year's killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer, gains control of them. By contrast, AQIM's leader in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has emerged in past negotiations as a less dogmatic dealmaker, willing to free hostages in return for a ransom and the release of jailed militants.
AQIM released two Spanish hostages shortly after July's failed military operation in a prisoner exchange with Mauritania that is believed to have also involved a payment of $5 million in ransom to the militants. In a statement, the jihadists said the release of the Spaniards demonstrated that they were still open for business. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel suggested that the group would test whether the killing of Germeneau in retaliation for the July raid had caused France to reconsider its approach.
Earlier this year, France had acquiesced to the release of French hostage Pierre Camette in exchange for the liberation of jailed militants in Mali. In the aftermath of the July raid, Droudkel warned that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had opened "the gates of hell on himself, his people and his nation." In response, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared his country at war with AQIM, and the French Foreign Ministry said that France's military forces were "fully mobilized" to counter "threats uttered by assassins."
Last week's abductions could escalate French and EU involvement in what is increasingly becoming not just an African but also a European problem. They are also likely to strengthen opposition to the paying of ransoms, which serve to embolden the militants while ensuring that they are able to fund further operations.
A 2008 French defense white paper (.pdf) identified the mineral- and oil-rich Sahel as one of four regions crucial to French national security. At the same time, the document and subsequent French defense planning called for reducing the number of France's African bases from four to three. Speaking after the abductions, Sarkozy warned that "the Sahel zone is extremely dangerous. . . . [This] shows that we must redouble vigilance." The recent developments could also lead France to redouble -- or at least maintain -- its presence there, too.
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Balkans Become Breeding Ground For Militant Islam
Southeastern Europe is emerging as the latest breeding ground for homegrown Islamist militants in the West as a result of missionary work by Saudi-inspired Wahhabis, followers of the strict, puritan interpretation of Islam adopted by oil-rich Saudi Arabia and violently promoted by Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and jihadists in Somalia.
Muslim charities, many of them with Saudi funding or Wahhabist leanings, have been active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and EU member Bulgaria since the wars in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. A recent music online video featuring a group of Macedonians praising Bin Laden in Albanian has focused attention on what Muslim authorities in the region and intelligence agencies say is an alarming trend that threatens not only fragile stability in the region but could produce a pool of terrorists with easy access to the rest of Europe. Similar songs have also emerged in Bosnian.
Beyond building a large number of mosques across southeastern Europe, Wahhabis have also founded a string of schools that lie beyond the control of local authorities. Concern about the rise of militant Islam in southeastern Europe also focuses attention on the broader impact of Saudi-funded Wahhabi missionary work. While Saudi King Abdullah has been seeking to gradually reform Wahhabi practice in the kingdom, militants often exploit its ascetic version of Islam to create a feeding ground for radical Islam.
Analysts say unregulated Wahhabi schools in Bulgaria have produced some 3,000 graduates in the last 20 years. The threat posed by the Wahhabis has become a major bone of contention in the tense relations between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, which so far has been successful in neutralizing Wahhabi influence by controlling the appointment of imams in mosques and teachers at Islamic educational institutions.
A Serbian court last year sentenced 12 militants from the tense region of Sandzak to prison for planning terrorist attacks, including an attack on the US embassy in Belgrade. Moderates and Wahhabis are battling for control of Macedonia’s Islamic Religious Community, one of the country’s major Islamic organizations.
Muslim charities, many of them with Saudi funding or Wahhabist leanings, have been active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and EU member Bulgaria since the wars in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. A recent music online video featuring a group of Macedonians praising Bin Laden in Albanian has focused attention on what Muslim authorities in the region and intelligence agencies say is an alarming trend that threatens not only fragile stability in the region but could produce a pool of terrorists with easy access to the rest of Europe. Similar songs have also emerged in Bosnian.
Beyond building a large number of mosques across southeastern Europe, Wahhabis have also founded a string of schools that lie beyond the control of local authorities. Concern about the rise of militant Islam in southeastern Europe also focuses attention on the broader impact of Saudi-funded Wahhabi missionary work. While Saudi King Abdullah has been seeking to gradually reform Wahhabi practice in the kingdom, militants often exploit its ascetic version of Islam to create a feeding ground for radical Islam.
Analysts say unregulated Wahhabi schools in Bulgaria have produced some 3,000 graduates in the last 20 years. The threat posed by the Wahhabis has become a major bone of contention in the tense relations between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, which so far has been successful in neutralizing Wahhabi influence by controlling the appointment of imams in mosques and teachers at Islamic educational institutions.
A Serbian court last year sentenced 12 militants from the tense region of Sandzak to prison for planning terrorist attacks, including an attack on the US embassy in Belgrade. Moderates and Wahhabis are battling for control of Macedonia’s Islamic Religious Community, one of the country’s major Islamic organizations.
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Donors To Establish Development Fund For Yemen in Fight Against Al Qaeda
In the clearest recognition yet that Islamist militants in Yemen cannot be defeated by military means alone, the United States and its allies are set to create an international fund for development of the impoverished, conflict-ridden Arab nation. Donor countries, including the US, Britain, France and the Gulf states, are expected to launch the fund at a meeting in New York on September 24.
The fund comes as the US military is seeking $1.2 billion to strengthen Yemeni security forces over a five-year period. State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin said earlier this month that the US sees the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Gulf, as a priority. The US has this year allocated $300 million to Yemen, half of which, according to Benjamin, targets the “incubators for extremism” – poverty, weak governance and corruption.
The donors are also expected to discuss ways to stimulate a national dialogue between Yemen’s political forces in a bid to reduce nepotism, make its political system more inclusive, resolve an intermittent insurgency in the north and a growing separatist movement in the south and stem AQAP’s increasing strength.
To a large extent, change in Yemen will however depend on a change in Saudi policy towards Yemen. In many ways, Saudi Arabia, like the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih itself, is as much part of the solution as it is part of the solution. The Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which groups the region’s six oil-rich states has already taken steps to build closer ties with Yemen. The GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, could ease Yemen’s economic pain by agreeing on the free movement of labor in the region. This would reduce unemployment, increase the flow of remittances and stem illegal border crossings.
To counter the inward looking, xenophobic, conservative environment on which AQAP feeds, Saudi Arabia will however also have to strengthen the Yemeni government by halting the buying of tribal fealty at the expense of the government and controlling Saudi-funded missionary work that has significantly increased the influence of a militant, ascetic interpretation of Islam among Yemenis as well as among the large number of Somali refugees in the country.
The fund comes as the US military is seeking $1.2 billion to strengthen Yemeni security forces over a five-year period. State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin said earlier this month that the US sees the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Gulf, as a priority. The US has this year allocated $300 million to Yemen, half of which, according to Benjamin, targets the “incubators for extremism” – poverty, weak governance and corruption.
The donors are also expected to discuss ways to stimulate a national dialogue between Yemen’s political forces in a bid to reduce nepotism, make its political system more inclusive, resolve an intermittent insurgency in the north and a growing separatist movement in the south and stem AQAP’s increasing strength.
To a large extent, change in Yemen will however depend on a change in Saudi policy towards Yemen. In many ways, Saudi Arabia, like the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih itself, is as much part of the solution as it is part of the solution. The Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which groups the region’s six oil-rich states has already taken steps to build closer ties with Yemen. The GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, could ease Yemen’s economic pain by agreeing on the free movement of labor in the region. This would reduce unemployment, increase the flow of remittances and stem illegal border crossings.
To counter the inward looking, xenophobic, conservative environment on which AQAP feeds, Saudi Arabia will however also have to strengthen the Yemeni government by halting the buying of tribal fealty at the expense of the government and controlling Saudi-funded missionary work that has significantly increased the influence of a militant, ascetic interpretation of Islam among Yemenis as well as among the large number of Somali refugees in the country.
Whither Turkey?
In the discussion Whither Turkey? much is made of Turkey’s move east as opposed to its continued integration into the West through EU membership. The notion that Turkey is turning East at the expense of the West disregards a host of factors.
Turkey’s expanding influence in the Middle East and the broader Islamic world enhances rather than weakens its interest in EU membership. Turkey has always and still positions itself as a bridge between East and West. Turkey also sees itself as a model for the Islamic world. Those positions would be strengthened by EU membership giving Turkey a much firmer foot in both worlds and highlighting its role as a bridge and a successful model.
Beyond the fact that the EU remains Turkey’s largest trading partner and the fact that Turkey has a large ethnic community in Europe, Turkish business has quietly made major acquisitions in Europe and are in sectors like electronics leading original equipment manufacturers (OEM) for the European market.
Moreover, this weekend’s referendum may increase self-confidence among Turkey’s governing Islamist elite, but secularists and Islamists alike have always seen EU membership as the ultimate guarantor of their worldviews: secularists believe it will ensure continued separation of state and mosque, Islamists see the EU as the road towards greater freedom of religion.
Constitutional change in Turkey does not replace the EU’s guarantor role; it may well however toughen the negotiating stance of a more self-confident Turkish government on the back of a significant victory in rolling back the influence of the military. Ultimately, the expanded focus of Turkish foreign policy reflects a greater reality in Turkey’s neck of the woods: states no longer neatly fit into pro- and anti-Western boxes but pursue policies, some of which are in line with US and European policies and some that are not.
It’s a reality the United States and the European Union needed to adjust to; recognizing that Turkey remains staunchly embedded in the West with its NATO and Council of Europe membership and EU membership applications would be an important step towards that adjustment.
Turkey’s expanding influence in the Middle East and the broader Islamic world enhances rather than weakens its interest in EU membership. Turkey has always and still positions itself as a bridge between East and West. Turkey also sees itself as a model for the Islamic world. Those positions would be strengthened by EU membership giving Turkey a much firmer foot in both worlds and highlighting its role as a bridge and a successful model.
Beyond the fact that the EU remains Turkey’s largest trading partner and the fact that Turkey has a large ethnic community in Europe, Turkish business has quietly made major acquisitions in Europe and are in sectors like electronics leading original equipment manufacturers (OEM) for the European market.
Moreover, this weekend’s referendum may increase self-confidence among Turkey’s governing Islamist elite, but secularists and Islamists alike have always seen EU membership as the ultimate guarantor of their worldviews: secularists believe it will ensure continued separation of state and mosque, Islamists see the EU as the road towards greater freedom of religion.
Constitutional change in Turkey does not replace the EU’s guarantor role; it may well however toughen the negotiating stance of a more self-confident Turkish government on the back of a significant victory in rolling back the influence of the military. Ultimately, the expanded focus of Turkish foreign policy reflects a greater reality in Turkey’s neck of the woods: states no longer neatly fit into pro- and anti-Western boxes but pursue policies, some of which are in line with US and European policies and some that are not.
It’s a reality the United States and the European Union needed to adjust to; recognizing that Turkey remains staunchly embedded in the West with its NATO and Council of Europe membership and EU membership applications would be an important step towards that adjustment.
Labels:
EU,
Islam,
Middle East,
Turkey,
United States
Monday, September 13, 2010
U.S. Lawsuit Tarnishes UAE Anti-Corruption Drive
By James M. Dorsey
JustAnti-Corruption
The United Arab Emirates finds itself battling to hold on to its image as well as its role as a big player on the world economic stage.
Read further at JustAnti-Corruption
JustAnti-Corruption
The United Arab Emirates finds itself battling to hold on to its image as well as its role as a big player on the world economic stage.
Read further at JustAnti-Corruption
Labels:
Abu Dhabi,
Corruption,
UAE
Russians Invoke Kazakhstan’s OSCE Chairmanship in Dispute Over Gold Company
By James M. Dorsey
JustAnti-Corruption
The Russians who now control Kazakhgold Group Ltd. are invoking Kazakhstan’s controversial chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as pressure in the dispute. The prize is the gold company’s London Stock Exchange listing.
Read further at JustAnti-Corruption
JustAnti-Corruption
The Russians who now control Kazakhgold Group Ltd. are invoking Kazakhstan’s controversial chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as pressure in the dispute. The prize is the gold company’s London Stock Exchange listing.
Read further at JustAnti-Corruption
Labels:
Corruption,
Kazakhstan
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Spanish Authorities Seek U.S. Help In Political Corruption Probe
By James M. Dorsey
MainJustice / JustAnti-Corruption
Just Anti-Corruption reviewed a diagram in the hands of Spanish police mapping 12 Florida-registered companies that are linked to the corruption scandal engulfing the conservative opposition party. The Florida companies are owned by British Virgin Island shells
Read further at MainJustice / JustAnti-Corruption
MainJustice / JustAnti-Corruption
Just Anti-Corruption reviewed a diagram in the hands of Spanish police mapping 12 Florida-registered companies that are linked to the corruption scandal engulfing the conservative opposition party. The Florida companies are owned by British Virgin Island shells
Read further at MainJustice / JustAnti-Corruption
Labels:
Corruption,
Spain,
United States
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)